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Vanishing Water 
Landscapes in 
the Middle East
The Jordan River has been reduced to 2% of its historic size and is heavily polluted. 
Across Syria, rivers are shrinking, springs have dried up and the desert is spread-
ing. The water crisis in the Middle East, the most water-scarce region in the world, is 
rapidly worsening, yet decision makers appear unwilling to acknowledge its severity 
and water remains low on the political agenda. How can this gap between the reality 
of growing scarcity on the ground and the continued illusion of plenty be explained? 
 
This is one of the key questions Francesca de Châtel explores in Vanishing Water 
Landscapes in the Middle East, a study that combines extensive research on the 
ground in pre-conflict Syria and across the region with historic data to show how high 
population growth, overambitious agricultural development projects and uncontrolled 
water use over the last 60 years have irreversibly disrupted the Middle East’s fragile 
ecological balance.
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InTroDuCTIon
This	PhD	dissertation	is	the	result	of	14	years	of	fascination	with	the	Middle	East	and	North	
Africa	(MENA)	region1 and	its	water	resources	(Fig.	1).	During	this	period,	I	travelled	widely	
from	Iran	to	Morocco	and	from	Turkey	to	Sudan,	and	lived	in	the	Syrian	capital	Damascus	
from	2006	until	2010.	I	worked	as	a	journalist,	writer	and	editor,	but	also	researched	and	
wrote	a	non-fiction	book	about	the	history,	culture	and	politics	of	water	in	the	MENA	(de	
Châtel	2007).	The	chapters	in	this	cumulative	PhD	dissertation	reflect	this	trajectory,	with	
three	chapters	dedicated	 to	different	aspects	of	water	management	 in	Syria	and	 three	
chapters	covering	a	broader	geographical	scope	in	the	MENA.	All	chapters	are	based	on	
empirical	 and	 qualitative	 research	 and	 fieldwork	 carried	 out	 in	 the	MENA	 region	 since	
2001.	All	chapters	have	been	published	separately	in	academic	journals	and	publications	
between	2007	and	2014.	
BaCkgrounD 
My	first	foray	into	Middle	Eastern	water	issues	was	in	2001,	when	I	travelled	from	Granada	
to	 Istanbul	 through	North	Africa	and	 the	Middle	East	on	a	nine-month	 “Water	 Journey”	
in search of the meaning of water in the most water-scarce region in the world. I had 
prepared the trip with extensive reading about water, losing myself in libraries, weaving 
my	way	between	narrow	isles	of	books,	and	searching	the	catalogues	for	“water”,	“water	+	
Middle	East”	and	“water	+	desert”.	I	read	voraciously,	anything	I	could	get	my	hands	on,	from	
travel	journals	written	by	intrepid	19th-century desert explorers, to semantic discussions of 
the	symbolic	value	of	water	in	the	Koran	and	countless	theoretical	books	on	the	“Middle	
East	water	question”.	These	were	written	by	political	scientists,	economists,	geographers	
and engineers, for whom water was an economic resource, a commodity to be traded, 
1	Various	definitions	of	the	MENA	region	exist.	Unless	otherwise	specified,	regional	figures	quoted	
in	this	chapter	are	based	on	World	Bank	(2007),	which	defines	the	region	to	include	Algeria,	Bahrain,	
Djibouti,	Egypt,	Iran,	Iraq,	Israel,	Jordan,	Kuwait,	Lebanon,	Libya,	Malta,	Morocco,	Oman,	Qatar,	Saudi	
Arabia,	Syria,	Tunisia,	the	United	Arab	Emirates,	West	Bank	and	Gaza,	and	Yemen.	My	research	since	
2001	has	included	fieldwork	in	Egypt,	Israel,	 Iraq,	Jordan,	Lebanon,	Libya,	Morocco,	Palestine,	Syria,	
Tunisia	and	Turkey,	with	a	focus	on	Syria,	Palestine,	Israel	and	Jordan.
14
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the	“blue	gold”	that	would	soon	replace	the	black	gold,	oil,	as	a	strategic	resource.	It	was	a	
political weapon to be wielded against, withheld from, or sold to, neighbouring countries. 
Water would be the cause of the wars of the 21st	 century,	 some	authors	affirmed	with	
candid authority; others refuted these theories and said that, on the contrary, water 
scarcity would lead to peace and collaboration between nations. 
Figure 1. The	Middle	East	and	North	Africa.	Source:	Michael	Durran.
Here	I	was	in	the	realm	facts	and	figures	and	clearly	delineated	problems	that	were	
sliced into chapters and handed to the reader in clear analytical order. It was reassuring 
to	read	books	like	this,	but	as	soon	as	I	had	left	the	ordered	discipline	of	the	library	behind	
me,	the	neat	hierarchy	collapsed,	as	I	had	known	it	would.	From	a	distance	it	was	easy	to	
label	and	classify,	decanting	the	torrent	of	ideas,	thoughts	and	images	into	separate	jugs.	
Once	I	stepped	into	reality,	and	found	myself	in	the	valleys	of	the	High	Atlas	in	Morocco,	the	
Western	Desert	of	Sudan,	or	the	dying	Ghuta	Oasis	around	the	Syrian	capital	Damascus,	
seeing	 the	 land	and	the	water	and	speaking	 to	 the	people	who	used	 it,	 it	all	became	a	
tangled, rushing stream of meanings, values and perceptions with currents and counter-
currents whirling through my mind. 
Water	 is	 an	 elusive	 subject,	 ungraspable	 and	 fleeting;	 its	 significance,	 usages	 and	
values so layered and manifold that it is impossible to distil a single meaning. It plays a 
Introduction
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central	 role	 in	 the	 region’s	 three	main	 religions:	 the	Bible	and	 the	Koran	are	filled	with	
metaphors	of	water	as	a	source	of	life,	fertility	and	prosperity.	Yet	as	soon	as	one	looks	
at	how	this	is	reflected	in	everyday	practice	in	this	region	where	religion	continues	to	play	
a	defining	socio-cultural	and	political	role,	one	notices	that	water	is	wasted,	polluted	and	
undervalued. How can this disconnect be explained? 
Before	 setting	 off,	 I	 had	 expected	 the	 beliefs,	 attitudes	 and	 traditions	 surrounding	
water	to	reflect	water’s	natural	scarcity	 in	the	Middle	East	and	to	be	very	different	from	
perceptions	of	water	in	the	wet	Dutch	climate	I	had	grown	up	in.	I	imagined	people	had	
more respect for the resource, used it more sparingly and valued its presence more highly 
than we did. Yet in most places I found water was an unquestioned resource that was 
taken	 for	 granted	 like	 the	 air	 people	breathed.	 In	 the	 eyes	of	many,	water	was	 still	 an	
abundant resource. And in places where scarcity was a daily reality, few felt any sense 
of responsibility to resolve the problem. As I travelled through the region, I became 
increasingly aware of the gap between individual perceptions of water and the reality of 
growing	scarcity.	But	I	also	found	that	these	perceptions	and	individual	realities	are	just	
as important as the physical reality of growing scarcity because the facts of hydrology, 
demography	and	meteorology	are	often	only	known	and	 fully	understood	by	scientists,	
whereas local realities and perceptions determine the behaviour of water users from the 
Moroccan	Sahara	to	Tel	Aviv.	As	the	articles	in	this	thesis	show,	much	of	my	subsequent	
research	has	continued	 to	 focus	on	 these	discrepancies	and	different	perceptions	and	
narratives	of	water	and	scarcity	in	the	MENA	region.	
My	initial	choice	to	explore	water	in	the	MENA	was	partly	motivated	by	the	fact	that	the	
region is today the most water-scarce region with one of the highest population growth 
rates in the world. However, it was also grounded in a desire to gain a better understanding 
of the region’s history and culture in general. For beyond its role as a natural resource in the 
ecosystem,	the	way	water	is	used	and	perceived	also	reflects	a	society’s	cultural,	religious,	
economic	and	political	values.	As	Tvedt	and	Oestigaard	(2006:	ix-xxii)	have	argued:
A	knowledge	of	how	people	have	conceived	water	 throughout	history	helps	us	
to understand the impact of human activity on the worlds of water and, indeed, 
to	comprehend	how	water	has	influenced	human	activity.	The	fundamental	and	
dual character of water being both culture and nature, and being both essential 
to	life	yet	also	a	taker	of	life	through	water-borne	disease	and	flooding,	meant	that	
people	in	all	societies	attached	a	significance	and	a	complex	web	of	meaning	to	
water that is unmatched by any other element of nature. From everyday activities 
to religious ceremonies and festivals all over the world, water has always been 
interwoven	in	social	interaction	(Ibid.:		xviii).
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HISTorICaL anD gEograPHICaL ConTExT
Water history in the MEna region
Since	 ancient	 times,	 the	MENA	 region	 has	 been	 exposed	 to	water	 scarcity,	 aridity	 and	
high climatic variability. Through history, the region’s populations adapted to these harsh 
conditions, developing sophisticated water collection, storage and supply systems. The 
world’s	first	irrigation	systems	were	developed	in	the	region,	in	the	alluvial	plain	between	
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Here the Sumerians managed to control the unruly waters 
of	the	Twin	Rivers	from	the	fifth	millennium	BC	onwards,	diverting	water	into	canals	and	
leading	 it	 to	 the	fields	where	they	cultivated	a	mixture	of	grain,	 forage	and	date	palms.	
From the third millennium BC onwards, the Ancient Egyptians also harnessed the water 
of	the	Nile	(Fig.	2),	constructing	irrigation	channels	and	irrigating	the	surrounding	desert	
land.	Later	in	the	first	millennium	BC,	the	Persians	developed	the	qanat	system,	a	network	
of tunnels and wells that tap a subterranean source and lead water down a slow gradient 
to	communities	and	crops.	Over	the	centuries,	this	technology	spread	through	the	Middle	
East,	North	Africa	and	beyond	to	Kyrgyzstan,	China,	Japan,	Spain	and	Mexico.	While	many	
have dried up or been abandoned, qanats are	still	in	use	today	across	the	MENA	region.	The	
qanat technology remains one of the most sustainable methods of exploiting groundwater 
as	it	relies	entirely	on	gravity	(de	Châtel	2007a;	Balali	et	al.	2012).	
Besides the need for these advanced technologies of water collection and supply, the 
precious	nature	of	water	in	the	MENA	region	made	careful	management	and	distribution	
in the community essential. This led to the development of complex and detailed water 
management	systems	and	 legal	 frameworks,	which	were	most	often	administered	on	a	
local level. These customary laws, which had evolved through the pre-Roman, Roman 
and Byzantine eras, were later integrated into the sharia, the body of Islamic law, and the 
Ottoman	legal	system.	According	to	the	sharia,	water	–	together	with	grass	as	pasture	for	
animals	and	fire	–	is	one	of	the	three	things	to	which	every	Muslim	has	an	inalienable	right.	
Water	also	plays	an	important	role	in	Judaism	and	Christianity.	It	is	the	primeval	element	
from	which	God	created	life,	and	it	plays	an	important	role	in	ritual	ablutions,	purification	
and	baptism.	Thus	for	centuries,	communities	from	the	Moroccan	Sahara	to	the	Nile	Valley	
and	 from	 the	Damascus	Ghuta	Oasis	 to	 the	Mesopotamian	plains	on	 the	banks	of	 the	
Euphrates	and	Tigris	Rivers	in	Iraq	developed	their	own	water	civilisations.	On	a	practical	
level,	they	adapted	to	the	arid	conditions,	erratic	rainfall	patterns,	droughts	and	floods	by	
developing elaborate water management systems and technologies. But the local water 
conditions	also	reflected	on	culture	and	society,	influencing	urban	design,	architecture,	art,	
religious scripture and practice, and social structures. 
Introduction
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Demographic, technological and political changes in the 20th century
Over	the	last	century,	profound	demographic,	technological	and	political	changes	in	the	
region	have	disrupted	the	fragile	ecological	balance	that	was	kept	in	place	for	millennia.	
Today,	 the	 MENA	 is	 the	 most	 water-scarce	 region	 in	 the	 world.2 Regional per capita 
availability	of	renewable	water	resources	has	dropped	from	around	4,000	m3 per year in 
1950 to 1,100 m3	per	year	in	2007.	Projections	suggest	this	figure	will	be	further	reduced	
to an annual 550 m3	by	2050.	These	figures	compare	to	the	current	global	average	of	8,900	
m3 per person per year and an estimated 6,000 m3	per	person	per	year	in	2050	(World	
2 	The	 literature	generally	applies	a	number	of	 thresholds	to	define	water	availability.	They	 include	
water	security	(>1,700	m3	per	capita	per	year	of	renewable	water),	water	stress	(<1,700	m3 per capita 
per	year),	water	scarcity	(<1,000	m3 per	capita	per	year)	and	absolute	scarcity	(<500	m3 per capita per 
year).	However,	such	definitions	also	have	their	 limitations,	as	 they	do	not	 take	 into	account	 trade	
in	agricultural	products,	efficiency	of	water	use	in	agriculture,	and	other	variables	such	as	the	social	
ability	to	adapt	to	water-scarce	conditions	(World	Bank	2007).	They	also	conceal	local	inequalities	in	
water availability within countries. 
Figure 2. The	main	rivers	in	the	MENA	region:	the	Nile,	Jordan,	Euphrates	and	Tigris.	Source:	Michael	
Durran.	
18
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Bank	2007).	Rapid	population	growth	throughout	the	region,	technological	advances	and	
the	intensification	and	expansion	of	agriculture	have	resulted	in	an	exponential	increase	
in water demand, while over-exploitation of both surface and groundwater resources, 
pollution and climatic changes have caused sharp deterioration in freshwater supplies. 
Furthermore,	uncontrolled	urbanization,	desertification	and	deforestation	have	destroyed	
water landscapes throughout the region. 
The	MENA	region’s	population	has	increased	from	82.2	million	in	1950	to	384.1	million	
in	2010.	Projections	show	this	number	will	further	increase	to	524	million	by	2030	(Ibid.).	
The	political	make-up	of	the	region	also	changed	dramatically	over	the	20th century with the 
collapse	of	the	Ottoman	Empire,	the	creation	of	the	state	of	Israel,	the	end	of	colonial	rule	
and the creation of new nation states across the region. From the 1950s onwards, these 
newly	independent	states	embarked	on	ambitious	national	water	development	schemes	
aimed	at	increasing	supply	and	expanding	irrigated	areas.	In	the	process,	the	MENA	region	
fully	embraced	the	“hydraulic	mission”,	extolling	new	technical	achievements	such	as	high	
dams,	hydropower	and	well-drilling,	and	inspired	by	projects	in	the	United	States	and	the	
Soviet	Union	to	tame	nature	and	make	deserts	bloom.	Thus	“hydraulic	bureaucracies	were	
created	to	take	up	the	challenges	of	flood	protection,	hydropower	generation	and	large-
scale public irrigation. These bureaucracies had their secular priesthoods, acting in the 
name of the common good and in tandem with politicians and national leaders. Not a 
single	drop	of	water	should	reach	the	sea	without	being	put	to	work	for	the	benefit	of	Man”	
(Molle	et	al.	2009:	332).	
In the following decades, infrastructural developments such as dams, barrages 
and diversion canals, but also the introduction of motor pumps to extract groundwater 
profoundly	altered	the	flow	regime	of	rivers	and	reduced	groundwater	levels	throughout	
the	region.	Today,	 the	MENA	region’s	 rivers	are	 the	most	heavily	dammed	 in	 the	world	
in	relation	to	 fresh	water	available	 (World	Bank	2007)	and	their	discharge	has	dropped	
dramatically.	Thus	the	Jordan	River	has	been	reduced	to	2%	of	its	historic	flow,	with	dams,	
diversion	canals	and	 large-scale	 irrigation	projects	on	 the	 river	 itself,	 its	 tributaries	and	
headwaters. Water quality has sharply deteriorated, with raw sewage and agricultural run-
off	polluting	the	remaining	water	(FoEME	2010).	Turkey’s	partially	completed	Southeastern	
Anatolia	Project	(GAP),	which	foresees	in	the	construction	of	22	dams	and	19	hydroelectric	
power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, has had a far-reaching impact on water 
quantity	and	quality	in	both	rivers.	According	to	estimates,	upon	completion	the	project	
will	consume	more	than	50%	of	the	Euphrates	and	about	14%	of	the	Tigris	(UN-ESCWA	
and	BGR	2013:	64).	Additional	large-scale	water	infrastructure	and	irrigation	projects	on	
the	Euphrates	and	Tigris	in	Syria	and	Iraq	have	further	diminished	the	rivers’	stream	flow	
and water quality. 
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Throughout	the	MENA	region,	groundwater	reserves	have	also	been	severely	reduced	
following the introduction of low-cost drilling technologies and motor pumps in the 1960s. 
A	2013	report	on	the	depletion	of	global	groundwater	reserves	found	that	parts	of	Turkey,	
Syria,	Iraq	and	Iran	in	the	Euphrates	and	Tigris	River	basins	had	lost	144	billion	cubic	metres	
(BCM)	of	total	stored	fresh	water	in	the	period	between	2003	and	2010.	Nearly	two	thirds	
of	this	water	(90	BCM)	was	lost	as	a	result	of	groundwater	over-exploitation	(NASA	2013).	In	
the	same	region,	one	of	the	largest	karst	springs	in	the	world	on	the	Syrian-Turkish	border,	
the Ras al-Ain Spring, has dried out completely since 2001 as a result of over-pumping 
from	6,000	wells	that	have	been	drilled	in	Syria	and	Turkey	in	recent	decades	(UN-ESCWA	
and	BGR	2013).	
The	long-term	over-exploitation	of	surface	and	groundwater	resources	in	the	MENA	
region	was	partly	spurred	by	a	desire	for	national	food	self-sufficiency,	which	was	driven	by	
ongoing	regional	instability	and	conflict	since	the	1940s.	This	led	to	the	implementation	of	
policies that were economically and environmentally unsustainable, such as Saudi Arabia’s 
decision to use non-renewable water resources to produce - and until recently export - 
wheat	in	the	desert	(World	Bank	2007).	However,	national	water	mega-projects	from	the	
Aswan	High	Dam	 in	 Egypt	 to	 Libya’s	Great	Manmade	River	 and	 Israel’s	National	Water	
Carrier also form powerful political symbols, as the material expression of the capacity of a 
state,	ideology	or	individual	ruler	to	control	nature	and	make	the	desert	bloom.	
The	desire	for	food	self-sufficiency	also	drove	the	investment	of	massive	financial	and	
natural	resources	into	the	agricultural	sector.	Despite	growing	water	scarcity,	agriculture	
still	consumes	more	than	85%	of	water	resources	in	the	MENA	region	today.	Water	use	
is,	however,	often	inefficient	and	efforts	to	increase	efficiency	and	boost	productivity	have	
had limited success. A phenomenal amount of water is still wasted in the agricultural sector 
due to the cultivation of low-value crops, wasteful irrigation practices, continued price 
supports for staple crops, subsidies for water and energy, and rigidities in land, real estate 
and	financial	markets.	The	continued	support	for	the	agricultural	sector	throughout	the	
MENA	region	and	failure	to	implement	any	far-reaching	change	in	water	and	agricultural	
policies appears contradictory, particularly given the continuously decreasing share of 
agriculture	in	the	region’s	economy.	As	Selby	(2005)	has	shown,	agriculture’s	contribution	
to	Gross	Domestic	Product,	foreign	earnings	and	employment	across	the	Middle	East	is	
rapidly	waning.	Yet	at	the	same	time,	“the	significance	attached	to	water,	at	least	in	political	
rhetoric,	often	continues	to	outlive	its	dwindling	economic	value”	(Selby	2005:	337).	This	
apparent	 contradiction	 –	 between	 the	 low	 macro-economic	 value	 of	 agriculture	 and	
continued	government	support	for	the	sector	–	indicates	the	complex	and	layered	role	of	
water	in	MENA	societies	and	its	non-economic	values.	
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Water problems are not water problems alone, but are in a large measure 
products	 of	 relative	 ability	 or	 inability	 of	 different	 states	 and	 societies	 to	
address their economic and social problems, water problems included. And it 
is	this	differential	capacity	of	different	societies	to	control	and	produce	water	in	
accordance with social needs […] that one must above all concentrate on, if one 
wants	to	understand	the	roots	of	water	crisis	(Selby	2005:	333).
Public perceptions of water and scarcity
Despite	the	drastic	transformation	of	landscapes	and	the	sharp	drop	in	renewable	water	
resources throughout the region over the last century, public awareness of the mounting 
regional water crisis remains low. Traditional representations, images and ideals of water 
and local water landscapes often no longer correspond to the reality on the ground, 
yet	due	to	their	enduring	strength	they	still	overshadow	the	 increasingly	bleak	and	arid	
reality. There are several reasons for this disconnect between public perceptions of water 
availability	and	the	reality	of	growing	scarcity.	My	conversation	with	a	Damascene	family	in	
2006 aptly illustrates some aspects of this disconnect. 
Damascus	 was	 historically	 famed	 for	 its	 abundant	 freshwater	 resources,	 but	 had	
been	 struggling	 with	 a	 worsening	 water	 crisis	 since	 the	 1990s	 (see	 Chap.	 1).	 In	 2001,	
the	Damascus	Basin	had	a	water	deficit	 of	more	 than	300	million	 cubic	metres	 (MCM)	
(Sagardoy	 et	 al.	 2001).	 The	 combination	 of	 rapid	 population	 growth	 since	 the	 1950s,	
uncontrolled	 urbanization	 and	 ongoing	 government	 support	 for	 inefficient	 agricultural	
practices in this arid region led to a rapid drop in groundwater levels; the drying up of the 
city’s main river, the Barada; widespread pollution of surface and groundwater sources; 
and	the	destruction	of	gardens	and	orchards	in	the	surrounding	Ghuta	Oasis.	Yet	most	
inhabitants	of	central	Damascus,	a	city	of	around	6	million	inhabitants	on	the	edge	of	the	
Syrian	Desert,	were	unaware	of	any	water	shortage.	Thus	when	I	mentioned	to	a	working-
class	mother	and	her	four	adult	children	that	I	had	written	a	book	on	water	in	the	Middle	
East,	they	looked	at	me	uncomprehendingly.	“What	about	water?”	I	explained	that	it	looked	
at various aspects of water scarcity in the region, and they all smiled as the mother said: 
“Oh	well	it’s	not	about	Syria	in	that	case.”	
This	 lack	 of	 awareness	 can	 be	 explained	 through	 the	 different	 layers	 of	 cultural-
religious, political and technological narratives that still succeed in concealing the growing 
local	scarcity	in	urban	environments.	Even	though	the	water	supply	in	central	Damascus	
was	cut	between	four	and	10	hours	a	day,	all	households	had	reserve	water	tanks,	which	
provided water when the central supply was cut. Thus technology ensured the scarcity was 
concealed on a practical level. Water was also heavily subsidized and domestic water bills 
were	low.	There	was	therefore	little	incentive	to	conserve	water	or	even	reflect	on	water-
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saving	practices.	In	addition,	while	the	government	narrative	acknowledged	the	threat	of	
growing	shortages	in	the	Damascus	area,	there	was	little	questioning	of	the	deeper	causes	
of	the	growing	scarcity	and	no	serious	effort	to	resolve	the	rapidly	worsening	crisis.	Thus	
while	Damascenes	saw	the	Barada	being	reduced	from	a	broad	fast-flowing	river	to	a	slimy	
trickle	of	sewage	water	in	the	space	of	barely	20	years,	Damascus	remained	in	the	minds	
of	many	the	city	described	by	medieval	writers	as	the	“Paradise	of	the	Orient…	bedecked	
in	the	brocaded	vestments	of	gardens”	(Broadhurst	1952:	271-272).	
METHoDoLogy anD SourCES
As explained at the beginning of this introductory chapter, my initial approach to the 
question	of	water	and	scarcity	in	the	MENA	region	was	empirical,	with	a	strong	emphasis	on	
fieldwork	and	interviews.	I	wanted	to	understand	local	attitudes	towards	and	perceptions	
of the resource in this arid region and place them in their socio-cultural and historical 
context.	This	approach	was	perhaps	a	little	unorthodox,	as	I	set	out	with	limited	knowledge	
of	the	science	of	water	and	sought	to	first	understand	the	resource	in	a	cultural-historical	
/	human	(and	therefore	strongly	multidisciplinary)	context.	On	the	other	hand,	my	lack	of	
scientific	grounding	meant	that	I	came	to	the	subject	without	theoretical	assumptions	or	
preconceptions	and	by	speaking	to	a	wide	range	of	people,	from	farmers	to	scientists	and	
ministers,	I	was	able	to	identify	different	levels	of	narrative	around	water	and	scarcity.	Over	
the	years,	 I	built	up	considerable	knowledge	of	different	aspects	of	water	 in	 the	MENA	
region	and	my	research	inevitably	took	in	aspects	of	(geo)politics,	geography,	hydrology,	
environmental	 science	 and	 agronomy.	 However,	 the	 work	 always	 remained	 rooted	 in	
fieldwork	and	empirical	observation.
Bibliographical sources and interviews
The	six	chapters	of	this	dissertation	were	–	with	the	exception	of	Chapters	3	and	4	–	based	
on	separate	research	projects	and	fieldwork.	However,	a	similar	methodological	approach	
was	employed	in	all	chapters,	combining	data	from	the	literature	and	official	sources	with	
data from interviews with a broad cross-section of people. 
With regards to hydrological, geographical and meteorological data, it is important 
to	note	that	it	is	very	difficult	to	obtain	reliable,	accurate	and	recent	data	on	the	state	of	
water	 resources	 in	all	MENA	countries.	 This	 is	partly	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	data	 systems	
are	 inefficient	 and	 incomplete.	However,	 equally	 important	 is	 the	dominant	perception	
among	government	officials	in	the	region	that	water	is	a	strategic	resource	and	that	data	
regarding	availability	and	use	should	remain	confidential	(see	Ch.	3	for	more	on	the	culture	
of	secrecy	around	water).	This	means	that	researchers	are	often	confronted	with	outdated,	
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incomplete	or	 contradictory	data,	with	different	data	being	 issued	by	different	national	
ministries and international organizations. 
I have relied on various sources in my research, including:
•	 Reports and studies by UN organizations and other international organizations;
•	 Online	global	databases	such	as	Aquastat,	the	FAO’s	Information	System	on	Water	
and Agriculture; 
•	 Reports and studies by local, regional and international non-governmental 
organizations;
•	 Reports, studies and data sets of national governments and research institutes in 
the region;
•	 And local, regional and international media sources.
In	 addition,	 I	 consulted	 literature	 from	 the	 fields	 of	 hydrology,	 environmental	 science,	
political science, international relations, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, history and 
religious studies, as well as historical sources such as travel accounts and historic texts 
describing religious practices around water, local water management practices and legal 
aspects of water management through history. Each chapter includes a separate list of 
references. 
Throughout	the	dissertation,	desk	and	bibliographical	research	is	complemented	with	
data	from	extensive	fieldwork	and	interviews	with	a	broad	range	of	people.	Depending	on	
the interviewee and the setting of the interview, conversations were held in English, Arabic, 
French,	Dutch	 or	German.	 For	 a	 number	 of	 official	 interviews	 I	 used	 an	 Arabic-English	
interpreter. I conducted most other Arabic interviews myself. Interviews were held with 
the following people: 
•	 Ministers	and	other	national	and	local	government	representatives;	
•	 Hydrologists, agronomists and other experts; 
•	 Representatives	of	non-governmental	(environmental)	organizations;	
•	 Priests,	 imams,	 rabbis,	 religious	 experts	 and	 practicing	 believers	 of	 the	 Jewish,	
Muslim	and	Christian	faiths;	
•	 And	members	of	local	communities,	(former)	farmers,	and	their	families.
Particularly	during	my	time	in	Syria,	where	I	worked	for	as	the	managing	editor	and	editor-
in-chief	of	a	Syrian	current	affairs	magazine,	I	gained	unparalleled	access	to	government	
sources and experts, and was able to travel with relative ease. The fact that I was able 
to	speak	 to	 interviewees	 in	Syrian-Arabic	dialect	was	obviously	a	great	advantage	here.	
Because the process of applying for permits and gaining permission to travel was often 
very	lengthy	in	Syria	(permits	could	take	months	to	be	granted),	few	foreign	journalists	and	
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researchers	were	able	to	access	the	diversity	of	sources	I	did	–	from	obtaining	repeated	
permission to interview the minister of irrigation to being allowed to travel to the country’s 
north-east	during	the	2006-10	drought.	In	addition,	as	I	was	not	registered	as	a	journalist	
with	 the	Ministry	of	 Information,	 I	was	able	 to	circumvent	 limitations	 imposed	on	other	
foreign	journalists,	and	travel	to	areas	that	were	off-limits	to	other	foreigners.	
Levels of analysis: macro- and micro-level views
This dissertation is divided into three parts. After this short introductory chapter, the 
regional	scope	of	Chapter	1	provides	a	conceptual	framework	and	outlines	key	themes	that	
are further developed in subsequent chapters. Part 2 is made up of three chapters that 
examine the past and present of water use in Syria and analyse the growing gap between 
government narratives, public perception and the on-the-ground reality of growing water 
scarcity. Part 3 analyses the role of water in the region’s three main religions and explores 
the	spiritual	value	and	ritual	use	of	water	in	Christianity,	Islam	and	Judaism.	
As such, the dissertation examines aspects of regional cultural-religious perceptions 
and	uses	of	water,	but	then	zooms	in,	first	to	the	national	and	then	to	the	local	level,	to	
provide a more in-depth analysis of the political narratives surrounding water and scarcity. 
While	 the	macro	 (regional)	 level	 can	provide	 an	 insight	 into	broad	 regional	 trends	 and	
highlight	the	specificities	of	the	MENA	region’s	geographic,	climatic,	economic	and	socio-
cultural conditions as compared to other regions, it is only by scaling down to national and 
local levels that one can gain a thorough understanding of the profound discrepancies that 
exist between the images, beliefs and narratives of water and abundance on the one hand 
and the reality of growing scarcity and vanishing water landscapes on the other. 
Moreover,	the	recent	history	of	water	use	in	Syria	can	in	many	ways	be	considered	
representative	 for	 the	wider	 region.	Like	other	countries	 in	 the	MENA,	Syria	has	a	high	
population growth rate: the population has risen from 3.3 million in 1950 to approximately 
20.4	million	in	2010	and	the	annual	average	population	growth	rate	remains	among	the	
highest	in	the	region	(Elhadj	2005;	United	Nations	2008).	Syria	also	embarked	on	ambitious	
hydraulic	development,	 land	reclamation	and	 irrigation	projects	 from	the	1950s	as	part	
of	a	sustained	drive	to	achieve	food	self-sufficiency	and	boost	the	irrigated	surface	area	
(see	Chap.	4).	Between	1960	and	2000,	 the	government	spent	about	US$	20	billion	on	
agricultural	projects,	 the	equivalent	of	20%	of	 the	country’s	 total	 investment	resources.	
However, this investment did not bring the promised returns, but instead resulted in 
widespread	depletion	of	the	country’s	surface	and	groundwater	resources:	by	1997,	five	of	
Syria’s seven water basins had a negative water balance, while the quality of the remaining 
reserves	had	been	degraded	(Elhadj	2005).	In	the	decade	between	1995	and	2005,	annual	
per capita water availability decreased from 1,791 m3 to 882 m3	(FAO	2009),	placing	Syria	
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below the water scarcity line of 1,000 m3	per	person	per	year.	Despite	the	alarming	state	
of the country’s water resources in 2010, the government narrative continued to uphold 
the	image	of	Syria	as	a	country	with	“an	excellent	water	resources	management	system”	
(de	Châtel	2010)	that	was	struggling	to	confront	conditions	of	growing	scarcity	beyond	its	
control.	Meanwhile	on	a	local	level,	Syrians	across	the	country	suffered	the	consequences	of	
years of water and land mismanagement and over-exploitation. They watched landscapes 
around them change as springs and rivers ran dry and fertile land turned to desert. 
SuMMary oF CHaPTErS 
The	first	chapter,	‘Perceptions	of	Water	in	the	Middle	East:	The	Role	of	Religion,	Politics	and	
Technology	in	Concealing	the	Growing	Water	Scarcity’	(de	Châtel	2007b),	explains	why	there	
is	such	low	awareness	of	water	scarcity	in	the	MENA	region.	It	identifies	religious,	political	
and technological narratives that conceal the reality of growing water scarcity and explores 
local perceptions of abundance and scarcity. It shows that the subsidization of water and 
the continued support for agriculture, combined with a false sense of security created by 
large-scale	engineering	projects	 strengthen	 the	mythology	of	plenty.	Constructed	upon	
age-old traditions and beliefs, but also on the convincing rhetoric and imagery of modern-
day politicians and engineers, these myths conceal the reality of growing water scarcity. 
The	chapter	provides	a	structural	framework	for	the	dissertation,	introducing	key	themes	
that are further developed in subsequent chapters.
Chapter	2,	‘Damascus:	The	Death	of	the	Garden	of	Eden’	(de	Châtel	2014a),	illustrates	
and develops the themes introduced in Chapter 1 through a historical overview and case 
study	 of	 water	management	 in	 the	 Syrian	 capital	 Damascus	 from	pre-Roman	 times	 to	
today,	highlighting	the	contrast	between	the	poetic	historic	image	of	Damascus	as	an	oasis	
in the desert and the rapid depletion of the city’s water resources and destruction of its 
water landscapes over the last 60 years. 
Chapter	3,	‘The	Role	of	Drought	and	Climate	Change	in	the	Syrian	Uprising:	Untangling	
the	Triggers	of	the	Revolution’	(de	Châtel	2014b),	examines	political	narratives	around	water	
scarcity in Syria. The chapter focuses on a severe drought that hit the country between 
2006	and	2010,	which	affected	more	than	1.3	million	people	in	the	country’s	north-east	
and	resulted	 in	dramatic	crop	 failure,	 the	decimation	of	flocks,	and	the	migration	of	an	
estimated 65,000 families to urban centres. Recent analysis of the triggers of the current 
conflict	 in	 Syria	 has	often	 included	 references	 to	 the	2006-10	drought	 and	 the	 impact	
of climate change. Closer analysis of the broader economic and historic context shows 
that	the	link	between	drought/climate	change	and	the	uprising	is	tenuous	and	forms	an	
unhelpful distraction that diverts attention from tangible and real problems in the Syrian 
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water	sector.	Moreover,	it	strengthens	the	narrative	of	the	Syrian	government	that	blames	
external factors for its own inability to reform. The chapter examines the dissonance 
between the government narrative that portrayed Syria as a naturally water-scarce 
country	actively	working	to	‘modernize’	its	water	sector	and	the	reality	on	the	ground	of	
an	inefficient,	corrupt	and	rigid	water	management	system	that	enabled	large-scale	over-
exploitation of water and land resources and disenfranchised rural communities. It shows 
that while climate change may cause more frequent and harsher drought in Syria, the 
ongoing failure to rationalize water use and enforce water laws certainly constitutes a 
much greater threat to the country’s natural resources. 
Chapter	4,	‘Watching	Landscapes	Disappear:	Local	Perspectives	on	the	Impact	of	Long-
term	Water	Mismanagement	in	Syria’	(de	Châtel	2014c)	delves	further	into	the	discrepancy	
between	government	rhetoric	and	on-the-ground	realities	in	rural	Syria.	Drawing	extensively	
on personal accounts from Syrians across the country in the period 2006-10, it shows how 
the	Syrian	government’s	fixation	on	food	security	and	the	constant	drive	to	increase	the	
irrigated surface area meant that the limits of the country’s land and water resources were 
disregarded, which in turn led to the destabilization of fragile ecosystems, the depletion 
and	pollution	of	water	resources	and	the	salinization	and	desertification	of	steppe	lands.	
Accounts	from	farmers	across	the	country	highlight	not	just	the	depth	and	breadth	of	the	
environmental	damage	inflicted	over	the	last	60	years,	but	also	the	extraordinary	speed	
with which water resources and landscapes were destroyed. While the fragile balance of 
local ecosystems across the country had been maintained for millennia, in the last 60 years 
uncontrolled population growth, technological advances and over-ambitious agricultural 
expansion programmes have destroyed the country’s water and land resources. 
Together,	Chapters	2-4	underscore	how	ongoing	disregard	 for	 the	 limits	of	natural	
resources in Syria and the growing discrepancy between the government narrative of 
abundance on the one hand and growing poverty and disenfranchisement on the ground 
on	the	other	hand	ultimately	destabilized	the	country	and	spurred	the	first	anti-government	
protests	 in	March	 2011.	 Since	 then	 the	 country	 has	 been	physically,	 economically	 and	
socially destroyed: more than 100,000 people have died, one third of the population has 
had to leave their homes and the economy is shattered. While there is no end in sight to the 
conflict	and	no	indication	of	what	Syria’s	future	will	look	like,	when	reconstruction	begins	it	
will be crucial to emphasize the importance of a sustainable and sound natural resource 
management	system	that	can	provide	sufficient	fresh	water	to	a	growing	population.	The	
experience of the last 60 years shows that disregarding the balance of ecosystems and 
exploiting natural resources beyond their sustainable limit comes at a high cost.
Part	3	explores	 the	 role	of	water	 in	 religious	 rituals	and	beliefs	 in	 the	wider	MENA	
region.	More	specifically,	 it	focuses	on	the	discrepancy	between	the	scriptural	 ideal	and	
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spiritual value of holy water on the one hand, and everyday practice and the physical state 
of pollution on the other. 
Chapter	5,	‘Bathing	in	Divine	Waters:	Water	and	Purity	in	Judaism	and	Islam’	(de	Châtel	
2009)	examines	the	role	of	water	in	Judaism	and	Islam,	both	in	the	scriptures	and	in	the	
respective	 purification	 rituals.	 Specifically,	 the	 chapter	 examines	 the	 spiritual	 qualities	
attributed to water and analyses the concepts of purity/impurity in a ritual sense and 
cleanliness/dirt in a strictly physical sense. It also discusses the evolution of practices 
through	 history	 and	 in	 different	 cultural	 settings,	 and	 shows	 how	 the	 often-blurred	
distinction	between	 ritual	 purity	 and	physical	 cleanliness	was	 –	 and	 still	 is	 –	 frequently	
confused. 
Chapter	 6,	 ‘Baptism	 in	 the	 Jordan	 River:	 Immersing	 in	 a	 Contested	 Transboundary	
Watercourse’	(de	Châtel	2014d),	highlights	the	layered	complexity	of	meaning	associated	
with	 the	 Jordan	River.	 Indeed,	 the	 river	 that	marked	 the	 boundary	 of	 the	 biblical	 Land	
of	 Israel	 and	 in	which	 Jesus	Christ	was	 baptized	by	 John	 is	 today	 not	 only	 a	 source	 of	
holy water, but also a geopolitical border, a contested transboundary watercourse, a 
threatened ecosystem and a tightly regulated water resource system. In particular, the 
chapter examines the dissonance between the far-reaching physical transformation and 
degradation of the river during the 20th century and the experience of Christian pilgrims 
baptizing in the river who perceive its water as eternally and unchangeably holy. The chapter 
examines the evolution of the concept of holy water in Christianity, the historical-religious 
role	of	the	Jordan	River	as	the	“prototypical	river	of	life”	and	current	transboundary	efforts	
to revive the river.
Together	Chapter	5	and	6	reflect	the	central	role	of	water	in	Christianity,	Judaism	and	
Islam, but also highlight the gap between the scriptures, where water is extolled as the 
source of life and a sacred resource, and everyday practice where it is polluted, wasted 
and undervalued.
ConCLuSIon
This	dissertation	does	not	endeavour	to	offer	solutions	to	the	water	crisis	 in	the	MENA	
region. Rather, it is a snapshot of the situation before 2011 and an examination of the 
complex web of economical, social and cultural elements in which water is inextricably 
entangled. In addition, it explores the discrepancy between the reality on the ground of 
the growing water crisis and the public perception and political narratives that uphold the 
image of plenty.  
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CHaPTEr 1
Perceptions of Water in the Middle East: The role of religion, 
Politics and Technology in Concealing the growing Water 
Scarcity
InTroDuCTIon
Around	the	world	water	 is	becoming	an	increasingly	scarce	and	valuable	resource:	40%	
of	the	world’s	population	in	80	countries	suffers	from	serious	water	shortages,	and	more	
than	a	billion	people	worldwide	do	not	have	access	to	safe	drinking	water	 (UNEP	2002:	
69-71).	The	countries	of	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(MENA)	are	among	the	poorest	
in	the	world	in	terms	of	water	resources.	About	10%	of	the	world	population	lives	in	the	
region,	yet	it	only	has	access	to	2%	of	the	world’s	total	freshwater	resources	(World	Bank	
1995:	1).	Pressure	from	population	growth,	the	introduction	of	more	modern	techniques	of	
water collection and distribution, higher standards of living, and a decrease in the already 
low	rainfall	levels	all	mean	that	this	situation	is	only	deteriorating	(UN-ESCWA	2001b:	3).	
The	UN	Global	Environment	Outlook	2002	foresees	that	95%	of	the	Middle	East	will	be	
suffering	from	severe	water	shortages	by	the	year	2032	(UNEP	2002:	385-390).	
Given	the	gravity	of	this	situation,	it	is	surprising	that	the	general	public	in	the	MENA	
region	remains	largely	unaware	of	the	impending	water	crisis	and	the	far-reaching	effects	
it	 could	 have	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 society.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 this	 lack	 of	 public	
awareness is due to the tenacious presence of religious, political and technological myths 
which create the illusion of plenty. Constructed upon age-old traditions and beliefs, but 
also on the convincing rhetoric and imagery of modern-day politicians and engineers, 
these	myths	conceal	the	reality	of	growing	water	scarcity.	Like	the	current	levels	of	water	
consumption in the region, the perpetration of these myths is highly unsustainable; in fact, 
the longer they are upheld, the sooner the region will be confronted with serious shortages. 
It	is	however	difficult	to	call	attention	to	a	problem	which	has	until	now	remained	invisible	
to most. In many countries water scarcity is not yet tangible on a daily basis. And, sadly, it 
appears	that	people	will	only	change	their	attitudes	towards	water	use	once	it	is	‘too	late’	
–	when	reserves	have	reached	critical	levels	and	water	is	rationed.	Programmes	to	raise	
awareness of water scarcity therefore seem to be most successful in areas where the crisis 
is most acute. The material presented in this chapter is based on four years of research 
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in	 the	MENA	 region.	During	 this	 period	 I	 visited	Morocco,	 Tunisia,	 Libya,	 Egypt,	 Sudan,	
Jordan,	 Israel,	Palestine,	Syria,	Lebanon	and	Turkey.	 In	each	of	 these	countries	 I	carried	
out	interviews	and	field	and	literature	research	with	the	aim	of	gaining	an	understanding	
of local attitudes towards water and perceptions of the growing problem of water scarcity. 
Before	 embarking	 on	 this	 project,	 I	 had	 expected	 the	 beliefs,	 attitudes	 and	 traditions	
surrounding	water	in	the	Middle	East	to	be	very	different	from	those	in	the	wet	northern	
climates in which I had grown up. I imagined people used the resource more sparingly 
and valued its presence more highly than we do in The Netherlands where water is only a 
problem through its abundance.
Yet in most places I found people had exactly the same perception of water as I do: 
they	never	really	think	about	it.	 It	 is	an	unquestioned	resource	that	is	taken	for	granted	
like	 the	air	one	breathes,	 and	 few	seem	 to	cherish	 it	 to	 its	 true	 value.	Only	 those	who	
experience	 acute	 scarcity	 at	 a	 physical	 level	 –	 the	 Sudanese	 farmers	 who	 send	 their	
daughters	to	fetch	water	three	hours	walk	away;	the	Amman	housewife	who	has	to	run	
her	household	on	a	ration	of	24	hours	of	water	a	week	–	seem	to	fully	acknowledge	the	
value	of	water’s	presence.	And	even	those	who	acknowledge	that	there	is	a	problem	feel	
little incentive to alter their behaviour towards the resource. Instead, water management 
is	 left	 in	the	hands	of	God	or	the	government.	Due	to	the	heavily	centralized	system	of	
water	distribution	 in	countries	 like	Egypt,	Turkey	and	Israel,	 the	 individual	user	has	 little	
control over the resource and therefore feels no responsibility for the water he uses. But 
also	in	countries	with	less	centralized	systems	–	Syria,	Jordan	and	Morocco	for	instance	–	
users feel little compulsion to become actively involved in water management. Thus in the 
Jordan	Valley,	farmers	are	reluctant	to	join	the	newly	established	water	user	associations:	
they	simply	do	not	see	the	point.	As	water	represents	only	2-5%	of	the	cost	of	running	a	
farm, it is very low on the farmer’s list of priorities; many other things are more important. 
In	the	farmer’s	eyes	it	is	like	this:	if	there	is	no	water,	you	go	and	do	something	
else,	and	if	there	is	water,	then	why	should	you	have	to	take	responsibility	over	
it, and pay for it and go to boring water user association meetings? Water only 
becomes	important	when	it	stops	flowing,	when	it	is	polluted	and	when	it	is	saline.	
That’s when it becomes an issue. And in their eyes, God provides. So you see it is 
difficult	to	change	attitudes	(Courcier	2003).
rELIgIon anD IDEoLogy: WaTEr aS a goD-gIVEn rIgHT
While	 perhaps	 not	 the	 primary	 cause	 of	 water’s	 undervaluation	 in	 the	 MENA,	 religion	
and	 ideology	are	certainly	 the	most	deep-rooted	and	 tenacious	 reasons	 for	 the	 lack	of	
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awareness surrounding the issue of water scarcity.1 Because of the strength of religious 
and ideological beliefs, water is perceived as a gift from God to which one should have an 
inalienable right. This means that in many predominantly Islamic countries in the region 
water remains heavily underpriced, which in turns leads to widespread waste of the 
resource on both domestic and agricultural levels. 
In Syria, the domestic user only pays a nominal price for water: in 2001 an inhabitant 
of	Damascus	paid	just	US$	0.05	per	1,000	litres	of	water	he	consumed	(World	Bank	2001).	
In agriculture Syrian farmers have recently started paying a fee for water diverted from 
government	irrigation	networks.	However,	out	of	the	total	irrigated	area,	59%	of	the	land	is	
irrigated	with	water	from	private	–	and	often	illegal	–	wells.	The	absence	of	any	control	over	
the water that is pumped from these wells has led to a severe decrease in groundwater 
levels	throughout	the	country	(Bazza	et	al.	2002:	13).	In	Egypt	neither	municipal	users	nor	
farmers pay for the water they use and monthly water bills in Cairo can be as low as US$ 1 
(World	 Bank	 2001).	 Pricing	 in	 agriculture	 remains	 a	 taboo,	 as	 I	 realized	 during	 several	
interviews	at	the	Ministry	of	Water	Resources	in	Cairo,	where	I	received	shocked	responses	
when	I	enquired	about	the	price	of	water	for	agricultural	use	(Mahmoud	2001;	Al	Din	Al	
Qosy	2002).	In	both	cases	the	gross	underpricing	of	water	is	justified	on	religious	grounds.	
In	his	 time,	 the	Prophet	Mohammed	discouraged	 the	selling	of	water	and	according	 to	
Muslim	 teaching,	water	 is	a	gift	 from	God	 that	should	be	 freely	available	 to	all.	But	 the	
Koran	also	incites	believers	to	use	water	sparingly	and	constantly	reminds	them	that	it	is	a	
gift	from	God	that	he	can	withhold	if	he	so	pleases	(see	Chap.	5).	
Yet in practice most users appear to see the resource as a God-given right, instead of a 
precious gift that should be treasured. In conversations with a wide range of people in the 
MENA	–	from	government	officials	to	local	farmers	–	I	observed	a	certain	resignation	and	an	
acceptance	of	the	situation.	Thus	in	the	dying	Ghuta	Oasis	near	Damascus	a	disillusioned	
farmer explained the degradation of the environment and the pollution of the local Barada 
River	as	God’s	punishment	for	the	sins	of	the	believers.	At	the	site	of	the	Hassan	Addakhil	
Dam	in	southern	Morocco	the	director	of	the	dam	smiled	happily	as	he	looked	down	into	
the	nearly	empty	 reservoir	and	commented:	 “We	 trust	God	will	 send	us	 rain	soon.”	He	
seemed completely carefree: it was out of his hands. In both cases higher forces are held 
responsible	for	situations	that	are	entirely	manmade.	In	a	sense	this	is	a	way	of	shirking	
responsibility: as though the blame can be laid on God’s shoulders and his omnipotence 
can be used as an excuse for the human neglect and destruction of the environment.
In Israel, Zionist ideology has strongly coloured public perceptions of water and its 
availability. Even before the establishment of the state of Israel, the Zionist movement 
1  For more details on the role of ideology and religion in shaping public perceptions of water 
availability, see also de Châtel, F. 2007: Chap. 2, 5, 7.
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made	 the	quest	 for	water	 in	 the	Land	of	 Israel	 its	priority.	 For	without	 sufficient	water	
supplies,	the	dream	of	returning	to	the	Jewish	homeland	could	never	be	fulfilled	(Rouyer	
2000:	80).	
The quest for the development and acquisition of water resources continued to 
play	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	definition	of	national	policy	after	 Israel’s	 independence	 in	
1948.	Former	Prime	Minister	Levi	Eshkol	described	water	as	“the	blood	flowing	through	
the	arteries	of	 the	nation”	 (Ibid.),	and	 it	came	to	be	seen	not	 just	as	a	natural	resource	
but as the instrument of Israel’s transformation and prosperity. Water was more than an 
economic commodity; it was part of an ideology. And as technological capacities increased, 
water resource development became a symbol of the unlimited power of technology in 
transforming	the	land.	The	Israelis	believed	that	with	hard	work	and	the	development	of	
sophisticated	hydrological	projects,	there	was	no	limit	to	the	development	of	the	land	and	
its	water.	Thus	ideology	and	geopolitics	took	precedence	over	economic	and	environmental	
realities	(Ibid.;	Tal	2002:	200).	Water	was	only	valuable	if	it	could	be	harnessed	for	agricultural	
expansion; climatic considerations such as low and unpredictable rainfall were ignored by 
politicians of the day, while unsustainable use of the resource was seen as a necessary ill.
Tal	(2002)	describes	the	passion	for	water	that	dominated	during	the	early	years	of	
the	 Israeli	 state	as	almost	a	 “Shakespearean	 tragic	flaw”:	on	 the	one	hand	 it	 led	 to	 the	
development	of	 innovative	water	development	projects	on	a	scale	hitherto	unknown	 in	
the	Middle	East.	On	the	other	hand,	it	created	an	unrealistic	appetite	and	blinded	decision	
makers	to	the	long-term	implications	of	stress	on	a	fragile	resource.	“The	argument	could	
be	made	that	they	almost	loved	Israel’s	water	resources	to	death”	(Tal	2002:	200).	While	
the	Zionist	movement	thought	of	itself	as	liberating	the	Holy	Land	and	restoring	it	to	its	
former glory, the underlying attitude towards the environment would, over the years, place 
a growing and unsustainable demand on the country’s water resources. Today this attitude 
has become an inextricable part of Israeli policy and as agriculture and the water it uses 
play	such	a	key	role	in	Israel’s	founding	myth,	it	is	difficult	to	question	the	policymaking	in	
either domain. 
WaTEr aS a PoLITICaL anD SoCIaL ISSuE
The reluctance to price water at its true value is however not only based on pious 
principles and religious conviction; more often than not the main motivation behind low 
water	 fees	 is	 the	support	of	 the	agricultural	sector	 that	guzzles	between	60%	and	90%	
of water resources throughout the region. The continued support and expansion of the 
agricultural	sector	partly	stems	from	a	concern	over	food	security.	While	MENA	countries	
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can	never	be	fully	self-sufficient,	they	seek	to	attain	relative	food	security,	ensuring	basic	
food needs are met. 
In the Arab countries of the region, there is also another social reason for supporting 
agriculture,	as	it	effectively	limits	further	urbanization,	and	supports	small-scale	subsistence	
farming in the region. In these rural societies, water cannot be considered as an isolated 
resource and water management and allocation have far-reaching social, political and 
economic implications. 
There	is	a	strong	social	dimension.	Most	people	here	live	in	the	countryside	and	
have a rural lifestyle. Water has a very special status in their life. This is why many 
countries in the region aim to maintain an agricultural society: to ensure stable 
societies.	That	is	also	why	there	are	subsidies.	It	is	not	just	economics	that	affects	
the use of water in these countries; you also need to evaluate the other aspects 
that	 come	 into	 the	 equation	 such	 as	 environment,	 society	 and	 politics	 (Oweis	
2001).
The continued support for agriculture as it exists now is unsustainable; at the same time 
any	kind	of	reform	is	fraught	with	difficulties	as	this	traditional	agriculture	also	represents	
a	way	of	life	that	has	existed	for	thousands	of	years	in	the	Middle	East.	It	is	thus	easier	for	
governments to maintain the status quo, subsidize agriculture and turn a blind eye to the 
lowering	groundwater	levels,	the	depletion	of	aquifers	and	the	huge	waste	that	takes	place	
everywhere. 
In Israel the continued support for agriculture is not so much a social necessity as a 
political choice. Current agricultural and water management policies are still strongly tinted 
by Zionist ideology and the desire to transform the desert landscape into green pastures. 
Around	60%	of	Israel’s	water	supply	goes	to	agriculture	(Bar-Shiva	2005).	When	compared	
to	the	other	countries	in	the	region,	this	is	still	relatively	low.	However,	unlike	other	MENA	
countries, in Israel agriculture represents only a small portion of the national income. In 
1991	it	made	up	only	3%	of	the	country’s	Gross	Domestic	Product,	while	only	4%	of	the	
total	workforce	was	employed	in	the	agricultural	sector	(Lipchin	2003).	Yet	it	continues	to	
enjoy	strong	support	from	the	government,	most	conspicuously	through	the	water	pricing	
system which blatantly favours agriculture over household and industry. Therefore farmers 
pay much less than users in other sectors and the water they use is heavily subsidized.2 
Critics of Israel’s water pricing and agricultural policies are numerous. They point out that 
2 	Bar-Shiva,	Cohen	&	Kislev	(2005):	Israeli	farmers	pay	around	70%	of	the	real	cost	of	the	water	they	
use.	Household	users	are	charged	much	higher	rates,	both	by	the	state	water	company	Mekorot	and	
the municipalities. While farmers paid an average of US$ 0.25/m3 in 2005, household users paid at 
least twice that price at US$ 0.61-1.27.
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the high subsidies for water used in agriculture create a net loss for the national economy 
and that water-thirsty crops such as bananas and citrus should be imported. According to 
Lipchin	(2003)	any	change	in	this	status	quo	will	require	the	revision	of	Zionist	ideology	to	
match the reality of Israel’s arid environment and scarce water resources. He argues that 
to	break	through	the	entrenched	views	of	Zionism,	the	system	needs	to	be	decentralized,	
allowing	for	privatization	and	local-level	decision-making.	In	his	view	this	could	help	reduce	
the	buffer	zone	that	exists	between	water	management	and	the	public	perception	of	water	
availability.	 “Because	the	public	 is	encapsulated	 in	a	centralized	system	over	which	they	
have no control, changing ideological values that actually represent the situation on the 
ground	will	prove	daunting,”	he	says,	adding	that	it	is	at	the	same	time	a	necessity	if	the	
country	is	to	confront	the	regional	water	crisis	(Lipchin	2003).	While	Israel’s	current	water	
policy	is	perhaps	irrational	and,	in	the	long	term	certainly	unsustainable,	it	will	be	difficult	
to change. This is partly due to the power of the agricultural lobby within Israeli politics, 
but, on a deeper level, Zionist ideology also plays an important role. It is perhaps less 
influential	than	25	years	ago,	but	its	values	and	the	image	of	Israel	it	represents	are	still	
deeply engrained in the national psyche. 
grEEnIng THE DESErT: THE ProMISE oF TECHnoLogy
Technology and the impact it has on daily life and the functioning of society at large is an 
important	cause	for	water’s	undervaluing.	Indeed,	modern	technology	deeply	affects	the	
way	people	think	about	water	and	use	it.	As	soon	as	water	starts	flowing	from	a	tap,	it	is	
taken	for	granted;	people	forget	that	a	fluctuating	river	or	an	erratic	weather	system	lies	at	
its	origins.	By	making	its	source	invisible,	water’s	existence	is	divorced	from	the	elements	
and the seasons, and it becomes paradoxically omnipresent. The user can comfortably 
assume	 that	 it	 flows	 from	 an	 endless	 supply.	 It	 is	 indisputable	 that	 the	 technological	
advances of the 20th	 century	 have	 enabled	 the	 development	 of	MENA	 economies	 and	
improved	standards	of	 living.	However,	on	a	psychological	 level	–	and	because	many	of	
these	projects	were	hailed	by	their	creators	as	the	answer	to	all	problems	–	there	is	now	
a	 complacency	 about	water.	 The	 Egyptian	President	Gamal	 Abdel	Nasser	 spoke	of	 the	
High	Aswan	Dam	as	a	“source	of	everlasting	prosperity”.	Indeed,	the	High	Aswan	Dam	has	
transformed the country: not only has it allowed Egypt to intensify its agriculture, it also 
saved the country from the drought and famine that devastated Ethiopia and Sudan in the 
1980s.	But	on	a	more	abstract	level	the	Aswan	High	Dam	has	given	the	Egyptians	a	false	
sense of security over water. 
Mohamed	 Sid	 Ahmed,	 a	 political	 journalist	 and	 commentator	 in	 Cairo,	 comments:	
“[Since	 the	construction	of	Aswan	High	Dam]	people	are	 less	aware	of	 the	value	of	 the	
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water	they	use.	They	take	it	for	granted	in	a	way	and	don’t	see	it	as	a	precious	resource.	
They	think	they	can	just	press	a	button	and	that	the	water	will	come”	(Sid	Ahmed	2001).
Two	issues	are	at	stake	here:	in	the	first	place	there	is	the	issue	of	scale.	Twentieth-
century	technology	brought	large-scale	engineering	schemes	with	it.	Projects	like	the	High	
Aswan Dam	in	Egypt,	 the	Great	Manmade	River	 in	Libya	and	the	Southeastern	Anatolia	
Project	(GAP)	in	Turkey	all	have	one	thing	in	common:	their	dehumanizing	scale.	The	sheer	
size of the dam reservoirs and the huge amount of water that is transported through 
these pipelines simply surpasses the individual imagination. This in turn leads the general 
public to believe that water supplies are endless. The second issue is distance. Through 
the	development	of	modern	water	distribution	systems,	the	link	that	used	to	exist	between	
the	individual	user	and	his	water	is	severed.	Water	now	flows	from	the	source	through	an	
intricate	network	to	arrive	at	a	user	many	dozens	or	even	hundreds	of	miles	away.	This	is	
the case in Israel where the nationalization of water resources in 1959 and the construction 
of	the	National	Water	Carrier	in	1964	has	created	an	extremely	efficient	and	sophisticated	
system of water distribution. According to Tal, there should have been a transition at this 
point:	after	a	first	stage	in	which	water	resources	were	developed	and	made	accessible	
across the country, there should have come a second stage during which the limits of the 
resource	were	acknowledged	and	the	emphasis	would	have	been	placed	on	conservation	
and	 an	 improvement	 in	 efficiency.	 “The	 fundamentally	 ideological	 approach	 to	 water,	
however,	prevented	a	 successful	 transition	 to	 the	more	mature,	 sustainable	 stage”	 (Tal	
2002:	 200-201).	 The	 seamless	 ease	with	which	water	 is	 now	 delivered	 throughout	 the	
country	 is	without	a	doubt	remarkable,	but	Lipchin	 (2004)	believes	 it	 is	a	double-edged	
knife.	For	the	system’s	efficiency	has	also	blunted	people’s	sense	of	awareness	of	water	
scarcity. In the eyes of the general public there is endless potential in technological 
development	and	neither	decision-makers	nor	the	general	public	have	acknowledged	that	
there are limits to the country’s water resources.
Today the solution to scarcity is being sought not in conservation or a change in 
agricultural policies but in new technology: desalination, a method that promises unlimited 
supplies. While the schemes can indeed provide a large volume of water, the technology 
does not address the underlying political and institutional problems. In fact, desalination 
makes	it	possible	to	avoid	these	issues	and	maintain	a	system	in	which	household	users	
pay	for	the	water	that	is	used	–	and	because	of	the	low	prices,	also	wasted	–	in	agriculture.	
Thus	 the	 promise	 of	 large-scale	 desalination	 in	 Israel	 has	 the	 same	 effect	 as	 the	High	
Aswan	Dam	has	had	in	Egypt:	it	has	created	an	over-reliance	on	technology.	In	the	case	of	
Israel has slowed the discussion on water allocations: not only between the agricultural, 
industrial and domestic sectors, but also between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
Indeed, in the eyes of some, the fact that Israel can rely on desalination implies that it 
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will	in	the	future	no	longer	have	to	look	at	the	issue	of	water	supply	in	a	regional	context.	
Arnon	 Soffer,	 a	 professor	 of	 geography	 at	 Haifa	 University,	 is	 a	 protagonist	 of	 a	 “total	
divorce”	between	Israel	and	the	Palestinian	Authority.	He	says	that	because	Israel	can	rely	
on	desalinated	water,	 it	no	longer	needs	the	water	of	the	Mountain	Aquifer.3	 “I	am	very	
clear	on	 the	steps	 that	should	 taken.	There	should	be	a	 total	separation	of	all	aspects.	
Also	of	water.	They	[the	PA]	are	a	third-world	country	and	they	will	pollute	the	Mountain	
Aquifer	and	all	the	resources	they	have.	So	let	them	have	it”	(Soffer	2003).	Because	Israel	
can rely on technology to resolve its water problem, it holds the strong position in any 
water	negotiations	with	the	Palestinian	Authority.	The	Palestinians	cannot	afford	modern	
technologies such as desalination. 
The	current	political	situation	and	the	ongoing	conflict	between	Israel	and	the	Palestinian	
Authority	means	that	it	is	very	difficult	to	form	an	image	of	the	public	perception	of	water	
among Palestinians. Where religion, politics and technology conceal the reality of scarcity 
in	many	MENA	countries,	in	Palestine,	water	scarcity	is	a	daily	reality	for	many.	However,	
the scarcity here is construed: it is not so much about availability as about access. At the 
same	time,	while	water	scarcity	 is	a	serious	problem,	 it	 is	 just	one	of	a	dozen	problems	
Palestinians	have	 to	worry	about	on	a	daily	basis.	The	acuity	of	 the	political	 situation	–	
both	internal	and	with	Israel	–	also	makes	it	difficult	to	carry	out	research	on	the	popular	
perceptions of water in Palestine. 
This review of dangerous modern myths is not a condemnation of modern technology 
or a nostalgic eulogy of traditional water wheels and hand-dug wells. The point is that 
modern	 engineering	 projects	 through	 their	 impressive	 scale	 and	 grand	 allure	 conceal	
the	 reality	 of	water	 scarcity.	 This	 reality	 needs	 to	 be	 urgently	 acknowledged.	 For	while	
a	new	dam	can	alleviate	the	immediate	effects	of	water	scarcity,	 it	does	not	change	the	
geographical conditions of the region. It does not transform desert climates to temperate 
ones	or	guarantee	abundant	rainfall	levels.	It	is	just	one	component	among	many	that	can	
help in confronting the problem of water scarcity. 
raISIng aWarEnESS anD CHangIng aTTITuDES 
Around	the	MENA	region	there	is	an	increasing	number	of	initiatives	–	by	governments	and	
NGOs;	on	national	and	local	level	–	to	raise	awareness	about	water	scarcity.4	In	Morocco,	
3 	 “The	 Mountain	 Aquifer	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 sources	 of	 water	 for	 both	 Israelis	 and	
Palestinians.	Nearly	the	entire	Palestinian	population	in	the	West	Bank	is	dependent	on	springs,	wells	
or	extracted	water	 from	the	Mountain	Aquifer	 for	drinking	and	other	uses.	 In	 Israel,	 the	Mountain	
Aquifer	supplies	water	to	major	population	centers”	(www.foeme.org).
4 	See	also	de	Châtel,	F.	2007,	Chap.	10,	11.
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Egypt,	Jordan,	Israel	and	Turkey	a	variety	of	programmes	are	being	implemented	with	the	
aim of educating and involving the user, and ultimately, changing his behaviour towards 
water.	The	most	obvious	way	to	make	people	aware	of	the	value	of	water	is	by	introducing	
water	prices	that	reflect	the	true	cost	of	the	resource.	As	mentioned	above,	there	are	many	
political	and	ideological	obstacles	preventing	this.	Still,	many	Muslim	countries,	including	
Iran,	 Morocco,	 Jordan	 and	 Tunisia,	 have	 started	 implementing	 pricing	 policies	 in	 both	
urban	and	 (local)	 rural	 contexts.	But	pricing	alone	 is	not	enough;	 this	policy	 should	be	
complemented by education programmes that involve users in local water management. 
Instead of shielding the user from reality through the perpetration of deceptive policies, 
these programmes can give them an insight into the gravity of the situation and restore 
water	to	its	true	value.	On	an	agricultural	level,	such	projects	are	being	widely	implemented	
through the creation of water user associations in which small groups of farmers are 
given the direct communal responsibility over the water they use. In Egypt the Irrigation 
Improvement	Project	(IIP)	aims	to	rationalize	and	simplify	water	use	along	the	Nile’s	side	
channels. By replacing the numerous individual hand pumps by a single pump at the head 
of each channel, water is divided more equally and farmers become more involved in 
the process of water management. The IIP has been in place since 1997, creating more 
than 6,000 water user associations throughout the country. The programme is seen 
as a success, also because many farmers who are not yet involved are signing up to it. 
However,	there	has	been	no	net	reduction	of	water	use	and	critics	question	the	project’s	
effectiveness	(Bron	2002;	Roostee	2002;	Doma	2002).
Nasr	 Allam	 (2002)	 argues	 that	 while	 user	 participation	 and	 privatization	 of	 water	
management are important, IIP is perhaps not the best way to do it. 
We need to encourage the cooperation of users. The government has a shortage 
of	financing	and	technical	capacities	[and]	it	is	important	for	the	government	to	
transfer water management to other sectors. But the IIP programme is very slow 
and its results are not very conclusive in terms of water conservation. It achieves 
lower	cost	for	the	farmer	and	better	production,	but	no	water	is	really	saved	(Nasr	
Allam	2002).	
Thus while Egyptian farmers may today be more involved in the process of water 
management, their involvement has not yet led to water savings. 
On	 a	 domestic	 level,	 awareness	 campaigns	 focus	 on	measures	 that	 can	 help	 save	
water	 in	 the	household.	 In	 Jordan,	USAID	 introduced	a	programme	between	2000	and	
2005.	Water	Efficiency	and	Public	Information	for	Action	(WEPIA)	set	itself	the	ambitious	
goal of not only raising awareness, but also changing behaviours. The programme 
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focused on the dissemination of Water Saving Devices	(WSDs),	small	attachments	that	can	
be	screwed	on	to	taps,	showerheads	or	installed	in	toilets	to	reduce	the	water	flow.	The	
project	 was	 successful,	 amending	 several	 laws,	 launching	 two	major	media	 campaigns	
and designing education programmes for everyone from toddlers to university students, 
women,	and	even	imams.	WSDs	were	also	introduced	to	60%	of	the	large	users	including	
hotels,	hospitals	and	universities.	WEPIA’s	mandate	was	taken	over	in	2004	by	the	Water	
Demand	Management	unit	within	the	Jordanian	Ministry	of	Water	Resources.	Its	challenge	
is	to	ensure	the	durability	of	WEPIA’s	work,	not	only	perpetrating	its	education	and	media	
projects,	but	also	making	sure	that	the	general	public	remembers	WEPIA’s	core	message:	
“The	Solution	is	at	Your	End”	(Dahlan	2003;	Abdel	Khaleq	2003).	This	is	the	difficulty	with	
many	of	 these	programmes:	as	 their	mandate	and	financing	are	 limited,	 their	message	
is	 all	 too	 often	 forgotten,	 leaving	 little	 tangible	 results.	 Durability	 and	 sustainability	 are	
therefore	of	key	concern.	
ConCLuSIon
There	are	too	many	priorities.	You	look	at	the	situation	and	you	see	only	priorities.	
It	 is	a	big	challenge:	we	have	 to	maximize	our	benefit	 from	 the	water	we	have	
–	use	 it	more	efficiently.	Then	we	have	to	prevent	pollution	and	also	work	with	
our	neighbours.	 In	parallel	we	have	to	 look	to	modernize	the	 irrigation	system,	
encourage drainage water reuse and limit the birth rate… It is a great challenge 
and	it	is	hard	to	know	where	to	begin	(Abu	Zeid	2002).
The	then-minister	of	water	resources	of	Egypt,	Mahmoud	Abu	Zeid,	summed	it	up;	he	was	
talking	about	Egypt,	but,	by	and	large,	the	same	is	valid	for	the	whole	region.	Water	is	an	
increasingly	scarce	resource	 throughout	 the	Middle	East.	Many	 foresee	that	 the	severe	
shortages	that	will	afflict	the	region	in	the	future	will	have	far-reaching	implications	for	the	
lives and livelihoods of the population there. Yet this population remains largely unaware 
of	the	impending	crisis	(Nasr	Allam	2002;	Al	Ansari	2003;	Boutros	Ghali	2003).
The harsh reality of water scarcity is shrouded in religious, political and technological 
myths,	which	make	it	possible	to	 ignore	reality	and	continue	using	water	as	 it	has	been	
used	 for	 centuries.	However,	 the	problem	 is	 taking	on	 such	proportions	 that	 it	 can	no	
longer be resolved on the sidelines of the society. 
Water	is	first	of	all	a	natural	resource,	but	it	is	also	part	of	an	intricate	web	of	economic,	
social and political issues from which it cannot be dissociated. It is impossible to consider 
water	in	the	MENA	without	considering	its	users,	and	their	beliefs	and	attitudes.	Because	
water	 is	not	an	 isolated	issue	and	because	its	availability	 influences	the	 life	of	everyone	
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in	the	MENA	region,	the	problem	of	water	scarcity	should	be	addressed	by	society	as	a	
whole,	not	just	by	policymakers	and	engineers.	For	a	part,	it	is	a	technical	issue	that	can	
be	resolved	through	engineering	works,	better	distribution	and	less	waste.	But	it	 is	also	
a	social	issue	that	is	aggravated	by	unrestrained	population	growth,	pollution	and	lack	of	
education.  
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The	Euphrates	at	Jarablous	on	the	Syrian-Turkish	border,	2009.	
Source: Adel Samara.

47
CHaPTEr 2
Damascus: The Death of the garden of Eden
Variously	described	as	the	“bride	of	cities,”	“the	grain	of	beauty	on	the	world’s	cheek”,	and	
“a	lover’s	torment”,	(Gibb	1958:	118-120)	the	Syrian	capital	Damascus	was	famed	through	
history for its abundant freshwater resources and the shady gardens that surrounded it. 
Some	speculated	that	it	must	be	the	site	of	the	biblical	Garden	of	Eden	(Gibb	1958),	while	
the	Prophet	Mohammed	was	so	enchanted	when	he	looked	down	on	the	city	from	Mount	
Qassioun	that	he	had	to	avert	his	eyes	from	what	he	believed	to	be	an	earthly	paradise.	
Convinced that man cannot enter paradise twice, he refused to enter the city and resolved 
to	continue	his	quest	for	heavenly	paradise	(Rogerson	2003:	64).	
However,	as	the	city	grew	and	water	demand	rose	beyond	the	capacity	of	the	Damascus	
Basin	and	 its	water	resources,	 the	situation	changed.	Damascus	gradually	engulfed	 the	
surrounding	 villages	 to	 create	 a	 sprawling	 city	 of	more	 than	 4	million	 inhabitants.	 The	
Barada River, the source of the city’s prosperity through the centuries, was reduced to a 
slimy	trickle	of	sewage	and	garbage.	In	2009,	farmers	in	the	Barada	Valley,	who	until	the	late	
1990s irrigated their orchards with water from the river, feared that their grandchildren 
would not even remember the river’s existence. By 2001 the gardens that surrounded the 
city had all but disappeared, covered in concrete and asphalt, as they were swallowed by 
uncontrolled urban growth. The situation has only worsened since 2011, as what started 
as a peaceful uprising against the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad has spiralled 
out	of	control	into	a	brutal	civil	and	proxy	war.	While	most	parts	of	central	Damascus	still	
received a regular water supply in 2013, large parts of the suburbs no longer received any 
water.  
This	chapter	traces	the	history	of	water	use	in	Damascus	from	the	early	beginnings	of	
the city to today, examining the causes of the current water crisis and discussing proposed 
solutions.	More	specifically,	it	examines	how	the	sustainable	pattern	of	water	use	that	had	
been in place for millennia has been disrupted in the past 60 years by a number of factors 
including high population growth, poor agricultural water practices, and uncontrolled 
urban	expansion	 –	 and,	 perhaps	most	 importantly,	 a	 lack	of	 political	will	 and	 technical	
capacity to implement and enforce a sustainable water management strategy.
The chapter draws on historic and literary descriptions of the Syrian capital and its 
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surroundings.	Data	on	the	more	recent	evolution	of	water	use	in	Damascus	were	gathered	
from:	 Syrian	 government	 databases	 and	 reports;	 scientific	 studies	 and	media	 reports;	
personal communications with Syrian government representatives and Syrian and foreign 
water	experts	working	in	the	Damascus	region;	and	on-the-ground	research	in	Damascus	
in	2001	and	in	the	period	2006–10.	Regarding	data	on	water	availability	and	use,	and	the	
hydrology of rivers in the basin, it is important to note that the Syrian water sector as a 
whole	suffers	from	a	lack	of	comprehensive	and	accurate	data,	particularly	when	it	comes	
to groundwater resources.1
THE BaraDa rIVEr anD ITS SEVEn CanaLS
Until the early 20th	century,	Damascus	inspired	poets,	travellers,	kings,	and	prophets.	The	
10th-century	geographer	Ibn	Hawqal	wrote	that	water	was	“everywhere”	in	Damascus:	“in	
the	houses,	 in	the	streets	and	 in	the	baths”	 (Degeorge	1997).	The	12th-century	Moorish	
traveller	Ibn	Jubayr	even	wondered	whether	there	was	too	much	water	and	claimed	that	
“its	ground	is	sickened	with	the	superfluity	of	water	so	that	it	yearns	even	for	a	drought,	
and	the	hard	stones	almost	cry	out	to	you”	(Broadhurst	1952:	271).
Writing in the 13th	 century,	 the	Sufi	 imam	Shams	ed-Din	Abu	Abdullah	Mohammed	
(known	as	Dimashki),	qualifies	Damascus	as	“one	of	the	healthiest,	prettiest,	most	beautiful	
and	most	elegant	cities	in	the	world”	(Dimashki	1874:	262).	In	his	detailed	account	of	the	
city,	he	describes	three	parts:	the	urban	core	and	the	buildings	around	it	“which	resemble	
a	white	bird,	resting	in	a	green	meadow,	drinking	the	waters	that	come	to	it,	one	after	the	
other”;	the	Ghuta	Plain	that	surrounds	the	city;	and	a	third	subterranean	part	“that	forms	
a separate city of water courses, channels, rivers, springs, reservoirs, underground canals; 
wherever	one	looks,	one	finds	water	courses	interlaced	to	the	right	and	the	left,	one	layer	
above	another”	(Dimashki	1874:	262-3).
European	 travellers	 were	 also	 enchanted	 by	 the	 sight	 of	 this	 Oriental	 city	 hidden	
away	 in	 thick	 forests2 and living to the rhythms of gurgling springs. In the 15th-century, 
Bertrandon	 de	 la	 Broquière,	 standard	 bearer	 and	 advisor	 to	 Duke	 Philip	 the	 Good	 of	
Burgundy,	described	it	as	“a	large	and	spacious	city	with	beautiful	large	gardens	the	likes	of	
1 	On	the	issue	of	accuracy	and	availability	of	data,	Elhadj	(2003)	quotes	a	1998	study	by	Environmental	
Resource	Management	(ERM),	which	states:	“Many	estimates	of	water	balances	have	been	made	in	the	
past	10	years.	Of	those	reviewed,	no	one	set	of	data	appeared	totally	free	from	contradictions,	either	
internally	or	with	other	data	sets.”	Elhadj	adds	that	there	are	discrepancies	in	the	figures	published	by	
different	government	ministries	and	international	agencies.
2 	A	14th-century	account	of	Alexander	the	Great’s	conquest	of	Damascus	in	333	BC	records	that	“the	
valley	where	the	river	of	Damascus	[the	Barada]	flows	today	was	at	the	time	a	cedar	forest”.	According	
to	Degeorge	(1997:	53),	in	the	4th	century	BC,	Lebanon’s	cedar	forests	stretched	from	Mount	Lebanon	
to	the	Damascus	Plain.
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which	I	have	never	seen	before	with	the	best	fruits	and	large	amounts	of	water”	(Degeorge	
1997:	325).	The	19th-century	traveller	Alexander	Kinglake	wrote	that	Damascus	was:
a city of hidden palaces, of copses, and gardens, and fountains, and bubbling 
streams… Close along the river’s edge, through seven sweet miles of rustling 
boughs and deepest shade, the city spreads out her whole length. As a man falls 
flat,	face	forward	on	the	brook,	that	he	may	drink,	and	drink	again,	so	Damascus,	
thirsting forever, lies down with her lips to the stream, and clings to its rushing 
waters	(Kinglake	1996:	229–30)
The	combination	of	Damascus’s	abundant	water	resources	and	its	strategic	location	at	the	
crossroads of desert caravan routes from India, Persia, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa 
and Anatolia ensured that it rapidly became a centre of economic, cultural, and political 
exchange. It was a meeting place for nomadic populations from the east and settled 
coastal populations from the west. But the water was not only essential for the survival of 
the	city	and	its	surroundings,	it	was	also	cherished	as	part	of	Damascus’s	cultural	heritage.	
The	presence	of	abundant	water	influenced	the	planning	of	urban	space	and	the	design	of	
the	Damascene	house,	and	inspired	the	development	of	a	highly	sophisticated	irrigation	
network	that	covered	25,000	hectares	(ha)	in	its	heyday.
Without	 the	 waters	 of	 the	 Barada	 River	 and	 its	 main	 tributary,	 the	 Fijeh	 Spring,	
Damascus	 would	 never	 have	 flourished	 as	 one	 of	 the	 region’s	 most	 important	 cities.	
Shielded	from	the	coastal	rains	by	the	Lebanon	and	Anti-Lebanon	Mountain	ranges,	the	
ancient	city	on	the	edge	of	the	Syrian	Desert	lies	in	an	arid	to	very	arid	climatic	zone,	with	
an	annual	precipitation	of	around	250	mm	on	the	city’s	western	outskirts	and	less	than	
100	mm	in	the	Eastern	Ghuta	(Hobler	and	Rajab	2002).
The	 first	 traces	of	 human	 settlement	 in	 the	 area	of	Damascus	 can	be	 traced	back	
to	the	Neolithic	era,	with	the	first	written	mention	of	the	city	appearing	in	the	cuneiform	
texts of Ebla in the 3rd	millennium	BC.	The	first	reference	to	its	fertile	surroundings	can	be	
found in 9th-century	BC	texts	describing	the	city’s	siege	by	the	Assyrian	King	Salamanazar	
III,	where	reference	is	made	to	the	king’s	men	cutting	down	the	dense	forests	around	the	
city	(Degeorge	1994:	11).
The	city’s	two	main	water	sources	originate	in	the	Anti-Lebanon	Mountains:	the	source	
of	the	Barada	Spring	lies	40	km	from	Damascus	at	an	altitude	of	1,090	metres	above	sea	
level	(m asl)	(JICA	1996)	and	flows	through	a	narrow	valley	to	the	Damascus	Plain	(Fig.	3).	
Writing in the 12th	century,	the	Damascene	historian	Al-‘Umari	described	the	Upper	Barada	
Valley	as	one	of	the	“most	admirable	spectacles	one	can	see”:	“The	water	from	the	heavens	
and the land are plentiful here, the sun and the air are full of dew; the two mountains that 
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surround it are covered in violets that lie in the shade of the tangled branches of willow 
trees”	(Degeorge	1997:	269).
Nineteen	kilometres	from	the	Barada	Spring,	the	Fijeh	Spring	(altitude:	820	m asl)	joins	
the	river’s	course	through	the	narrow	gorges	of	the	Barada	Valley.	At	the	foot	of	the	Anti-
Lebanon	in	the	village	of	Rabwe,	the	Barada	River3	branches	off	into	seven	channels;4 these 
flow	at	different	elevations	and	fan	out	through	the	city	into	the	Ghuta	Plain5	(altitude:	600-
700	m asl),	where	they	in	turn	branch	off	into	smaller	canals	(Fig.	4).	Historically,	before	the	
intensification	of	irrigation	in	the	Ghuta,	the	Barada	River	used	to	discharge	into	the	Lake	
Ateibeh, which was surrounded by dense reed beds. However, the river’s water has not 
reached	this	lake	since	1969	and	it	has	today	dried	out	completely	(Fig.	10).
A	second	important	river	in	the	Damascus	Basin	is	the	Awaj,	which	originates	on	the	
eastern	slopes	of	Mount	Hermon	and	flows	 into	the	plain	south	of	Damascus,	where	 it	
3 	 The	Barada	River	 is	mentioned	 in	 the	Old	 Testament,	 2	Kings	5:11	 as	 “Abana”	when	 the	Syrian	
general	Naaman	tells	the	Prophet	Elijah:	“Are	not	the	Abana	and	Pharpar,	rivers	of	Damascus,	better	
than	all	the	waters	of	Israel?”	The	name	Pharpar	has	variously	been	interpreted	as	a	reference	to	the	
Banias	or	the	Awaj,	respectively	a	branch	of	the	Barada	and	a	river	running	south	of	Damascus	(see	
Chap.	6	for	the	biblical	story	of	Naaman).
4 	Named	in	Dimashki	(1874:	263)	as	the	Yezid,	Tawra,	Mezzawi,	Darajja,	Qanawat,	Banias,	and	Barada.
5 	In	Arabic,	a	ghuta is a green and well-watered area. Al ghuta	–	preceded	by	the	article	–	designates	
the	oasis	around	Damascus.
Figure 3.	Waterfalls	in	the	Barada	Valley,	1898–1914.	Source:	Library	of	Congress,	Prints	&	Photographs	
Division.
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splits	into	a	series	of	irrigation	canals.	Historically,	the	Awaj	used	to	drain	into	Lake	Hijaneh	
south-east	 of	 Lake	 Ateibeh.	 However,	 due	 to	 intensive	 irrigation,	 the	 water	 no	 longer	
reaches	the	lake,	which	has	dried	out	(JICA	1996:	C-7).
Many	 of	 the	 Barada’s	 channels	 date	 back	 to	 the	 Aramaean	 era	 (8th	 c.	 BC)	 or	 earlier	
(Degeorge	1997:	7).	The	oldest	written	manuscript	recording	the	existence	of	Damascus’s	
water	 network	dates	back	 to	 670	AD	and	was	written	by	 the	Gallic	 Bishop	Arculf,	who	
recorded	the	existence	of	 “IV magna flumina”	 (four	 large	rivers)	 in	Damascus	 (Degeorge	
1997).	The	oldest	record	from	Arabic	sources	comes	from	the	12th-century historian Ibn 
Asakir,	who	writes	about	the	Barada	canals	and	describes	the	modifications	carried	out	by	
the	various	caliphs.	He	also	says:	“Every	time	one	questions	the	farmers	on	the	origins	of	
the	works,	the	answer	is	identical;	in	every	village	everything	is	attributed	to	the	Romans”	
(Tresse	1929:	 472).	 Simple	 gravity	 and	 the	 construction	of	 seven	 canals	with	 countless	
side channels allowed for the development of one of the most fertile and productive 
agricultural	areas	in	the	Middle	East.
In	its	early	days,	the	Ghuta	of	Damascus	covered	8,000	ha,	later	expanding	to	25,000	
ha,	 as	more	 canals	were	dug	 and	 the	 irrigation	network	 grew	more	 sophisticated.	 The	
gardens were set out in concentric rings, with the most intensive irrigation and fertile 
grounds situated near the city. As one travelled east into the Ghuta, cultivation became 
less	intensive	and	water	less	abundant.	Dimashki	counted	110,000	gardens	of	orchards	
Figure 4. Schematic map of the Barada River and its canals. Source: Naito 1986.
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and vegetable plots in the Ghuta, and described the cultivation of apricots, pomegranate, 
walnut,	 apple,	 pear,	 plum,	 cherry,	 peach,	 fig,	myrtle,	 cucumbers,	 courgettes,	 tomatoes,	
beans,	chickpeas	and	aniseed	(Dimashki	1874:	263).
Beyond the inner ring of intensive cultivation was an area of fruit orchards followed by 
the Zor, where vegetable gardens were planted between poplar trees. As water became 
scarcer to the east, vegetable plots made way for vines, wheat and olives. Further out, 
livestock	was	kept	in	a	less	densely	populated	area	known	as	Al Marj	(meadow).	Covered	
in green pasture in spring, this area on the edge of the desert steppe was arid during 
the	 rest	 of	 the	 year	 (Degeorge	 1997:	 9).	 Numerous	 springs	 and	 shallow	 groundwater	
supplemented	the	network	of	rivers	and	canals,	contributing	further	to	the	 irrigation	of	
the Ghuta’s gardens and orchards.
Surrounded	by	dense	greenery,	the	city	itself	(altitude:	680	m asl)	was	just	a	small	dot	
on	the	map,	an	area	of	less	than	2	km	from	east	to	west	at	the	foot	of	the	1,150	m	Mount	
Qassioun	(Fig.	5).	The	seven	main	canals	supplied	water	to	both	domestic	and	agricultural	
users. The Yezid, commissioned by the 7th-century	Umayyad	Caliph	Yezid	ibn	Mu’awiya,	is	
the	northernmost	canal	and	was	traditionally	used	to	irrigate	fields	at	the	foot	of	Mount	
Qassioun,	often	using	waterwheels	to	haul	the	water	uphill.	The	Tawra,6 described by Al-
‘Umari	 as	 the	 “Nile	 of	Damascus”,	 irrigated	 fields	 and	orchards	 on	 the	 left	 bank	 of	 the	
Barada,	whereas	 the	Qanawat	and	Banias	supplied	 the	residential	areas	within	 the	city	
walls. Each of these canals had countless branches and derivations: the 12th-century Ibn 
Asakir	 counted	19	canals	outside	 the	city	walls	and	130 intramuros, most of them with 
picturesque	names	 such	as	Cucumber	Canal	 and	Pearl	Market	Channel.	 The	Qanawat,	
which is thought to have been dug by the Romans in the 2nd or 3rd	century	AD,	continued	to	
supply	three	quarters	of	the	Old	City	until	the	early	20th century, while a separate sewage 
network	collected	waste	water	(Degeorge	1997).	Drainage	water	from	the	Yezid,	Tawra	and	
Barada	flowed	downhill	into	a	second	network	of	canals	that	stretched	east	from	the	Old	
City	at	Bab	Tuma	(Saint	Thomas’	Gate),	irrigating	the	Eastern	Ghuta	and	the	Zor.	The	main	
channels	of	this	network	were	the	Aqrabani,	the	Da’iyani,	the	Malika	and	the	Majdul,	each	
named	after	the	last	village	along	its	course	(Degeorge	1997).
Until the beginning of the 20th century, these urban canals were cleaned on an annual 
basis.	 This	 process	 took	 14	days	 for	 each	 canal	 and	was	 carried	 out	 in	 succession	 for	
the	Tawra,	Qanawat	and	Banias.	The	cost	of	 cleaning	of	 the	canals	was	divided	among	
local	residents,	though	along	the	Qanawat	only	the	owners	of	bathhouses,	cafés	and	inns	
contributed; private residences were exempt. Besides this yearly expense, users did not 
pay	 for	water	 in	Damascus.	This	was	a	rare	 luxury	 that	did	not	escape	 the	attention	of	
6 	According	to	Dimashki	(1874),	the	Tawra	was	dug	by	a	Greek	king	of	the	same	name.	According	to	
Degeorge	(1997),	the	name	is	derived	from	the	Aramaic	word	for	bull,	tōr or tawrā.
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medieval	chroniclers	such	as	Ibn	Asakir,	who	saw	it	as	“one	of	the	fortuitous	advantages	of	
this	town”,	as	in	most	other	countries,	water	could	only	be	obtained	by	payment	(Degeorge	
1997).	According	to	Tresse	(1929),	this	custom	continued	into	the	early	20th century, with 
users	only	paying	for	the	upkeep	of	the	canals.
The	cleaning	took	place	after	the	rainy	season,	so	that	the	land	was	sufficiently	irrigated	
to	cope	with	several	weeks	without	water.	Each	village	appointed	a	 team	of	workers	 to	
drain the canals and clean them out one by one, starting with the most northern branch 
and	working	gradually	southward.	Banks	were	rebuilt,	and	silt	and	mud	were	removed.	
When	the	water	was	let	back	into	the	canals	–	a	procedure	known	as	fatah al thaqab (the	
opening	of	the	hole)	–	a	torrent	of	spring	water	and	hundreds	of	fish	would	come	gushing	
down,	to	the	great	delight	of	fishermen,	who	threw	themselves	into	the	floods	armed	with	
nets	and	baskets	(Tresse	1929).
The	presence	of	an	uninterrupted	flow	of	fresh	water	was	also	reflected	and	celebrated	
in	 the	 layout	of	 the	Damascene	house,	which	was	designed	 to	provide	coolness	 in	 the	
stifling	 summer	months.	Centred	on	 its	 sheltered	 green	 courtyard,	 the	 traditional	 two-
storey	house	featured	a	fountain	in	the	middle	of	the	courtyard	(Fig.	6).	A	range	of	fruit	
trees and scented plants such as apricot, pomegranate, lemon and orange trees, vines 
and	 jasmine	 ensured	much-needed	 shade.	 Together	with	 additional	 small	 fountains	 in	
the reception and living rooms, the sound of running water was always present, a feature 
Figure 5. View	of	Damascus	 from	Salhiyeh,	with	 the	Ghuta	Oasis	 in	 the	 background,	 1898–1914.	
Source:	Library	of	Congress,	Prints	&	Photographs	Division.
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which was not only pleasant, but which also ensured that private conversations in the 
rooms could not be overheard by curious ears outside. Before all houses were connected 
to	a	piped	water	supply	network,	inhabitants	drew	water	from	wells	in	the	courtyards,	or	
from one of the seven branches of the Barada that ran nearest to the house.
Figure 6. Fountain	in	a	Damascus	courtyard,	1900.	Source:	Library	of	Congress,	Prints	&	Photographs	
Division.
As the city’s population increased to reach approximately 200,000 in 1906,7 water demand 
rose	 and	 the	 canals	 became	 increasingly	 polluted.	 The	 construction	 of	 the	 Ain	 al	 Fijeh	
water distribution system in the early 20th	 century	 allowed	 Fijeh	 Spring	 water	 to	 be	
conveyed	by	 gravity	 through	a	pipeline	 from	 its	 source	 in	 the	Anti-Lebanon	Mountains	
to	 an	 underground	 reservoir	 in	 the	Damascus	 neighbourhood	 of	 Salhiyeh,	 at	 the	 foot	
of	Mount	Qassioun.	From	the	reservoir,	which	was	 inaugurated	 in	1908,	 the	water	was	
distributed to about 200 public fountains, which became the city’s main source of water 
(Hudson	2008).	This	system	survives	today	with	two	tunnels	from	the	Fijeh	Spring:	the	old	
7 	According	to	the	Baedeker	Guide	to	Damascus	cited	in	Degeorge	(1994).
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one to Salhiyeh is rarely used and has been replaced by a new one that delivers water 
to the Wali Reservoir. The spring water is supplemented with water from various other 
sources in a bid to meet the ever-growing domestic demand.
ELEMEnTS oF THE WaTEr CrISIS
In	 the	1860s,	 the	Scottish	barrister	 John	MacGregor	explored	Egypt,	Palestine,	 and	 the	
Red	Sea	in	his	seven-metre-long	canoe,	the	Rob	Roy.	During	his	journey,	he	also	paddled	
through	Syria	and	was	the	first	traveller	to	sail	down	the	entire	course	of	the	Barada,	which	
he	declared	to	be	“one	of	the	most	interesting	of	the	ten	rivers	explored	on	this	journey”	
(MacGregor	1870:	115).	MacGregor	set	off	from	the	source	of	the	Barada	River,	which	he	
described	as	“a	Scotch	salmon-stream,	with	high	snow-clad	mountains	on	one	side	and	
bluff	rocks	on	the	other”	(Fig.	7).	From	here	he	descended	into	the	Ghuta	Plain,	where	the	
Barada	“was	about	sixty	feet	broad...	The	stream	is	swift,	and	tumbles	along	in	a	rugged	
bed,	with	a	very	lively	noise”.	Further	down	he	commented	on	“a	waterfall	and	torrents	of	
foam	with	dense	woods	all	round”	(Ibid.:	121–5).
Figure 7.	Illustration	from	John	MacGregor’s	travel	account	showing	his	descent	through	the	Barada	
Valley.	Source:	MacGregor	1870.	
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As	 he	 progressed	 through	 Damascus	 to	 the	 Ghuta	 Plain,	 MacGregor	 was	 puzzled	 to	
find	 that	 the	 river’s	 course	eastward	was	shrouded	 in	mystery,	with	 locals	describing	 it	
as	 “a	silent	and	desolate	 region”,	and	claiming	 that	 the	bleak	morass	at	 the	end	of	 the	
Barada	was	“impenetrable”	and	“full	of	whirlpools,	which	sucked	people	down;	of	hyenas,	
panthers,	and	wild	boars,	which	ate	people	up;	and	of	fevers,	agues,	snakes,	jungle,	sun-
strokes,	and	many	other	horrible	things”	(Ibid.:	130).	Undeterred	by	the	“stolid	ignorance	
or	stupid	exaggeration”	of	the	“natives”	(Ibid.:	129),	MacGregor	set	out	on	a	reconnaissance	
mission	to	explore	the	Damascus	Plain	on	horseback,	which	allowed	him	to	discover	the	
“marvellous	ingenuity	and	perseverance	with	which	the	Abana	has	been	led	through	the	
desert	to	water	it”	(Ibid.:	130).	He	commented:	“Certainly,	as	a	work	of	hydraulic	engineering,	
the system and construction of the canals by which the Abana and Pharpar are used for 
irrigation	may	be	still	considered	as	the	most	complete	and	extensive	in	the	world”	(Ibid.:	
120).
As	he	launched	the	Rob	Roy	down	the	Barada,	he	delighted	in	being	the	first	to	discover	
this rich landscape by boat:
The water was now red in colour and two feet deeper than before, being swollen 
high by mountain storms, and the channel led us away and away among orchards 
and	groves	and	thick	osier-beds	and	smiling	water-meadows.	Tortoises	sleeping	
on	the	bank	toppled	into	the	stream	as	we	passed,	and	land-crabs	lazily	crawled	
out	of	sight.	There	were	many	wild	ducks	in	the	river	brakes,	most	of	them	too	fat	
or lazy to rise, and I had to get out only seven or eight times to haul the canoe past 
obstructions, until on a sudden the ruddy current bore the Rob Roy right into an 
impassable	jungle	of	osiers	ten	feet	high	(Ibid.:	133).
MacGregor’s	account	is	all	the	more	remarkable	for	his	description	of	a	landscape	and	a	
water	network	that	can	today	hardly	be	imagined.	Reduced	to	a	seasonal	stream	that	was	
fed	more	by	sewage	and	wastewater	than	by	spring	water,	the	Barada	River	and	its	network	
of canals had largely disappeared by 2009. The gardens of the Ghuta had been decimated 
to	a	fifth	of	their	original	size,	while	some	of	the	most	fertile	lands	had	been	swallowed	up	
by	 the	sprawling	city	and	transformed	 into	chaotic	suburbs.	Meanwhile,	Damascus	was	
confronting a growing water shortage that authorities were struggling to resolve.
Pre-conflict	assessments	of	the	extent	of	the	water	deficit	 in	the	Barada/Awaj	Basin	
varied	widely,	ranging	from	212	million	cubic	metres	(MCM)	(Hoff	2009),	to	311	MCM,	450	
MCM	and	762	MCM.8	According	to	the	Damascus	Water	Supply	and	Sewerage	Authority	
8 	Figures	for	2000-1	cited	in	Elhadj	(2003)	from	the	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization,	World	Bank	
and	Syrian	Ministry	of	Irrigation	respectively.
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(DAWSSA)	statistical	yearbooks,	there	was	even	a	deficit	for	drinking	water.9	Various	Syrian	
sources	 indicated	a	fluctuating	annual	deficit	of	at	 least	190	MCM,	and	much	higher	 in	
drought	years	(Fallouh	2007),	for	the	whole	Barada/Awaj	Basin,	while	14	water	units	in	the	
Ghuta	reportedly	faced	a	chronic	deficit.	
In	practice,	domestic	users	 in	Damascus	City	were	hardly	affected	by	the	decline	 in	
water resources and still received tap water for 8-16 hours a day, with rooftop storage 
tanks	providing	uninterrupted	 supply	during	outage	periods.	Water	bills	 also	 remained	
low,	at	around	US$	8/month.	Conversely,	agricultural	users	in	the	Barada	Valley	and	Ghuta	
were severely impacted by the sharp decline in both surface and groundwater resources 
in	the	Damascus	area.	Villagers	and	farmers	in	the	Barada	Valley	had	seen	the	landscapes	
around them and their lives change, as the river had gradually dwindled to a seasonal 
stream over the last two decades. Farmers along the river’s course were forced to abandon 
agriculture and large parts of the Ghuta had been swallowed by urban sprawl encroaching 
from	the	west,	or	the	desert	advancing	from	the	east	(de	Châtel	2007).
While	Damascus	is	certainly	not	the	only	Middle	Eastern	city	to	suffer	from	growing	
water scarcity and problems of pollution, it does uniquely combine many of the factors 
that characterize the Arab region’s water crisis at large, including rapid population growth 
and soaring water demand, unsustainable groundwater use, pollution, uncontrolled 
urban expansion and illegal settlements, high water allocation to irrigated agriculture, 
low	water	tariffs,	both	for	urban	and	agricultural	water	use,	poor	governance,	and	a	weak	
legal	 framework.	The	current	conflict,	with	protracted	fighting	 in	the	suburbs	all	around	
Damascus	and	in	the	Barada	Valley,	has	only	worsened	the	situation.	
rapid population growth
Like	many	other	countries	in	the	region,	Syria’s	population	has	grown	exponentially	over	
the	past	60	years,	from	3.42	million	inhabitants	in	1950	to	20.4	million	in	2010	(UN-ESCWA	
2010).	Syria’s	annual	average	population	growth	rate	remained	among	the	highest	in	the	
Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(MENA)	region,	at	2.94%	in	2008.10 However, over the last 60 
years,	Damascus	has	grown	at	an	even	faster	rate.	This	trend	can	mainly	be	ascribed	to	the	
influx	of	migrants	from	rural	areas,	and	successive	waves	of	refugees	settling	in	the	capital	
and	its	suburbs.	In	1950,	Damascus	and	its	suburbs	had	a	population	of	701,000	(Elhadj	
2003:	18);	 in	2009,	the	population	reached	4.12	million	(Syria	Today	2009a).11 Following 
9 	Exact	figures	were	not	available,	as	DAWSSA	had	no	comprehensive	data	on	the	volume	of	water	it	
abstracted from aquifers in the Ghuta Plain. 
10 	The	growth	rate	has	dropped	from	an	average	of	3.75%	in	the	1970s	(UN-ESCWA	2008).	
11 	Official	government	figure.	Others	estimated	the	capital’s	population	to	lie	closer	to	6–7	million,	a	
third of the country’s population before 2011.
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the	Ba’ath	Party	 takeover	 through	a	military	coup	 in	1963,	 the	country’s	political	power	
structure	changed,	which	instigated	a	flood	of	migrants	from	coastal	rural	areas	between	
1963	and	1970	(Elhadj	2003).	The	capital’s	population	expanded	further	with	successive	
waves	of	 refugees	 from	Palestine,	 the	Golan	Heights	and	 Iraq	 in	1948,	1967	and	2003	
respectively.
In	general,	over	the	past	40	years,	the	Syrian	regime	has	concentrated	institutions	and	
services	in	Damascus,	which	has	further	encouraged	centralization	and	disproportionate	
growth	 in	 the	 capital.	 Government	 efforts	 to	 decentralize	 the	 economy	 and	 develop	
regional towns such as Homs, Tartous and Aleppo only started in the mid-2000s.
The movement of rural-urban migration that started in the 1960s has accelerated 
over	the	past	decade,	as	Syria	started	transitioning	to	a	“social	market	economy”.	Among	
others, this resulted in the liberalization of the agricultural sector and the cancellation 
of	agricultural	subsidies,	which	 led	many	 farmers	 to	abandon	their	 land	and	seek	work	
in	 the	 capital	 (see	 Chap.	 3	 and	 4).	 According	 to	 Aita	 (2009),	 460,000	 active	 people	 left	
the	agricultural	 labour	 force	between	2001	and	2007,	 representing	a	33%	decrease	 in	
jobs	 in	this	sector	 (and	10%	of	the	total	 labour	force).	Moreover,	a	devastating	drought	
in north-eastern Syria between 2006 and 2010 spurred further internal migration, with 
an	estimated	300,000	people	 leaving	 their	drought-stricken	 land	and	seeking	 refuge	 in	
makeshift	tent	camps	and	illegal	housing	in	the	capital’s	suburbs	(De	Châtel	2014).
rising demand, dwindling supply
Damascus’s	 soaring	 population	 has	 obviously	 had	 serious	 consequences	 for	 the	 city’s	
water	resources,	which	are	being	stretched	far	beyond	their	sustainable	limit.	Hoff	(2009)	
points	out	that	the	Barada/Awaj	Basin	disposes	of	less	than	5%	of	the	country’s	total	water	
resources,	while	30%	of	the	country’s	population	 is	concentrated	 in	the	area.	Based	on	
government	figures	from	2001,	the	water	balance	for	the	Barada/Awaj	Basin	presents	an	
annual	deficit	of	311	MCM,	with	a	total	water	availability	of	1,277	MCM	and	a	total	use	of	
1,588	MCM.	The	figures	show	that	the	deficit	is	mainly	caused	by	a	very	high	agricultural	
water	use,	estimated	at	1,207	MCM,	or	76%	of	total	water	use	(Varela-Ortega	and	Sagardoy	
2003).12
Elhadj	(2003)	blames	the	cumulative	effect	of	unsustainable	water	use	for	irrigation	in	
the	Barada/Awaj	region	for	the	depletion	of	the	aquifer.	Taking	the	long	view	of	irrigation	
development	in	the	Damascus	area,	he	estimates	an	annual	groundwater	over-abstraction	
of	200	MCM	for	irrigation	for	the	period	between	1950	and	2001,	bringing	the	aggregate	
water	 balance	 deficit	 to	 10	 billion	 cubic	metres	 (BCM)	 just	 for	 irrigation	 (and	 a	 further	
12 	Compared	to	an	estimated	85-90%	on	a	national	level.
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10	BCM	for	domestic	use).	In	1950,	an	estimated	80,776	ha	of	land	were	irrigated	in	the	
Ghuta Plain, suggesting a longer history of groundwater over-abstraction for irrigation and 
adding	to	the	10	BCM	abstracted	after	1950.
As	 the	 population	 of	 the	Damascus	 rose	 to	 200,000	 in	 the	 early	 20th century, and 
demand from the domestic sector increased, water allocation to irrigation should have 
been	 reduced	 in	order	 to	maintain	 a	positive	water	balance.	 Elhadj	 (2003)	 argues	 that	
successive	rulers	of	Damascus13	lacked	both	the	necessary	knowledge	of	the	aquifer	and	
its sources, and the political will to implement such a sectoral reallocation strategy in the 
basin.	Thus	instead	of	balancing	demand	from	different	sectors,	authorities	were	unable	
to control growing use in both the agricultural and domestic sectors, resulting in the 
depletion	of	the	aquifer,	a	lowering	of	the	water	table,	and	a	drop	in	spring	flow.
Damascus’s	 water	 supply	 –	 for	 domestic,	 agricultural,	 and	 industrial	 use	 –	 comes	
from	three	main	sources	today:	the	Barada	Spring,	the	Fijeh	Spring	–	both	of	which	mainly	
supply	drinking	water	to	Damascus	City	–	and	groundwater,	which	is	intensively	abstracted	
in	the	Barada	catchment	area	and	in	the	Ghuta	Plain	for	drinking	water	and	agricultural	
purposes.	As	mentioned	above,	the	Awaj	River,	which	originates	on	the	eastern	slopes	of	
Mount	Hermon,	no	longer	flows	beyond	the	village	of	Kisweh,	due	to	intensive	abstraction	
for	irrigation	purposes	(JICA	1996:	C-7).	The	Fijeh	Spring	still	forms	the	city’s	main	source	of	
drinking	water	supply	with	a	long-term	annual	average	discharge	of	200	MCM	(Al-Charideh	
2011).	The	karstic	spring	in	the	Anti-Lebanon	Mountains	is	replenished	annually	through	
rainfall and snowfall in the catchment area. The creation of a protection zone in 1989 has 
successfully protected the aquifer, with a ban on all construction, well drilling, and any 
commercial,	industrial,	agricultural,	tourism	or	urban	activities	(Al	Assad	1989).	For	most	of	
the	year,	the	entire	Fijeh	flow	volume	is	captured	and	transferred	to	Damascus	for	drinking	
water	purposes.	However,	in	periods	of	peak	flows,	spring	water	is	still	released	into	the	
riverbed. For the remainder of the year, only rainwater, untreated sewage, and irrigation 
return	flows	enter	the	riverbed	(Fig.	9).	In	periods	of	low	flow,	additional	water	is	pumped	
from	the	spring	to	supply	Damascus	City	with	drinking	water.
The	Barada	Spring,	which	until	1978	had	a	mean	long-term	annual	yield	of	99	MCM,	
has	shrunk	considerably.	Figures	for	the	period	1983-93	show	a	significant	reduction	in	
spring	yield	to	70	MCM/yr	(JICA	1996:	C-15).	Since	2000,	the	spring	only	flows	for	seven	to	
eight	weeks	a	year,	as	most	of	the	water	is	captured	by	wells	in	the	catchment	area	(Fig.	
8).	These	wells	are	used	for	irrigation	and	domestic	purposes	in	the	Zabadani	Valley	(Ibid.).	
In	addition,	a	well	field	made	up	of	22	wells	in	the	Barada	Spring	catchment	area	pumps	
water	to	the	Fijeh	Spring	and	on	to	Damascus	(Ibid.:	C-18).	The	well	field	was	commissioned	
13 	The	Ottomans	(1517-1918),	the	French	Mandate	(1920-46),	and	Syrian	governments	after	1946.	
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in 1995 and became fully operational a year later, with a pumping rate of 1m3/s	 (15.76	
MCM/yr).	An	additional	well	field	at	 Jabous	 in	a	different	area	of	 the	Barada	catchment	
supplements	the	drinking	water	supply.14
14 	 According	 to	 villagers	 in	 the	Barada	 Valley,	 the	 creation	 of	 this	well	 field	 had	 a	 severe	 impact	
on	river	flow,	and	after	the	wells	started	pumping	water	out	of	the	catchment,	the	level	of	the	river	
dropped dramatically.
Figure 8. The	Barada	Spring,	here	pictured	 in	2009,	used	to	 form	a	 lake	at	 the	head	of	 the	valley	
before	flowing	down	to	Damascus.	After	the	spring	almost	dried	up	in	2000,	the	lake	disappeared.	
Source: Adel Samara. 
Figure 9.	The	Barada	flowing	south	through	the	Damascus	Plain,	2009.	Source:	Adel	Samara.
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overexploitation and pollution of groundwater
As	 the	 water	 of	 the	 Barada	 and	 Fijeh	 no	 longer	 meet	 demand	 for	 drinking	 water	 in	
Damascus	and	its	suburbs,	supply	 is	augmented	by	groundwater	from	seven	well	fields	
in	the	Ghuta	Plain	that	are	operated	by	DAWSSA.	Water	from	the	Fijeh/Barada	Reservoir	
is	mainly	used	to	supply	Damascus;	the	villages	around	Damascus	are	supplied	by	water	
from over 1,000 wells in the Ghuta Plain. In 1995, these wells abstracted an estimated 30 
MCM/yr	 (Ibid.:	C-35).	No	recent	abstraction	figures	exist,	as	most	of	 these	wells	are	not	
metered,	but	the	drinking	water	deficit	 in	Damascus	Countryside	reportedly	 lies	around	
34	MCM/yr.
The city’s rapid population growth since the 1950s has had a far-reaching impact on 
the	Ghuta	Plain.	With	the	 influx	of	new	populations,	urban	areas	rapidly	expanded	 into	
the plain, swallowing up villages into the urban fabric, destroying parts of the irrigation 
network,	 and	 transforming	agricultural	 lands	 into	 residential	 areas.	On	 the	other	hand,	
the growing demand from the domestic sector meant that water from the Barada and 
Fijeh	Springs	no	longer	reached	the	Ghuta	canal	network,	and	that	the	agricultural	sector	
increasingly	had	to	rely	on	groundwater	(Naito	1986:	14)	with	an	exponential	increase	in	
the	number	of	wells,	 from	622	wells	 in	1947	(JICA	1996:	C-36)	 to	nearly	57,000	 in	2010	
(SADB	2012).	Over-pumping	of	groundwater	and	illegal	well	drilling	have	become	serious	
problems, despite the issuing of successive laws since 1959 to prohibit further drilling of 
wells.
Figure 10.	 Lake	 Ateibeh,	 into	which	 the	 Barada	 River	 used	 to	 discharge	 until	 1969.	 Source:	 Adel	
Samara.
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Over-pumping	of	aquifers	became	a	problem	across	the	country	after	diesel	motor	
pumps were introduced in the 1960s. Increased groundwater exploitation was part of 
the government policy to increase agricultural output and boost production of water-
thirsty crops such as cotton, wheat and sugar beet. Farmers obtained cheap loans to drill 
wells and install pumps, while fuel prices were heavily subsidized. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
tens	of	thousands	of	new	wells	were	sunk	with	and	without	licences	(Kloosterman	2009),	
boosting Syria’s total groundwater-irrigated area from 318,000 ha in 1985 to 727,000 ha 
in	2005	(SADB	2012).	From	the	late	1990s	onwards,	the	government	has	tried	to	limit	the	
drilling of illegal wells and legalize existing wells, most recently through a new water law 
issued	in	2005.	Despite	this,	57%	of	wells	across	the	country	were	still	illegal	in	2010,	and	
new wells continue to be dug.
Nearly	a	quarter	 (24.7%)	of	the	country’s	wells	were	concentrated	 in	the	Damascus	
region	 (Damascus	 Countryside	Governorate)	 in	 2010	 and	more	 than	 three-quarters	 of	
these	were	illegal	(76%).
Table 1. Number	of	wells	in	Syria	and	in	the	Damascus	area	(1982–2010)
year
number of wells
SourceSyria Damascus + Damascus Countryside
Total unlicensed Total unlicensed 
1982 - - - 12,000 Ministry	of	Irrigation	1982,	cited in Naito 1986.
1999 135,089 63,078 31,880 26,795 SADB	2012.
2010 229,881 130,997 56,961 43,246 SADB	2012.
Historically,	the	depth	to	groundwater	in	the	plain	around	Damascus	ranged	between	2	m	
in areas near the Barada River up to 70 m in the eastern and north-eastern Ghuta. Water 
tables have, however, dropped over the past 30 years as a result of over-abstraction. This 
led to the depletion of the shallow aquifer, pumping from deeper aquifers, and upconing15 
of saline water. While abstraction rates have dropped over past decades, groundwater 
levels	have	not	recovered,	indicating	a	very	low	recharge	rate	(Hobler	and	Rajab	2002).
In the period 1993-2000, groundwater levels declined by more than 6 m/yr in 
some parts of the Ghuta, while springs ran dry. In the western and central Ghuta, levels 
dropped	 by	 1-2	m/yr,	 while	 in	 the	 east,	 rates	were	 closer	 to	 3-4	m/yr.	With	 such	 high	
rates of abstraction and rapid decline of the water table, complete recovery of the aquifer 
15 	“Upward	movement	of	salt	water	in	a	cone-shaped	manner	from	below	a	freshwater/	saltwater	
interface,	under	the	influence	of	freshwater	pumping	above	the	interface”	(UN-ESCWA	and	BGR	2009).	
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is	unlikely,	and	would	require	several	successive	years	of	above-average	rainfall.	During	
drought periods, the situation is worse, with springs running dry and wells producing less 
water. Farmers resorted to drilling deeper wells, but these were often less productive, and 
contained more saline water.
The only area where groundwater levels were rising before 2002 was the area around 
Damascus’s	only	waste	water	treatment	plant	in	‘Adra,	in	the	northern	part	of	the	Ghuta,	
where	(partially)	treated	waste	water	allowed	(unintended)	artificial	recharge	of	the	aquifer,	
and groundwater levels rose up to 8 m/yr. However, in this area, groundwater pollution 
formed	a	growing	threat,	as	the	water	treated	at	the	‘Adra	plant	did	not	meet	the	required	
standards	 for	use	as	 irrigation	water.	Most	parts	of	Damascus	and	some	of	 its	eastern	
suburbs	 were	 connected	 to	 the	 sewage	 network,	 but	 most	 towns,	 villages,	 and	 farms	
in	 the	 Damascus	 Countryside	 released	 their	 untreated	 waste	 water	 into	 surrounding	
wadis	and	channels.	Farmers	used	 this	water	 for	 irrigation,	with	obvious	 risks	 to	public	
health.16 The agricultural drainage water had high levels of salinity and fertilizers, the latter 
causing	severe	pollution	by	nitrates.	Hobler	and	Rajab	noted	 in	2002	that	groundwater	
was	the	only	source	of	water	for	the	population	in	rural	areas	but	that	“if	drinking	water	
standards	for	groundwater	salinity	and	nitrate	contents…	are	taken	into	consideration,	the	
groundwater	in	large	parts	of	the	Ghuta	Plain	is	not	suitable	for	domestic	supply	anymore”	
(Hobler	 and	 Rajab	 2002:	 23).	Other	 sources	 of	 pollution	 included:	 untreated	 industrial	
waste water from small- and medium-sized industries such as tanneries, food processing, 
pharmaceutical and textile plants and slaughter houses; petrol stations and fuel depots; 
and untreated waste water and medical waste from hospitals, which contained high levels 
of pathogens and viruses.
As a result of the depletion of the shallow aquifer and soil salinization, many farmers 
have abandoned agriculture, particularly in the south-eastern Ghuta where the desert was 
encroaching on agricultural land from the east. However, at the same time, the Ghuta’s 
agricultural lands were also increasingly threatened by the urban expansion of the 
Damascus	suburbs	from	the	west.
uncontrolled urban development
The Syrian authorities had long been aware of the threat of uncontrolled urban expansion 
and	its	effects	on	the	Ghuta.	Several	urban	plans	attempted	to	address	the	city’s	chaotic	
and	voracious	spread	into	the	oasis.	Key	among	these	was	the	Ecochard	Plan,	which	was	
16 	According	to	figures	from	the	Ministry	of	Housing	and	Construction	from	2008,	10.2	million	people	
(47%	of	the	Syrian	population)	were	not	connected	to	the	sewage	system,	while	14.9	million	people	
(69%)	did	not	 have	 access	 to	proper	 sewage	 treatment.	 As	 a	 result	 partially	 treated	or	untreated	
sewage	flowed	into	the	environment	and	created	public	health	risks	(GTZ	and	SPC	2009).
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articulated	in	the	1930s	and	continued	to	influence	urban	development	in	the	capital	in	
the 21st	century.	Developed	by	the	French	urban	planner	Michel	Ecochard	and	architect	
Robert	Danger,	the	plan	highlighted	the	need	to	protect	the	Ghuta.
If this illegal mode of settlement is allowed to develop, the gardens will disappear 
and with them the green belt that surrounds the city. In only a very few years we 
will be left surprised to see that in their place there is a collection of shoddy and 
unhealthy	huts	spreading	the	worst	diseases.	(Degeorge	1994:	176)
The Ecochard Plan also focused on the city’s ever-growing water requirements. These were 
to be addressed by the creation of dams and reservoirs along the course of the Barada 
and	Awaj	Rivers,	and	at	the	Fijeh	Spring	(Degeorge	1994).	Nothing	came	of	the	plan	though,	
and the Ghuta was losing an estimated 200 ha each year to the advancing city in the 
late	2000s.	As	Damascus’s	population	grew	after	independence	in	1946,	the	city	sprawled	
uncontrollably, swallowing the Ghuta and its orchards, and expanding from 1,900 ha in 
1945	to	8,500	ha	in	1988	(Ibid.).	Thus	the	oasis	was	gradually	eaten	away	from	its	grand	
25,000	ha	to	less	than	6,500	ha	in	2010	(Syria	Today	2010b).	
The city’s uncontrolled expansion into the Ghuta can be explained by several factors, 
including	housing	shortage,	the	absence	of	a	government	housing	policy,	and	a	weak	legal	
framework,	which	led	to	uncontrolled	and	illegal	urban	development	on	the	most	fertile	
lands	in	the	Ghuta.	As	many	farmers	in	the	area	did	not	benefit	from	the	land	reforms	of	
1958	and	1963-70,	they	sold	their	plots	to	the	migrants	who	flocked	to	the	capital	in	the	
1960s and 1970s. The new landowners could then build cheap new homes, a development 
that	destroyed	large	parts	of	the	oasis	and	its	canal	networks	(Lababedi	2008). The results 
were	disastrous:	high-rise	blocks	were	slapped	together	along	narrow	streets	and	basic	
facilities such as sanitation, electric power, water supply and ventilation were virtually 
non-existent	(de	Châtel	2007).	During	the	1980s,	more	than	70%	of	housing	belonged	in	
this	category.	In	2009,	50%	of	urban	growth	in	Damascus	was	illegal	(Syria	Today	2009b)	
and	40%	of	 the	 city’s	population	 lived	 in	 informal	 settlements.	 The	 construction	of	 this	
concrete	ring	around	the	Old	City	was	the	last	step	in	destroying	the	link	between	the	city	
and its gardens. Further uncontrolled urbanization has engulfed the small villages around 
Damascus	 into	 the	urban	 fabric,	and	thousands	of	 trees	were	 felled	 to	make	space	 for	
small	workshops	and	light	industries	(Degeorge	1994:	196).
A prime ministerial decree issued in 1977 aimed to put a stop to uncontrolled 
development	 in	 the	 Ghuta,	 but	 the	 law	 had	 little	 effect,	 and	 development	 continued	
unabated.	Even	though	large	parts	of	Damascus	were	illegal	in	2009,	and	many	of	these	
neighbourhoods	 were	 poor	 and	 lacked	 facilities,	 the	 informal	 settlements	 cannot	 be	
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compared to the unsanitary and unserviced slums seen in South America, for instance. 
Middle-class	families	also	lived	in	informal	settlements,	sometimes	even	in	expensive	villas	
(Syria	Today	2009c).	The	continued	spread	of	illegal	neighbourhoods	can	be	ascribed	to	
a number of factors, including a continued housing shortage and continued rural/urban 
migration	due	to	a	lack	of	investment	in	other	urban	centres	and	in	rural	areas.	The	legal	
framework	 further	 enabled	 the	 growth	 of	 illegal	 housing	 areas.	 Houses	 built	 without	
government	 approval	 were	 referred	 to	 as	 “spontaneous	 houses”,	 a	 phenomenon	 that	
resulted	from	a	regulatory	glitch	that	allowed	Syrians	to	keep	their	house	-	even	without	a	
building	permit	-	if	it	had	a	concrete	roof	(Oxford	Business	Group	2006).	In	addition,	official	
government guidance from the 1980s stipulated that all informal settlements should be 
provided	with	basic	services	such	as	water,	sanitation,	electricity,	and	roads	(Syria	Today	
2009b),	further	enabling	the	development	of	illegally	built	neighbourhoods.
oPTIonS For THE FuTurE 
Before	the	uprising	in	2011,	Damascus	did	not	yet	suffer	from	water	shortage	on	the	same	
scale	as	for	example	the	Jordanian	capital	Amman.	However,	it	is	clear	that	solutions	need	
to be found for the medium to long term.
Water transfers 
Various	 options	 have	 been	 proposed	 over	 the	 past	 decades,	 including	water	 transfers	
from the coastal region or the Euphrates Basin in north-eastern Syria. The latter option 
has been repeatedly discussed since the 1980s, and consists of conveying water from 
Lake	Assad	(the	reservoir	of	the	Tabqa	Dam)	to	Damascus,	over	a	distance	of	441	km.	The	
scheme	projected	a	capacity	of	27	m3/s	or	an	annual	water	transfer	of	850	MCM	at	a	cost	
of US$ 1.5 billion or US$ 0.52/m3,	according	to	figures	from	the	early	2000s	(Elhadj	2003).	
In subsequent elaborations of the plan, mention was made of building a pipeline via the 
city	of	Palmyra	 in	 the	eastern	desert,	 in	order	 to	develop	the	 town	 into	a	major	 tourist	
attraction	 (Syria	Today	2009b).	Elhadj	 (2003)	points	out	 that	 this	scheme	 is	not	viable	–	
not	only	because	of	high	cost,	but	also	because	the	flow	regime	of	the	Euphrates	River	
has	been	significantly	reduced	in	the	past	three	decades	following	Turkey’s	construction	
of	 a	 series	of	 five	dams	 (with	a	 further	nine	planned)	on	 the	Euphrates,	 as	part	of	 the	
Southeastern	Anatolia	Project.	The	option	of	import	from	the	coastal	region	would	involve	
transfer	over	a	shorter	distance	(225	km),	but	over	greater	altitude	(1,000	m).	Water	in	the	
coastal	region	could	come	from	two	potential	sources:	freshwater	springs	off	the	coast	of	
Lattakia,	or	desalination	(Elhadj	2003).	Regardless	of	costs	of	transfer	and	pumping,	both	
options	would	present	added	expense:	either	extracting	water	from	the	offshore	springs,	
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or	desalinating	seawater.	The	cost	of	either	project	has	been	estimated	in	the	region	of	
US$ 2 billion, bringing the cost of one cubic metre of water to US$ 1.22/m3.
Improved water management
Mualla	(2008)	pointed	out	that	while	such	projects	would	resolve	the	Syrian	capital’s	water	
crisis,	both	projects	were	prohibitively	expensive	and	should	only	be	considered	after	all	
other local management options had been explored. These included improved demand 
management,	 increasing	 water	 use	 efficiency,	 reducing	 network	 losses,	 reallocation	 of	
shares between sectors to favour domestic and industrial use over agricultural use and the 
development of a water treatment and reuse strategy. In addition, the city’s urban growth 
needed to be slowed to curb the growing water demand. While the implementation of 
such policy measures is most viable in terms of cost, it poses a number of challenges, such 
as	the	reallocation	of	water	from	irrigation	to	domestic	use,	which	is	likely	to	be	politically	
problematic	(Elhadj	2003).	Moreover,	until	the	current	conflict	is	resolved,	it	is	unlikely	that	
authorities will focus on future domestic and agricultural demand or rehabilitation of the 
aquifer. 
ConCLuSIon
The rapid and uncontrolled development of the Syrian capital over the last 60 years 
has	had	 a	 severe	 environmental	 impact	 on	 the	 city	 of	Damascus	 and	 the	 surrounding	
Ghuta Plain. Rapid population growth, unsustainable water resource development, and 
uncontrolled	urban	expansion	have	contributed	 to	a	growing	water	deficit	 in	 the	basin	
and	to	environmental	damage	that	will	most	likely	never	be	repaired.	The	city’s	geographic	
location	in	an	arid	climatic	zone	on	the	edge	of	the	Syrian	Desert	means	that	no	obvious	or	
cheap alternative sources of water are available, though improved water management and 
in particular a lower water allocation to the agricultural sector could address the mounting 
water crisis.
However,	in	the	short	term,	none	of	these	measures	–	either	large-scale	inter-basin	
water	 transfers	or	policy	 reforms	–	are	 likely	 to	be	 implemented.	Since	 the	start	of	 the	
uprising	in	March	2011,	water	resources	and	improved	water	and	land	management	have	
slipped	even	further	down	the	list	of	government	priorities	in	Syria.	As	the	conflict	escalates	
and state institutions gradually collapse, uncontrolled abstraction from the aquifer, 
unregulated discharge of pollutants into surface and groundwater bodies and further 
degradation of neglected water infrastructure will become more widespread and more 
difficult	to	monitor.	As	a	result,	the	oasis	in	the	Syrian	Desert,	which	was	once	compared	to	
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the Garden of Eden and for centuries was reputed for its abundant freshwater resources, 
is	likely	to	suffer	further	decline,	as	landscapes	and	waterscapes	that	were	sustained	for	
millennia slowly disappear.
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CHaPTEr 3
The role of Drought and Climate Change
in the Syrian uprising:
untangling the Triggers of the revolution
InTroDuCTIon
More	than	two	years	after	the	first	protests	in	the	rural	town	of	Dara’a	in	March	2011,	what	
started as a peaceful uprising against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria has 
degenerated	 into	 a	bloody	 conflict.	 The	United	Nations	 (UN)	 estimates	 that	more	 than	
100,000	people	died	between	March	2011	and	September	2013	and	that	more	than	5,000	
are	dying	per	month	since	July	2012,	while	millions	of	officially	registered	and	unregistered	
refugees	are	scattered	 from	Egypt	 to	Turkey	and	beyond,	and	an	estimated	6.5	million	
people are internally displaced.1 
The	uprising	in	Syria	took	many,	including	many	Syrians,	by	surprise.	They	looked	on	
in	admiration	as	Tunisians,	Egyptians,	Libyans	and	Yemenis	took	to	the	streets	to	demand	
freedom,	justice	and	the	fall	of	their	respective	regimes,	but	largely	agreed	that	nothing	like	
that	would	ever	take	place	in	Syria.	Yet	less	than	two	months	after	Bashar	al-Assad	had	told	
the Wall Street Journal that Syria was immune to the wave of protests sweeping through 
the region,2 inhabitants	of	Dara’a,	Homs,	Hama	and	other	provincial	towns	poured	into	the	
streets demanding freedom, dignity and an end to corruption, in what has been described 
as	a	‘rural	and	rurban	Intifada’.3 
As in other Arab countries, the uprising in Syria was triggered by a series of social, 
economic and political factors, including, in this case, growing poverty caused by rapid 
economic liberalization and the cancellation of state subsidies after 2005, a growing rural-
urban	divide,	widespread	corruption,	rising	unemployment,	the	effects	of	a	severe	drought	
between	2006	and	2010	and	a	lack	of	political	freedom.4	More	recently,	media	and	analysts	
have also suggested that climate change plays an indirect role in the Arab Spring and the 
1 	http://syria.unocha.org/	accessed	27	March	2014.	
2  J.	Solomon	and	B.	Spindle.	‘Syria	Strongman:	Time	for	“Reform”’, Wall Street Journal,	31	Jan.	2011.	
3	 A.	 Bank	 and	 E.	 Mohns,	 ‘Die	 Syrische	 Revolte:	 Protestdynamik,	 Regimerepression	 und	
Internationalisierung’,	in	A.	Jünemann	and	A.	Zorob	(eds.), Arabellions. Zur Vielfalt von Protest und Revolte 
im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika (Wiesbaden:	VS	Springer,	2013),	pp.85-106.	
4 	Ibid.
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Syrian uprising.5
All	these	elements	are	connected	and	have	mutually	influenced	each	other,	making	it	
difficult	to	untangle	the	importance	of	different	‘triggers’	or	identify	any	single	one	as	the	
definitive	‘last	straw	that	broke	the	camel’s	back’.	As	a	result,	there	is	a	tendency	to	take	
certain	events	out	of	context	and	misinterpret	or	overstate	their	significance	in	relation	to	
the current events unfolding in Syria. 
This article attempts to contextualize the 2006-10 drought and place it in the broader 
framework	 of	 a)	 the	 economic	 reforms	 and	 market	 liberalization	 that	 were	 initiated	
in	 the	 2000s	 as	 part	 of	 Syria’s	 transition	 to	 a	 social	 market	 economy,	 b)	 the	 recent	
history of agricultural development and water management in Syria and the large-scale 
mismanagement	 of	 resources	 over	 the	 last	 50	 years	 and	 c)	 the	 Syrian	 regime’s	 failure	
to	acknowledge	and	address	the	impact	of	this	mismanagement.	The	article	is	based	on	
extensive	research	that	was	carried	out	in	Syria	between	2006	and	2010,	including	fieldwork	
in	the	Jezira	region	in	2008	and	2009,	interviews	with	Syrian	officials	and	interviews	with	
migrants	who	left	drought-affected	areas	and	settled	temporarily	in	Damascus,	Damascus	
Countryside	and	Dara’a	governorates	in	Syria	and	in	the	suburbs	of	Beirut	and	the	Mount	
Lebanon	 region	 in	 Lebanon.	 This	 data	 was	 complemented	 by	 information	 from	 the	
literature, reports from UN agencies and media reports. 
I will argue that it was not the drought per se, but rather the government’s failure to 
respond to the ensuing humanitarian crisis that formed one of the triggers of the uprising, 
feeding	a	discontent	that	had	long	been	simmering	in	rural	areas.	Drought	forms	an	integral	
part	of	Syria’s	(semi-)arid	climate	and	is	not	an	exceptional	phenomenon.	Countries	in	the	
region	such	as	Iraq,	Israel,	Jordan,	Lebanon	and	Palestine	were	also	affected	by	drought	
in 2007-8, but only Syria experienced a humanitarian crisis, with large-scale migration of 
populations and widespread malnutrition. I will argue that this can be explained by the fact 
that the humanitarian crisis in fact predated the drought.
Similarly, climate change per se	–	to	the	extent	that	its	predicted	effects	would	already	
be	visible	–	did	not	drive	Syrians	into	the	street	in	protest;	it	was	the	Syrian	government’s	
failure to adapt to changing environmental, economic and social realities. 
While	climate	change	may	have	contributed	to	worsening	the	effects	of	the	drought,	
overstating its importance is an unhelpful distraction that diverts attention away from 
the core problem: the long-term mismanagement of natural resources. Furthermore, an 
exaggerated focus on climate change shifts the burden of responsibility for the devastation 
5 	T.	 Friedman,	 ‘The	Scary	Hidden	Stressor’,	The New York Times, 2	March	2013;	C.E.	Werrel,	 and	F.	
Femia	(eds.),	The Arab Spring and Climate Change, Centre for American Progress, Stimson, The Centre 
for	Climate	and	Security	(2013);	F.	Femia	and	C.E.	Werrel,	‘Climate	Change	Before	and	After	the	Arab	
Awakening:	The	Cases	of	Syria	and	Libya’,	in	Werrel	and	Femia,	The Arab Spring and Climate Change, 
pp.23-38;	S.	Mohtadi,	‘Climate	change	and	the	Syrian	uprising’,	Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 Aug. 
2012. 
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of Syria’s natural resources away from the successive Syrian governments since the 1950s 
and allows the Assad regime to blame external factors for its own failures. 
The drought hit hardest in the north-east, a region that was on the one hand the 
most impoverished and neglected part of the country, but which was also the country’s 
breadbasket	and	source	of	oil.	Since	2000,	this	region	had	been	rapidly	sinking	further	into	
poverty as groundwater reserves were depleted and a series of overambitious agricultural 
development	 projects	 overstretched	 both	 land	 and	water	 resources.	 The	 drought	 that	
struck	in	2006	merely	formed	a	final	coup de grâce. It was not a sudden, catastrophic event; 
it merely exacerbated an already disastrous situation. It did not trigger a humanitarian 
crisis; it merely highlighted the rising poverty levels and accentuated a series of trends that 
had	been	 taking	shape	 for	decades.	The	humanitarian	crisis	 that	 followed	 the	2006-10	
drought can thus be seen as the culmination of 50 years of sustained mismanagement 
of water and land resources, and the dead end of the Syrian government’s water and 
agricultural policies. The extent to which climate change exacerbated the situation is 
debatable, but in any case should not reduce the burden of responsibility on the Syrian 
government. 
DrougHT In SyrIa
The Syrian climate is characterized as arid to semi-arid, with broad variations in precipitation 
levels	between	the	Mediterranean	coast	in	the	west	(≤1,400	mm/yr)	and	the	eastern	desert	
areas	(<200	mm/yr).	About	55%	of	the	country	is	covered	in	desert	and	steppe	land;	annual	
precipitation	in	more	than	90%	of	the	country	lies	below	350	mm.	
Drought	 forms	 a	 structural	 part	 of	 this	 (semi-)arid	 climate,	 with	 cycles	 of	 wet	 and	
dry	years.	Over	the	 last	50	years	from	1961	to	2009,	Syria	experienced	nearly	25	years	
of	drought,	which	 represents	over	40%	of	 the	period.	On	average,	 the	droughts	 lasted	
around four and a half years each, though a drought in the 1970s lasted 10 consecutive 
years.6 A	number	of	droughts	of	two	or	more	years	had	a	significant	impact	on	agricultural	
production	and	livestock	in	the	country’s	north-east:	a	drought	in	1961	resulted	in	the	loss	
of	80%	of	 the	camel	population	and	50%	of	sheep.	 In	 the	1998-2001	drought,	329,000	
people	 (47,000	 nomadic	 households)	 had	 to	 liquidate	 their	 livestock	 assets,	 suffered	
food	 shortages	 and	 required	 urgent	 food	 assistance,	 which	 was	 “not	 an	 exceptional	
occurrence”.7
6  C.	 Breisinger,	 T.	 Zhu,	 P.	 Al	 Riffai,	 G. Nelson,	 R.	 Robertson,	 J.	 Funes,	D.	 Verner,	 ‘Global	 and	 Local	
Economic	 Impacts	 of	 Climate	 Change	 in	 Syria	 and	 Options	 for	 Adaptation’,	 International	 Food	
Policy Research	Institute,	Discussion	Paper	01091	(2011),	p.23.
7  F.	Hole,	‘Drivers	of	Unsustainable	Land	Use	in	the	Semi-Arid	Khabur	River	Basin,	Syria’,	Geographical 
Research,	Volume	47(1)	(2009),	pp.4-14.
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The	 link	between	climate	change	and	drought	 in	the	Eastern	Mediterranean	region	
and in Syria has been highlighted in a number of studies based on climate models, which 
predict	that	the	effects	of	climate	change	will	lead	to	more	frequent	and	harsher	droughts,	
higher temperatures and lower and more unpredictable precipitation levels.8 However, 
other analysts point out that there is very little solid evidence to date of such changes. 
“The	only	available	evidence	that	global	warming	will	lead	to	more	extreme	weather	events	
relies	on	modeling.	Data	do	not	really	sustain	this	hypothesis	so	far.”9
Data	collected	in	Syria	shows	that	the	overall	frequency	of	droughts	had	not	increased	
over	the	last	20	years,	except	in	one	of	the	country’s	five	agricultural	zones.	Yet	farmers	and	
Bedouins	in	affected	areas	perceived	an	increase	in	droughts.	“One	possible	explanation	
is that the impacts of droughts may have become more severe due to higher population 
densities and groundwater depletion. […] Therefore, even for the same severity of drought, 
the	socio-economic	consequences	can	be	much	greater	than	that	in	the	past.”10 Farmers 
in	the	Jezira	region	interviewed	in	2009	complained	about	the	increase	in	hot	sand	storms,	
which	“burnt”	their	crops.	They	explained	this	new	phenomenon	by	the	desertification	of	
steppe land in Syria’s eastern governorates. Far from being a result of diminishing rainfall 
and	climate	change,	this	rapid	desertification	can	be	explained	by	the	massive	overgrazing	
of Syria’s steppe lands following the nationalization of the steppe and the abolishment of 
tribes in 1958.11 
According	 to	 conservationist	 and	 ecologist	 Gianluca	 Serra	 who	worked	 on	 various	
conservation	projects	in	the	Syrian	steppe	from	2000	to	2010,	“the	vegetation	in	the	desert	
naturally adapts to droughts and wet periods. If the ecosystem is healthy, the vegetation 
can	deal	with	prolonged	droughts”.12 Experiments carried out over a period of 10 years in 
Al	Talila	Reserve,	Syria’s	first	nature	reserve,	in	the	eastern	desert	conclusively	showed	that	
the	mismanagement	and	over-exploitation	of	resources	lay	at	the	root	of	desertification,	
not drought or climate change. Between 2000 and 2010, researchers created protected 
enclosures	where	grazing	was	 forbidden	or	controlled	 (grazing	of	antelope	 rather	 than	
sheep)	 as	 opposed	 to	 all	 the	 surrounding	 areas	where	 intensive	 grazing	of	 sheep	was	
8 	Breisinger	et	al.,	 ‘Global	and	Local	Economic	Impacts’;	M.	Hoerling,	J.	Eischeid,	J.	Perlwitz,	X.	Quan,	
Z.	Zhang,	P.	Pegion,	 ‘On	the	Increased	Frequency	of	Mediterranean	Drought’,  Journal of Climate, 25	
(2012),	pp.2146–2161;	H.	Hoff,	 ‘Climate	Change,	 impacts	and	adaptation	 in	 the	MENA	region,	with	
focus	on	Syria’,	Stockholm	Environment	Institute	and	Potsdam	Institute	for	Climate	Impact	Research	
(2012),	unpublished	draft.
9 	B.	Tertrais,	‘The	Climate	Wars	Myth’,	The Washington Quarterly,	34:3	(2011),	p.21.
10 	Breisinger	et	al.,	‘Global	and	Local	Economic	Impacts’,	p.24.
11 	Hole,	‘Drivers	of	Unsustainable	Land	Use’.
12 	Interview	with	Gianluca	Serra,	conservation	biologist,	July	2009.
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allowed as elsewhere in the steppe. The vegetation in the enclosures fully recovered, 
creating	green	pastures,	while	outside	 the	reserve	 the	desert	continued	to	spread	 (Fig.	
11).13
This	refutes	the	claim	that	it	is	climate	change	or	drought.	[…	Decision	makers]	can’t	
hide	behind	external	causes	like	climate	change	and	droughts.	Mismanagement	
and unsustainable regulations have allowed for the over-exploitation of natural 
resources.	 […]	 These	 ecosystems	 have	 a	 major	 economic	 value	 so	 combating	
desertification	 is	 important	 for	 the	 national	 economy.	 Not	 to	 mention	 that	
13 	G.	Serra,	M.	Mirreh,	H.	Kaddour,	T.	Razzouk,	A.	Al	Jundi,	A.	Kanani,	C.	Batello,	D.	Williamson,	Assessment 
And Characterization of Al Talila Reserve and Surrounding Palmyrean Desert,	 Italian	 Development	
Cooperation,	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization,	Syrian	General	Commission	for	Badia	Management	
and	Development,	Syrian	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Agrarian	Reform	(2009),	pp.35-6,	81-2.
Figure 11.	 Experimental	 enclosure	 outside	 Al	 Talila	 showing	 different	 effects	 of	 grazing	 tenure:	
uncontrolled	sheep	grazing	(left,	outside	the	enclosure)	versus	no	grazing	(right,	inside).	Source:	Serra	
2009.
76
Part II
desertification	in	many	parts	of	the	world	has	fuelled	socio-economic	conflict	and	
wars	because	when	people	start	to	starve,	tension	rises.	It	should	be	taken	very	
seriously.14
The extent to which climate change played a role in triggering the Syrian uprising is the 
topic of growing debate. Writing about the Arab Spring in general, one analysis argues 
that	while	climate	change	did	not	cause	conflict	or	unrest	on	its	own,	it	played	a	significant	
role	 as	 a	 “threat	multiplier”.15 However, it also underlines the complexity of predicting 
the future impact of climate change, not only on the environment but also on social and 
political	unrest	or	conflict.	 “The	very	complexity	and	multiplicity	of	the	possible	paths	of	
which	climate	change	is	but	a	small	part	makes	prediction	impossible.	Any	role	that	climate	
change plays in certain events can only be discerned after the fact, and its increased 
contribution	to	threats	cannot	be	quantified.”16
 In the case of Syria, where there are so many other evident causes of the current 
conflict,	 it	 seems	 unproductive	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 possible	 role	 of	 climate	 change	 in	 the	
uprising,	or	indeed	in	possible	future	conflict.	Climate	change	may	cause	more	frequent	
and harsher drought in Syria, but the ongoing failure to rationalize water use and enforce 
environmental and water use laws certainly constitutes a much greater threat to the 
country’s natural resources. Rather than seeing the 2006-10 drought in north-eastern 
Syria	as	a	harbinger	of	catastrophic	climate	change	and	conflict	scenarios,	 it	 should	be	
considered	on	the	backdrop	of	years	of	mismanagement,	unsustainable	policy	making	and	
rising	rural	poverty,	which	fuelled	pre-existing	discontent	and	sparked	the	first	protests.	
The long dry spell
While	the	2007-8	season	registered	as	the	worst	regional	drought	in	40	years,	the	overall	
impact of the 2006-10 drought in north-eastern Syria was undoubtedly exacerbated by a 
long legacy of resource mismanagement. 
During	the	2007-8	season,	average	rainfall	across	Syria	dropped	to	66%	of	the	long-
term	average,	with	some	regions	receiving	no	rain	at	all	(Fig.	12).	The	drought	also	affected	
Iraq,	Israel,	Jordan,	Lebanon	and	Palestine.17 Syria’s north-east received less than half of the 
long-term	average	in	rainfall,	with	the	governorates	of	Hassakeh,	Deir	ez-Zor	and	Raqqa	
14 	Interview	with	G.	Serra.	
15 	S.	 Johnstone	and	J.	Mazo,	 ‘Global	Warming	and	the	Arab	Spring’,	 in	Werrel	and	Femia,	The Arab 
Spring and Climate Change, p.15.
16 	Ibid.,	p.20.	
17 	A.	Brown,	‘Middle	East	Faces	Widespread	Drought	and	Devastated	Crops’,	Alertnet,	14	Aug.	2008.
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registering	shortfalls	of	66%,	60%	and	45%	respectively.18 As a result, average yield of basic 
crops	dropped	by	32%	in	irrigated	areas	and	as	much	as	79%	in	rain-fed	areas.	Wheat	and	
barley	yields	dropped	by	47%	and	67%	respectively	compared	to	the	previous	year.	The	
consequences for national agricultural production were devastating: the 2007-8 wheat 
harvest	came	in	at	2.1	million	tonnes,	compared	to	the	long-term	average	of	4.7	million	
tonnes	(of	which	3.8	million	tonnes	was	consumed	internally),	forcing	Syria	to	import	wheat	
for	the	first	time	in	15	years.19 
The pattern of poor rainfall continued in parts of the country in 2008-9, particularly 
in	 the	north-eastern	 governorates	of	Deir	 ez-Zor,	Hassakeh	and	Raqqa.	 It	 is	 important	
to	note,	however,	 that	rainfall	 in	other	regions	 largely	recovered	by	2008-9.	Specifically,	
18 	 Syria	 Drought	 Response	 Plan	 2009-2010	 Mid-Term Review.	 United	 Nations	 Office	 for	 the	
Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs	(2010),	p.4	(hereafter	UN-OCHA,	2010).
19 	J.	Lennert,	‘Tough	Times’,	Syria Today,	May	2009.
Figure 12.	Drought	in	Raqqa	Governorate,	Syria,	2008.	Source:	Adel	Samara.
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many	media	reports	after	2011	erroneously	stated	that	the	governorate	of	Dara’a,	where	
the	first	protests	started,	had	been	severely	affected	by	the	four-year	drought.20 However, 
precipitation levels in this governorate recovered to average levels in 2008-9 and exceeded 
the average in the 2009-10 season.21 This also explains why farmers from the north-east 
migrated	to	this	region	to	find	work	after	2008.	The	population	of	Dara’a	initially	took	to	the	
streets	to	protest	against	the	arrest	of	15	children	in	March	2011	and	later	demonstrated	
against corruption,22 notably in the domain of well licensing and groundwater use.
In 2009-10, rainfall levels recovered across the country, though the north-east was 
plagued by irregular rainfall patterns, with 55 consecutive days without rain during the 
crucial	months	of	February	and	March,	after	good	rainfall	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	rainy	
season.	In	addition,	farmers	producing	soft	wheat	on	irrigated	land	suffered	widespread	
losses	in	their	crop	due	to	an	outbreak	of	yellow	wheat	rust,	a	fungal	disease,	which	spread	
rapidly owing to the previous years of drought.23 As a result, the 2009-10 wheat crop came 
in	at	3.2	million	tonnes,	well	short	of	the	4-5	million	tonnes	predicted	by	the	government.24	
Malnutrition and migration
The consecutive years of drought had a heavy impact on rural populations throughout the 
country,	but	particularly	affected	farming	communities	in	the	north-eastern	governorates.	
Broadly	 known	 as	 the	 Jezira,25 this region has long been among the country’s least 
developed.	Documentary	films	such	as	Omar	Amiralay’s	Everyday Life in a Syrian Village, 
A Flood in Baath Country and Reem Al-Ghazzi’s Lights paint a vivid picture of the extreme 
poverty that existed among rural communities in this region before 2006 and the impact 
of	large-scale	dam	construction	on	the	Euphrates	River	since	the	1970s.	Despite	the	fact	
that	the	Jezira	harboured	the	country’s	oil	supplies	and	provided	staple	agricultural	crops	
such as wheat and barley, it had a high poverty rate, low healthcare level, high illiteracy and 
few economic alternatives to agriculture. 
Figures	from	2004	show	that	the	north-eastern	region	(governorates	of	Aleppo,	Deir	
20 	For	example,	R.	Mills,	‘Long	drought	that	helped	to	spark	an	uprising	in	Syria’,	The National, 21 Aug. 
2012;	Z.	Karam,	‘Syrian	troops	fire	on	protesters,	kill	20’,	The Globe and Mail,	25	March	2011.
21 	Syrian	Agricultural	Database,	available	at	http://www.napcsyr.org/sadb.htm,	accessed	on	13	March	
2013.
22 	Bank	and	Mohns,	‘Die	Syrische	Revolte’.	
23 	Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food on his mission to Syria, Addendum, United Nations 
Human	Rights	Council,	27	Jan.	2011	(hereafter	UN-HCR,	2011).
24 	‘Yellow	wheat	rust	hits	supplies’,	IRIN News, 19 Aug. 2010.
25 	‘Jezira’	means	island	in	Arabic	and	refers	to	the	region	situated	between	the	Tigris	and	Euphrates	
Rivers	in	Syria,	comprising	the	governorates	of	Deir	ez-Zor,	Hassakeh	and	Raqqa.
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ez-Zor,	Hassakeh,	Idleb	and	Raqqa)	had	the	greatest	incidence,	depth	and	severity	of	rural	
and	urban	poverty,	with	58.1%	of	Syria’s	poor	concentrated	in	the	region.	This	region	also	
had	the	highest	percentage	of	people	living	under	two	dollars	per	day	in	Syria	(8.53%	and	
21.59%	for	the	urban	and	rural	areas,	respectively).	And	while	poverty	rates	decreased	in	
other	parts	of	Syria	between	1996-97	and	2003-4,	they	rose	in	rural	parts	of	the	north-
eastern governorates.26 
The 2006-10 drought enhanced this trend. According to several UN assessments 
between 2008 and 2011,27 1.3m	people	were	affected	by	the	drought,	with	800,000	people	
“severely	affected”.28 As the drought extended into a second and third year, the population 
was less and less able to cope: with no crops for two consecutive years, farmers had no 
seeds	anymore,	while	herders	were	forced	to	sell	or	slaughter	their	flocks	due	to	a	lack	of	
pasture and fodder.29
Malnutrition,	which	was	already	widespread	 in	the	 impoverished	north-east,	rapidly	
increased,	with	 up	 to	 80%	of	 those	 severely	 affected	 surviving	 on	 a	 diet	 of	 bread	 and	
sugared tea.30 Data	from	the	three	worst-affected	governorates	indicated	a	drastic	increase	
in	nutrition-related	diseases	between	2006	and	2010,	with	42%	of	six-	to	12-month-old	
children	suffering	from	anaemia	in	Raqqa	Governorate.	In	2010,	the	UN	estimated	that	3.7	
million	people,	or	17%	of	the	Syrian	population,	were	food	insecure,	which	included	more	
than	2	million	people	who	were	living	in	extreme	poverty	in	2003-4.31
Economic reforms
As	 the	 drought	 continued	 into	 its	 second	 and	 third	 year	 and	 the	 affected	 populations	
became increasingly vulnerable, the Syrian government cancelled a number of state 
26 	 Poverty in Syria 1996-2004, Diagnosis and Pro-Poor Policy Considerations, United Nations 
Development	Programme	(2005),	p.27.	Syria’s	north-eastern	region	is	usually	defined	as	encompassing	
the	governorates	of	Deir	ez-Zor,	Hassakeh,	Raqqa	and	Qamishli.	However,	this	report	defines	north-
eastern	Syria	as	including	Idleb,	Aleppo,	Al	Raqqa,	Deir	ez-Zor	and	Hassakeh.	
27 	 Drought Assessment Mission Syria 2007/2008,	 Food	 and	 Agriculture	 Organization,	 World	 Food	
Programme,	 United	 Nations	 Development	 Programme,	 World	 Health	 Organization,	 The	 United	
Nations	Children’s	Fund,	International	Organization	of	Migration	(2008);	Syria Drought Response Plan 
2009,	United	Nations	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs	(2009)	(hereafter	UN-OCHA,	
2009);	UN-OCHA,	2010;	UN-HCR,	2011.	
28 	The	UN	needs	assessment	mission	in	June	2009	concluded	that	the	severely	affected	population	
was largely below the extreme poverty line of US$ 1/person/day with high vulnerability due to loss of 
assets,	lack	of	future	sources	of	livelihood,	and	degradation	of	fields	and	pastures.
29 	UN-OCHA,	2010,	p.5.
30 	UN-OCHA,	2009,	p.9.
31 	UN-HCR,	2011,	p.4.
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subsidies in 2008 and 2009, which multiplied the price of diesel fuel and fertilizer overnight. 
For	many	farmers	in	the	Jezira	and	elsewhere	in	the	country,	this	formed	a	greater	burden	
than the successive years of drought and spurred their decision to abandon their land. 
Hinnebusch gives a clear explanation of why Bashar al-Assad’s attempt to open the 
Syrian	 economy	 to	 the	world	market	 through	 a	 progressive	 transition	 from	 a	 centrally	
planned	 economy	 to	 a	 ‘social	market	 economy’	 failed	 and,	 ultimately,	 led	 to	 the	 2011	
uprising.32 In the agricultural sector, deregulation measures since 1986 had led to the 
phasing out of certain subsidies and other forms of support for farmers. This movement 
was accelerated under the 10th	Five-Year	Plan	(2006-2010)	in	a	bid	to	integrate	the	Syrian	
economy into the global system and prepare the country for accession to the World Trade 
Organization.	The	move	to	cut	Syrian	dependency	on	subsidies	was	necessary	 from	an	
economic	point	of	view	given	the	growing	budget	deficit.	However	the	lack	of	social	safety	
nets left many in the agricultural sector unable to cope. 
According	 to	official	figures,	agriculture	employed	19.5%	of	 the	country’s	workforce	
in 2005-6.33 However,	others	estimate	the	figure	at	40-50%,	particularly	given	the	growing	
proportion	of	 the	workforce	employed	 in	 the	 informal	sector.34	The liberalization of the 
agricultural	sector	after	2000	led	to	a	significant	decrease	in	agricultural	 jobs.	Estimates	
based	on	Syrian	labour	force	surveys	showed	that	460,000	active	people	stopped	working	
in	the	agricultural	sector	between	2001	and	2007,	representing	a	33%	decrease	in	jobs	in	
this	sector	(and	10%	of	the	total	labour	force),	while	agricultural	Gross	Domestic	Product	
rose	by	9%.	Most	jobs	were	lost	in	2003	and	2004,	two	years	not	affected	by	drought.35 
The	cancellation	of	the	subsidy	on	diesel	fuel	in	May	2008	pushed	prices	up	overnight	
from	 SYP	 7	 (US$	 0.14)	 to	 SYP	 25	 (US$	 0.53).36 Farmers in Syria use diesel to extract 
groundwater	for	 irrigation	and	pump	surface	water	to	their	fields,	but	also	to	transport	
32 	 R.	 Hinnebusch,	 ‘Syria:	 from	 “authoritarian	 upgrading”	 to	 revolution?’	 International Affairs, 88:1 
(2012),	pp.95-113.	
33 	Y.	Meslmani,	National Circumstances/Syria’s Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC, United 
Nations	Development	Programme	(2008).
34 	H.	Harding,	 ‘Working	in	the	Grey	Zone’,	Syria Today,	May	2010.	According	to	the	United	Nations	
Development	Programme,	Syria’s	 informal	sector	was	increasing	in	size	in	2010,	making	up	45%	of	
the	workforce.
35 	UN-HCR,	2011.	
36 	D.	Haidar	and	F.	de	Châtel,	‘Leaving	the	Land’,	Syria Today,	May	2009,	pp.35-7.	On	12	April	2008,	
the	government	instated	a	coupon	system	allowing	poor	families	to	buy	1,000	L	of	diesel	at	SYP	9/L	
(0.19	US$/L).	While	this	was	intended	to	cover	home	heating	costs,	many	farmers	used	the	fuel	for	
agricultural production and heated their house with dried sheep dung and other agricultural waste 
products.	The	validity	of	the	government-issued	coupons	expired	on	1	April	2009.	On	31	March	2009,	
the	government	announced	it	would	cut	the	prices	of	diesel	nationwide	from	SYP	25	to	SYP	20	(US$	
0.53	to	US$	0.42),	but	for	many	farmers	it	was	still	impossible	to	make	a	profit.
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their	goods	 to	market	afterwards.	Seen	 from	a	purely	environmental	point	of	 view,	 the	
move	to	abolish	subsidies	was	entirely	justified	given	the	alarming	state	of	the	country’s	
groundwater reserves that have been largely depleted since the introduction of diesel 
motor pumps in the 1960s.37	But	the	price	hike,	which	came	just	weeks	before	the	harvest,	
forced many farmers in the north-east to stop irrigating their already meagre crop. 
Others	were	able	to	continue	irrigating	until	the	harvest,	but	were	subsequently	unable	to	
transport	their	produce	to	market.	Younes	Berho,	a	farmer	from	the	Raqqa	region,	fed	his	
red	pepper	crop	to	his	sheep	in	2008,	as	he	could	not	afford	the	price	of	transport	to	the	
market	in	Aleppo	following	the	subsidy	cuts.	Many	farmers	who	abandoned	their	land	and	
left	the	Jezira	in	2008-9	echoed	Berho’s	experience.	
In	May	2009,	the	price	of	chemical	fertilizer	was	also	liberalized	and	prices	doubled	
from	 SYP	 450	 to	 SYP	 900	 (US$	 9.60	 to	US$	 19.15)	 per	 50	 kg,	 worsening	 the	 plight	 of	
farmers.38	 The	average	monthly	salary	 in	Syria	 in	2009	was	US$	242,	but	most	 farmers	
earned	significantly	less	than	this,	with	30%	of	workers	in	the	agricultural	sector	earning	
US$ 109 or less.39 
Following the subsidy cuts in 2009, farmers and herders from the north-east massively 
abandoned their land and migrated to urban areas and the southern governorates in 
search	 of	 work.	 While	 seasonal	 migration	 –	 particularly	 of	 men	 seeking	 work	 in	 the	
construction	industry	in	Aleppo,	Beirut	and	Damascus	–	has	long	been	common	in	rural	
areas, migration of whole families was a relatively new phenomenon. For example, families 
who	lost	their	lands	after	the	construction	of	the	Tishrin	Dam	on	the	Euphrates	in	1999	
migrated	 to	 the	Damascus	suburb	of	Hamouriyeh	and	were	still	 living	 there	 in	 tents	 in	
2009.	Dozens	of	drought	victims	settled	in	a	tent	camp	in	Mzeirieb	near	Dara’a	from	2008	
onwards, but inhabitants of the camp and their relatives in the north-east said the camp 
had	existed	for	more	than	10	years.	The	drought	just	meant	it	had	expanded	(see	Chap.	4).
While	 no	 exact	 figures	 exist,	 UN	 agencies	 estimated	 that	 up	 to	 65,000	 families	 or	
around 300,000 people migrated from the north-east,40	and	that	60-70%	of	villages	in	the	
governorates	of	Hassakeh	and	Deir	 ez-Zor	had	been	deserted	 in	2009.41 In reality this 
figure	is	likely	to	have	been	a	lot	higher	as	no	comprehensive	study	was	ever	carried	out	
on	the	number	of	 internally	displaced	people	and	the	figures	did	not	take	 into	account	
37 	F.	de	Châtel,	‘Mining	the	Deep’,	Syria Today,	Jan.	2010,	pp.48-51.
38 	UN-HCR,	2011,	p.15.	Prices	of	fertilizer	rose	293%	for	superphosphate,	202%	for	nitrate	and	458%	
for potassium. 
39 	‘Syria’s	average	monthly	salary	at	SYP	11,133,’	Syria Today,	May	2010.	
40 	UN-OCHA,	2010.	
41 	UN-OCHA,	2009.
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workers	and	families	who	crossed	to	Lebanon.	The	migrants	settled	in	makeshift	illegal	tent	
camps	scattered	around	the	Aleppo	and	Damascus	suburbs	and	southern	governorates	
and	sought	work	in	agriculture,	construction	or	small	industry,	earning	SYP	200-400	(US$	
4.25-8.50)	a	day.42 The tent camps, which had no water, sanitation or electricity, varied in 
size from one or two tents to up to 80 tents. Tents were patched together from old burlap 
sacks	and	pieces	of	plastic	(Fig.	13).	
The humanitarian response
After	 initially	 ignoring	 the	mounting	 crisis,	 officials	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 drought	 had	
pushed up food prices and put pressure on basic food supplies,43	 forcing	Syria	–	a	net	
exporter	of	wheat	since	the	1990s	–	to	import	wheat	for	the	first	time	in	15	years	in	2008.	
Faced with a worsening humanitarian situation in the north-east, the government 
launched	 two	 drought	 appeals	 in	 conjunction	 with	 UN	 agencies	 in	 September	 2008	
and	 August	 2009	 to	 help	 finance	 a	 series	 of	 short-,	 medium-	 and	 long-term	 aid	 and	
development	projects.	However,	the	2008	Syria	Drought	Appeal	received	just	20%	of	the	
US$	20	million	requested,	while	the	2009	Syria	Drought	Response	Plan44	received	just	33%	
42 	2009	exchange	rate:	US$	1=SYP	47
43 	‘Drought	blamed	for	food	scarcity’,	IRIN News, 22 Feb. 2009.
44 	UN-OCHA,	2009.
Figure 13.	Drought	victims	from	north-eastern	Syria	living	in	a	tent	camp	near	the	Jordanian	border	
in 2009. Source: Adel Samara.
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of	the	requested	US$	43	million.45 
The	drought	appeals	primarily	targeted	populations	of	the	governorates	of	Deir	ez-
Zor,	Hassakeh,	Homs	and	Raqqa.	Migrants	to	the	southern	governorates	received	no	aid	
from	the	government	or	international	aid	agencies.	Moreover,	the	Syrian	security	forces	
discouraged	private	Syrian	initiatives	to	help	the	migrants.	In	July	2009,	the	United	Nations	
Children’s	Fund	(UNICEF)	carried	out	an	assessment	of	25	tent	camps	 in	the	Damascus	
suburbs	with	a	Syrian	NGO,	but	no	results	of	the	mission	were	published,	and	neither	the	
government nor aid agencies followed up with any concrete aid plan for the displaced 
populations.46	Instead,	migrants	were	‘encouraged’	to	return	to	their	drought-stricken	lands	
in the north-east, in exchange for cash handouts, transport assistance or the promise of 
food	aid	upon	return	to	the	north-east.	Needless	to	say,	few	took	up	this	offer.	No	aid	was	
provided in the tent camps themselves.47	
The media spin
The shortfall in funding for the two drought appeals was closely related to the government’s 
efforts	to	downplay	the	extent	of	the	crisis.	The	donor	community	was	largely	unaware	of	
the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the country’s north-east and donors complained of 
a	 lack	of	 clarity	 regarding	 the	government’s	 long-term	strategy	 to	cope	with	 the	effects	
of more frequent drought.48	For instance, some questioned why the Syrian government’s 
national	drought	strategy,	which	had	been	under	preparation	since	2000	and	was	officially	
approved in 2006, was not put to use during the drought period.49
 There was also disagreement within the government, with the minister of irrigation 
questioning the severity of the drought in November 2009.50 In general, the government 
was	keen	to	uphold	the	image	of	Syria	as	a	self-sufficient	producer	of	wheat	and	other	key	
staples and to avoid any closer examination of the deeper causes of the humanitarian and 
45 	Syria Drought Response Plan (Revised) (July 2009-June 2010) List of Appeal Projects, United Nations 
Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs,	available	at	http://fts.unocha.org,	accessed	on	28	
April 2012.  
46 	Syrian Association for Health Promotion and Development and UNICEF Participatory Rural Assessment 
for Migrant Communities in Rural Damascus due to Drought in North-Eastern Areas, The United Nations 
Children’s	Fund,	July	2009.
47 	 Interviews	 in	 Jan.	 2010	with	Mohammed	Hassan	 Katana,	 director	 of	 statistics	 and	 planning	 at	
the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Mohannad	Hadi,	country	director	of	the	United	Nations	World	Food	
Programme in Syria.
48 	 Interviews	in	Jan.	2010	with	Abdulla	Tahir	Bin	Yehia,	representative	of	the	Food	and	Agriculture	
Organization	in	Syria,	Niklas	Kebbon,	Sweden’s	ambassador	to	Syria	and	Mohannad	Hadi.
49 	UN-HCR,	2011,	p.8.
50 	F.	de	Châtel,	‘Q&A:	Nader	al-Bunni.	Syrian	Minister	of	Irrigation’,	Syria Today,	Jan.	2010,	pp.44-6.
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environmental crisis that was spreading from the north-east to southern governorates. It 
severely restricted media coverage and sought wherever possible to frame the worsening 
situation	in	the	broader	context	of	the	global	food	crisis,	financial	crisis	and	climate	change,	
portraying Syria as a victim of external factors and natural disasters beyond its control.51
Syrian state media outlets largely omitted any coverage of the drought and its economic 
and social repercussions. Coverage highlighted agricultural production achieved despite 
the lower rainfall and denied local water shortages.52 The only reference to the drought 
occurred	in	articles	discussing	global	or	regional	climate	change,	where	‘decreased	rainfall	
in	Syria’	was	mentioned	as	an	example	of	the	effects	of	global	climate	change.53 
Syrian private media dedicated more space to coverage of the drought and its victims, 
but largely failed to place them in the context of years of resource mismanagement.
After	 June	 2009,	 foreign	media	was	 severely	 restricted	 in	 its	 coverage	 of	 the	 crisis	
and	journalists	who	obtained	a	journalist	visa	were	banned	from	visiting	the	governorates	
of	Damascus	Countryside,	Dara’a	or	Suweida,	where	the	majority	of	the	tent	camps	had	
sprung	 up.	 Accompanied	 by	 ‘guides’	 and	 ‘translators’,	 foreign	 journalists	 were	 instead	
taken	to	Hassakeh	and	Raqqa	Governorates	where	they	were	allowed	to	interview	villagers	
under	supervision.	Few	were	able	to	obtain	interviews	with	Syrian	government	officials.	
DEConSTruCTIng DrougHT anD WaTEr SCarCITy 
narraTIVES
The	government’s	response	to	the	drought	–	attempts	to	downplay	it	and	subsequently	
deny	 the	 humanitarian	 crisis	 or	 blame	 it	 on	 externalities	 –	 is	 part	 of	 a	 mind-set	 that	
influences	all	aspects	of	policy	making	and	implementation	in	the	Syrian	water	sector.	As	
in	many	other	countries	in	the	water-scarce	Middle	East-North	Africa	(MENA)	region,	water	
is considered a strategic resource that pertains to national security. As a result, accurate 
and up-to-date information on water availability and use is not readily available to the 
general public. 
However,	in	Syria	the	fixation	on	water	as	a	‘sensitive’	issue	has	extended	far	beyond	
strategic considerations and covers all levels of water management. Water has become a 
51 	For	example,	W.	Erian,	B.	Katlan	and	O.	Beby	Babah,	Drought Vulnerability In The Arab Region, Case 
Study - Drought in Syria, Ten Years of Scarce Water (2000-2010), Arab Centre for the Study of Arid Zones 
and	Dry	Lands	and	United	Nations,	Secretariat	of	the	International	Strategy	for	Disaster	Reduction	
(2011).	
52 	‘Minister	of	Housing	and	Construction:	No	Water	Shortage	in	Damascus,	SANA,	21	May	2008;	‘Safar:	
Syria to Witness Agricultural Changes Based on Research’, SANA,	11	June	2008.	
53 	 ‘Drought	Repercussions	and	Means	 for	Facing	Them	Locally	and	 Internationally’,	SANA,	20	Oct.	
2008.
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taboo that is reluctantly discussed, not only in the public domain but also at government 
level.	The	idea	that	water	is,	and	should	remain,	‘sensitive’	goes	unquestioned.	As	a	result,	
government	officials,	water	experts	and	analysts	avoid	any	deeper	analysis	of	 the	state	
of	the	country’s	water	resources.	This	in	turn	means	that	any	efforts	to	reform	the	sector	
remain cosmetic. 
In	the	context	of	the	uprising	in	Syria,	political	scientist	Marwan	Kabalan	wrote	in	2012	
that	 ‘Syria	has	 two	power	 structures:	 the	official	powerless	one	and	 the	 real	one’.54 He 
describes how the former comprises all the institutions of a modern state, including a 
cabinet,	parliament,	ruling	party	and	bureaucracy,	while	the	latter	is	made	up	of	just	a	small	
group	who	make	 key	 decisions	 behind	 closed	 doors.	 Similarly,	 the	 Syrian	water	 sector	
operates	in	two	realities.	On	the	one	hand	there	is	the	official	narrative,	a	facade,	which	
portrays	Syria	as	a	naturally	water-scarce	country	actively	working	to	‘modernize’	its	water	
sector,55	and	on	the	other	there	is	the	reality	on	the	ground	of	an	inefficient,	corrupt	and	
rigid water management system that has enabled large-scale over-exploitation of water 
and land resources and engendered growing poverty and disenfranchisement among 
rural communities. 
The official narrative
The	 official	 narrative	 portrays	 Syria	 as	 increasingly	 water	 stressed	 due	 to	 a	 range	
of extraneous environmental and socio-economic factors such as climate change, 
desertification	(due	to	climate	change),	unequal	distribution	of	water	resources,	seasonal	
variations in rainfall and population growth. However, it also admits that Syria’s water sector 
faces a series of institutional challenges. In doing so, the government instantly neutralizes 
any criticism of its land and water use policies, as it can simply counter that it is addressing 
these	issues	but	that	it	‘takes	time’.	By	acknowledging	that	irrigation	systems	need	to	be	
modernized,	urban	networks	need	to	be	renewed	and	institutional	structures	simplified,	
the	government	creates	the	impression	that	it	is	committed	to	‘modernization’	and	that	it	
is both a responsible and a responsive actor. 
Thus the Syrian government operates on the surface, going through the motions 
of managing the country’s water resources, with little concrete result or proof of lasting 
change on the ground. In the long run, water and its management become almost abstract 
concepts that have little connection to reality and the rapidly worsening state of the 
country’s	water	 resources.	The	 institutional	water	management	 framework	 is	a	fictional	
arena where plans are outlined on paper but never followed through, goals are set but 
54 	M.	Kabalan,	‘Syrians	want	change,	not	reform	mirages’,	Gulf News, 2 Nov. 2012. 
55 	Officials	preferred	the	term	‘modernization’	to	the	more	politically	charged	‘reform’.
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never	 achieved,	 and	 the	minister	 of	 water	 can	 boast	 of	 ‘an	 excellent	 water	 resources	
management system’,56 while aquifers are depleted and pollution levels soar. This dynamic 
is	reinforced	by	the	culture	of	secrecy	and	the	‘sensitivity’	of	water	described	above,	which	
has engendered widespread self-censorship across the Syrian water sector and among 
those	working	with	it.
The reality on the ground
The	official	narrative	does	not	correspond	to	the	reality	of	a	deeply	dysfunctional	water	
sector, which is incapable of reform or change as long as basic issues such as inaccuracy 
and	 incompleteness	 of	 data,	 lack	 of	 human	 resources,	 opaque	 financial	 governance	
and	 lack	 of	 accountability	 are	 not	 comprehensively	 addressed.	 The	 existing	 structure	
makes	such	an	overhaul	impossible	as	the	‘sensitivity’	of	water	precludes	any	substantial	
discussion on the legacy of 50 years of agricultural and water resource mismanagement. 
As	in	many	countries	in	the	MENA	region,	water	policy	in	Syria	has	since	the	1950s	been	
driven	by	a	supply-side	approach	with	a	specific	focus	on	dam	construction	and	irrigation	
projects	 in	 the	 north-east	 of	 the	 country.57 The relentless drive to increase agricultural 
output	and	expand	irrigated	agriculture	blinded	policy	makers	to	the	natural	limits	of	the	
country’s resources. Unrealistic agricultural targets, corruption, a failure to implement and 
enforce legislation, and the absence of a long-term strategy have thus devastated a region 
that	was	until	50	years	ago	considered	a	breadbasket	for	Syria	and	the	region.58 
Over	the	past	60	years,	Syria’s	agricultural	sector	has	undergone	intensive	development,	
particularly in the north-east of the country. The country’s irrigated area has doubled over 
the	past	20	years	 from	651,000	hectares	 (ha)	 in	1985 to 1.35 million ha in 2010.59 Sixty 
percent of this surface area is irrigated with groundwater, which is being extracted at an 
unsustainable rate. Ninety percent of the country’s water goes to agriculture, by far the 
highest	percentage	in	the	region,	with	very	low	irrigation	efficiency.	Over	80%	of	irrigated	
land	is	still	irrigated	through	traditional	flooding	methods	and	losses	in	the	open	concrete	
government	irrigation	canals	range	from	10%	to	60%.60 
Growing demand and the continued drive to expand the irrigated area has created 
a	 water	 deficit.	 Syria’s	 total	 available	 water	 resources	 for	 use	 were	 estimated	 at	 15.6	
BCM	 in	 2007.	 Total	 average	 annual	water	withdrawal	 in	 the	 same	 year	was	 19.2	BCM.	
56 	De	Châtel,	‘Q&A:	Nader	al-Bunni’.
57 	M.	Ababsa,	 ‘Frontières	de	développement	en	Syrie:	l’adaptation	du	projet	Ba’thiste	aux	logiques	
tribales	dans	le	front	pionnier	de	la	Jazîra’,	A Contrario,	Vol.3,	No.2	(2005),	p11-25.
58 	Hole,	‘Drivers	of	Unsustainable	Land	Use’.
59 	Syrian	Agricultural	Database.	
60 	Hoff,	‘Climate	Change,	impacts	and	adaptation’,	p.9-10.
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The	 resulting	 3.59	 BCM	deficit	 was	 compensated	with	water	 from	 dam	 reservoirs	 and	
groundwater reserves. Syria’s per capita water availability had dropped to 882 m3 per year 
in 2007, classifying it as a water-scarce country.61	While	 the	official	narrative	hastens	to	
point to external factors such as population growth, worsening drought conditions and 
climate change, the absence of a long-term national water management strategy and 
overambitious	agricultural	policies	should	not	be	overlooked.	
Like	elsewhere	 in	 the	region,	Syria’s	population	has	grown	rapidly	over	 the	past	60	
years,	rising	from	3.42	million	in	1950	to	approximately	20.4	million	in	2010,62	with	53%	of	
the population living in urban centres. This explosive growth is the direct result of a strong 
pro-natalist	policy	launched	in	the	1950s,	which	led	to	an	official	ban	in	the	trade	and	use	
of contraceptives in the 1970s.63 Syria’s annual average population growth rate remains 
among	the	highest	in	the	region	at	2.94%,	down	from	around	3.75%	in	the	1970s.64 
According	to	the	official	narrative,	the	strong	drive	to	develop	irrigated	agriculture	is	
linked	the	demands	of	a	growing	population	and	the	desire	to	achieve	food	self-sufficiency.	
Yet	 the	 national	 wheat	 production	 target	 of	 4-5m	 tonnes	 per	 year	 exceeds	 internal	
demand,	while	cotton	–	clearly	a	non-food	crop	–	accounts	for	the	greatest	share	of	total	
irrigation	water	after	wheat.	‘Hence	the	scarcity	in	water	resources	which	Syria	faces	is	far	
from	a	“natural”	characteristic	of	the	country’s	limited	resources	and	growing	population’.65 
Despite	the	water	deficit,	and	extensive	proof	that	much	of	the	land	in	the	north-east	is	
in the long term unsuited to intensive irrigation,66 expansion of the irrigated area through 
land	reclamation	remained	official	government	policy,	with	over	400,000	ha	earmarked	for	
reclamation	in	Deir	ez-Zor	and	Hassakeh	Governorates	in	2011.67
61 	Baseline Water Sector Report,	GTZ	Modernization	of	 the	Syrian	Water	Sector,	 Support	 to	Sector	
Planning	and	Coordination,	State	Planning	Commission	(2009),	unpublished	draft	(hereafter	GTZ	and	
SPC).
62 	UN-ESCWA	(2010).	‘The	demographic	profile	of	Syria,	citing	world	population	prospects:	the	2010	
revision.’	Available	at	www.escwa.un.org/popin/members/syria.pdf,	accessed	26	May	2012.
63 	A.J.	Al-Tamimi	and	O.	Svadovsky,	‘Demography	is	Destiny	in	Syria’,	American Spectator,	2	June	2012.	
64 	World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision, United Nations Economic and Social Committee for 
Western	Asia,	available	at	www.escwa.un.org/popin/members/syria.pdf,	accessed	19	March	2013.	
65 	J.	Barnes,	‘Managing	the	Waters	of	Bath	Country:	The	Politics	of	Water	Scarcity	in	Syria’,	Geopolitics, 
14:3	(2009),	p.	515.
66 	Hole,	‘Drivers	of	Unsustainable	Land	Use’;	Ababsa,	‘Frontières	de	développement	en	Syrie’.	
67 	A	US$	2,1	billion	mega-project	launched	in	March	2011	on	the	Tigris	River	in	Syria’s	far	north-east	
was	to	pump	an	annual	1,25	BCM	of	water	to	irrigate	200,000	ha	of	land	in	Hassakeh	Governorate	
(L.	Ibrahim	and	N.	Razzouk,	‘Syria	Starts	$2.1bn	Irrigation	Project	on	Tigris	River’,	Bloomberg,	7	March	
2011).	 In	addition,	several	new	hydropower	dams	were	being	planned	and	built	on	 the	Euphrates	
and	Orontes	Rivers	(‘Otri,	Erdogan	Lay	Cornerstone	of	Friendship	Dam’,	SANA,	7	Feb.	2011),	providing	
hydropower and irrigation water to new cropping areas in the north and east of the country.
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Lack of transparency
The	culture	of	secrecy	around	water	has	engendered	a	chain	of	mechanisms	that	weakens	
the	system.	First	of	all,	the	obsession	with	the	 ‘sensitive’	nature	of	water	has	resulted	in	
a	 lack	of	 transparency.	On	a	 governmental	 level,	 the	perceived	 ‘sensitivity’	 of	 all	water-
related topics means that data sharing between and within ministries and research 
institutions	 is	 limited	and	 fraught	with	bureaucratic	procedure.	Different	ministries	and	
government research bodies do not freely share data, and data are not shared between 
governorates.	In	many	cases,	different	ministries	use	different	methods	to	assess	the	state	
of the country’s water resources, resulting in a cacophony of contradictory data sets.68 
This	general	confusion	makes	it	impossible	to	articulate,	let	alone	implement,	a	coherent	
national water policy. 
This	situation	is	not	helped	by	the	sector’s	arcane	institutional	framework.	The	system	
is trapped in a colossal bureaucratic structure with 22 ministries, councils, commissions 
and	 directorates	 directly	 and	 indirectly	 involved	 in	 water	 management.	 Often	 these	
bodies have overlapping responsibilities but there is little coordination between them.69 
Hinnebusch	describes	the	agricultural	management	system	under	Hafez	al-Assad	(1963-
2000),	 which	 was	 narrowly	 linked	 to	 the	 country’s	 water	 development	 strategy,	 as	 not	
only	bureaucratic	and	 fragmented,	but	also	 fraught	with	 rivalries	between	 the	different	
ministries.70 This	 situation	 has	 remained	 largely	 unchanged	 since	 Bashar	 al-Assad	 took	
over in 2000.
The	problem	of	conflicting,	outdated	and	inaccurate	data	is	worsened	by	a	widespread	
lack	of	capacity	in	the	water	sector.	The	majority	of	staff	in	the	ministries	of	Agriculture	and	
Irrigation	has	barely	finished	secondary	school	and	only	a	small	minority	has	a	university	
degree.	Of	the	multiple	bodies	administering	the	water	sector,	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	
and	Agricultural	Reform	is	the	largest	employer,	followed	by	the	Ministry	of	Irrigation	and	
its	water	establishments.	These	institutions	have	very	few	educated	staff,	with	40-60%	of	
employees having only completed preparatory school or lower.71	Moreover,	 low	salaries	
in senior positions, clientelism and nepotism within the ministries have encouraged 
corruption.72
68 	GTZ	and	SPC.
69 	Ibid.
70 	 R.	 Hinnebusch,	 ‘The	 Ba’th’s	 Agrarian	 Revolution	 (1936-2000)’,	 in	 R.	 Hinnebusch,	 A.	 El	 Hindi,	M.	
Khaddam,	M.	Ababsa	 (eds):	Agriculture and Reform in Syria	 (Fife,	Scotland:	University	of	St	Andrews	
Centre	for	Syrian	Studies,	2011),	pp.3-14.	
71 	GTZ	and	SPC.
72 	Hinnebusch,	‘The	Ba’th’s	Agrarian	Revolution’.	
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The	lack	of	transparency,	corruption	and	absence	of	reliable	data	 leads	to	a	 lack	of	
accountability. Ambitious policies are drafted on paper, but never implemented; special 
committees	are	formed	to	‘study’	various	aspects	of	sector	modernization,	but	final	reports	
are never produced; studies are carried out, but never followed up on; laws are issued, but 
inconsistently enforced. This has enabled years of unsustainable management. 
ProTECTIng grounDWaTEr rESErVES
The government’s inability to implement water policy and enforce law is perhaps most 
clearly	 exemplified	 in	 its	 failure	 to	 address	 the	 continuing	 depletion	 of	 the	 country’s	
groundwater reserves, resulting in widespread over-extraction and depletion of aquifers. 
Traditionally,	most	farmers	living	in	areas	removed	from	the	major	rivers	relied	on	seasonal	
rainfall to water their crops. They used shallow hand-dug wells to draw up groundwater 
manually,	which	they	used	for	drinking	water	and	domestic	purposes	only.	As	extraction	
levels were low, the groundwater was naturally replenished during rainy periods.
The large-scale introduction of diesel motor pumps in the 1960s, however, led to a 
rapid drop in groundwater levels. From the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, farmers across 
the country drilled hundreds of new wells and massively expanded the areas irrigated 
by groundwater.73 The number of wells is estimated to have increased from around 
135,089 in 1999 to over 229,881 in 2010.74 Fifty-seven percent of wells were unlicensed 
in	2010.	During	1980s	and	1990s	withdrawal	rates	were	approximately	five	times	higher	
each	decade	than	they	had	been	in	previous	decades.	In	the	worst-affected	areas,	such	
as	Mhardeh	 in	Hama	Governorate	and	Khan	Shaykhun	 in	 Idleb	Governorate,	 the	over-
pumping led to a drop of up to 100 m between the 1950s and 2000.75 The huge increase in 
groundwater	use	had	similar	effects	in	many	other	areas.	In	the	period	between	1993	and	
2000,	groundwater	levels	in	the	Damascus	Ghuta	and	its	surroundings	dropped	by	more	
than	6	m/yr	in	certain	areas	(see	Chap.	2).76
Far	from	acknowledging	the	limits	of	the	resource	during	the	1980s	and	1990s,	the	
government encouraged the large-scale expansion of groundwater-irrigated areas and 
73 	De	Châtel,	‘Mining	the	Deep’.
74 	Syrian	Agricultural	Database.	
75 	Kloosterman,	F.	 (2009).	Geologist/hydrogeologist,	Syrian-Dutch	water	partnership,	Deltares,	The	
Netherlands.
76 	M.	Hobler	and	R.	Rajab,	‘Groundwater	Vulnerability	and	Hazards	to	Groundwater	in	the	Damascus	
Ghouta	Plain	in	Syria’,	Arab	Centre	for	the	Study	of	Arid	Zones	and	Dry	Lands	and	Bundesanstalt	für	
Geowissenschaften	und	Rohstoffe	(2002).
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supported the digging of new wells for cotton cultivation.77 Farmers had easy access to 
advantageous loans to drill wells and install pumps, and fuel prices were heavily subsidized, 
making	it	inexpensive	to	extract	water,	even	from	great	depths.	In	addition,	the	licensing	
and	monitoring	 of	 wells	 was	 poorly	 organized	 and	 thousands	 of	 new	wells	 were	 sunk	
without government licenses during the 1980s and 1990s. 
In the late 1990s the government issued a decree demanding the licensing of all illegal 
wells	by	2001	–	a	measure	which	had	 little	 concrete	effect.	 Later,	 the	2005	Water	Law	
outlined various measures to improve water resource protection, license wells and better 
regulate	drilling	procedures,	with	a	commitment	to	punish	violators	with	fines	and	prison	
sentences.78 The government required well licenses to be renewed annually to allow for 
the monitoring of groundwater levels. However, this engendered widespread corruption 
as	security	personnel	or	local	officials	forced	farmers	to	pay	bribes	for	new	licenses,	which	
in turn triggered strong resentment in rural areas.79 The widespread corruption also meant 
that the number of wells continued to increase despite the new law.
Poor	 understanding	 of	 sustainable	 groundwater	 use	 coupled	 with	 a	 weak	 legal	
framework	and	failure	to	enforce	laws	has	led	to	depletion	of	aquifers	across	the	country.	
Aquifers	in	large	parts	of	Hassakeh	Governorate,	which	was	heavily	settled	and	cultivated	
from the 1970s on, are depleted,80 with large-scale migration from the land since the late 
1990s.	Massive	over-pumping	has	led	to	the	drying	up	of	many	springs,	while	most	wells	
and	shallow	aquifers	have	been	depleted.	The	Khabur	River	no	longer	flows	in	summer	
since	1999	and	one	of	the	largest	karst	springs	in	the	world,	the	Ras	al	Ain	Spring	on	the	
Syrian-Turkish	border,	has	disappeared	completely	since	2001	following	extensive	over-
abstraction in the spring catchment area over the last 50 years.81	The	area	of	Nebk	north	of	
Damascus,	which	used	to	be	renowned	for	its	vines	and	wheat	fields,	has	turned	to	desert	
following	extensive	over-exploitation	of	groundwater.	 In	2009,	 farmers	 there	worked	as	
real-estate	developers	(see	Chap.	4).	
77 	Interview	with	Omar	al-Shamali,	head	of	Homs	water	directorate,	14	Nov.	2009.
78 	De	Châtel,	‘Mining	the	Deep’.
79 	N.	Marzouq,	‘The	Economic	Origins	of	Syria’s	Uprising’,	Al Akhbar English, 28 Aug. 2011. 
80 	Hole,	‘Drivers	of	Unsustainable	Land	Use’.
81 	 Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia	 (Beirut:	United	Nations	Economic	and	Social	
Committee	for	Western	Asia	and	Bundesanstalt	für	Geowissenschaften	und	Rohstoffe,	2013),	Ch.24.
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ConCLuSIon
It is important to consider the 2006-10 drought and its possible role in triggering the 2011 
uprising in the broader context of 50 years of resource mismanagement, rapid economic 
liberalization, the abrupt cancellation of state subsidies and the government’s failure to 
address	a	humanitarian	and	environmental	crisis	 that	had	been	 taking	shape	 for	more	
than a decade. 
The	 Syrian	 uprising	 that	 started	 in	 March	 2011	 was	 sparked	 by	 a	 series	 of	 inter-
related	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 factors.	 While	 it	 is	 tempting	 to	 include	 ‘drought’	
and	 ‘climate	 change’	 in	 this	 list	 of	 triggers,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 a	 clear	 view	 of	 the	
correlations	 between	 the	 different	 causes	 and	 effects	 of	 events:	 50	 years	 of	 resource	
mismanagement and over-exploitation caused the depletion of resources, which in turn led 
to growing disenfranchisement and discontent in Syria’s rural communities. The 2006-10 
drought exacerbated an already existing humanitarian crisis. The government’s failure to 
adequately respond to this crisis was one of the triggers of the protests that started in 
March	2011,	along	with	a	host	of	political,	economic	and	social	grievances.	
The possible role of climate change in this chain of events is not only irrelevant; it is 
also an unhelpful distraction. In the context of the future of water management in Syria, 
it distracts from much more tangible and real problems; in the context of the uprising, 
it strengthens the narrative of the Assad regime that seizes every opportunity to blame 
external factors for its own failings and inability to reform.82 
82 	For	example,	on	30	March	2011,	Bashar	al-Assad	addressed	the	Syrian	Parliament,	saying:	 ‘You	
know	what	happened	in	Lebanon	in	2005,	and	later	the	war	of	2006	and	its	repercussions,	and	the	
war against Gaza at the end of 2008. So, the whole period was that of continued pressure. What added 
to the problems was that we had four years of drought, which damaged our economic program. […] 
Of	course	I	am	not	justifying.	I	am	simply	explaining	these	facts	and	separating	the	subjective	from	the	
objective.	When	I	say	that	we	had	drought,	this	is	beyond	our	powers’.	See	‘President	al-Assad	Delivers	
Speech at People’s Assembly’ SANA,	30	March	2011.	

93
CHaPTEr 4
Watching Landscapes Disappear:
Local Perspectives on the Impact of Long-term Water 
Mismanagement in Syria
InTroDuCTIon
While the general state of water resources in Syria and the overall impact of current 
and	future	water	scarcity	 in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	 (MENA)	region	have	been	
extensively	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature	 (Salman	 and	Mualla	 2003;	 Sagardoy	 and	 Varela-
Ortega	2001;	Erian	et	al.	2011;	World	Bank	2007),	comparatively	little	attention	has	been	
paid to the smaller-scale impact of the decline of freshwater resources on individuals, 
communities, landscapes and local environmental conditions. This chapter aims to 
provide a micro-level view, focusing on the human impact of long-term water and land 
mismanagement in Syria by scaling down to the level of personal accounts from across the 
country.	Drawing	on	research	carried	out	in	2000/2001	and	2006-10,	it	presents	a	series	
of	 snapshots	of	pre-conflict	Syria	and	highlights	 the	startling	depth	and	breadth	of	 the	
environmental	damage	inflicted	over	the	last	60	years.	This	has	obviously	had	far-reaching	
social repercussions, undermining small and medium-scale agricultural businesses, 
dislocating	rural	communities	and	forcing	farmers	to	seek	new	sources	of	income,	often	
in other parts of the country or abroad. Reading between the lines of the conversations I 
had	with	farmers,	water	experts	and	government	officials	over	a	10-year	period,	growing	
feelings of anger, frustration and powerlessness become apparent as Syrian farmers saw 
their livelihood disappear and landscapes irreversibly destroyed, mainly as a result of 
mismanagement	and	a	lack	of	coherent	policies	and	law	enforcement.
The	chapter	is	divided	into	three	sections,	which	each	focus	on	specific	themes.	Each	
section	is	broken	down	into	sub-sections,	including	several	local	case	studies	and	a	sub-
section	that	provides	historical	and	political	background	and	a	geographical	context	(Fig.	
14).	Part	1	provides	a	brief	summary	of	Syria’s	agricultural	and	water	policies	since	1960.	
Two	case	studies,	one	in	the	rural	town	of	Nebk	around	80	km	north	of	Damascus	and	
one	 in	 the	 surroundings	 of	 Damascus,	 highlight	 how	 unsustainable	 population	 growth	
rates	have	led	to	the	over-exploitation,	pollution	–	and,	locally,	depletion	–	of	groundwater	
resources. 
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Figure 14.	Overview	map	of	places,	 regions	and	rivers	 in	Syria	mentioned	 in	 this	chapter.	Source:	
Ghazal	Lababidi.	
Part 2 moves to the rural north-east of the country where the ambitious Euphrates Basin 
Project,	 a	massive	 hydropower	 and	 irrigation	 scheme	which	 included	 the	 construction	
of three dams on the Euphrates River, has profoundly transformed landscapes, land 
and water use patterns and social structures. However, despite massive government 
investment	in	the	project	–	a	quarter	of	the	national	budget	for	20	years	–	it	never	even	
came	close	 to	meeting	 its	objectives	and	the	north-eastern	governorates	remained	the	
least	developed	and	poorest	in	2009.	This	section	starts	with	a	description	of	the	project’s	
historical	background	and	regional	scope	and	then	zooms	in	on	the	specific	case	of	the	
village	of	Tel	al	Banat,	which	lies	on	the	banks	of	the	Tishreen	Dam	reservoir.	Interviews	
with villagers from 2009 reveal the far-reaching impact of the scheme, which displaced the 
village	out	of	the	Euphrates	Valley	and	left	its	inhabitants	scattered	across	the	country	in	
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“new	villages”	in	the	government	irrigation	projects,	tent	camps	in	the	Damascus	suburbs	
and	 disused	 buildings	 and	 sheds	 in	 Lebanon.	 Interviews	 in	 this	 section	 show	 that	 the	
depletion of water resources was already a problem in the late 1990s and that farmers 
from	 the	 Euphrates	 Basin,	 but	 also	 Idlib	 and	 Hassakeh	 Governorates,	 were	 gradually	
forced to abandon agriculture. 
Part 3 focuses on the badia1 or	steppe	lands	in	the	area	of	the	Khabur	River	in	north-
eastern	Syria,	where	the	ecosystem	has	effectively	been	destroyed	over	the	last	60	years.	
This	semi-arid	area	was	until	the	1950s	used	for	livestock	grazing	and	small-scale	irrigation	
in the river valley with a traditional land management system that maintained the ecological 
balance.	However,	a	series	of	changes	–	the	nationalization	of	 the	steppe,	resettlement	
of displaced populations, government support for the drilling of wells and cultivation of 
cotton	–	caused	widespread	soil	salinization,	desertification	and	depletion	of	groundwater	
reserves.	The	chapter	concludes	with	a	brief	discussion	of	possible	links	to	the	start	of	the	
Syrian	uprising	in	March	2011	and	the	role	of	water	management	in	Syria’s	future.	
THE LIMITS oF agrICuLTuraL groWTH In an arID rEgIon
Syrian agricultural and water policies since 1963
While	the	Syrian	government	has	been	keen	to	ascribe	growing	problems	of	water	scarcity	
to high population growth, growing water demand, the unequal distribution of water 
resources	 in	 the	country	and	climate	change,	Barnes	 (2009)	has	shown	 that	scarcity	 in	
Syria has been constructed and is a direct product of the Syrian government’s promotion of 
irrigated	agriculture	and	the	desire	to	attain	self-sufficiency	in	the	main	agricultural	staples.	
From the time the Ba’ath Party came to power in 1963, agriculture was its main focus. 
Due	to	its	strong	roots	in	the	rural	areas,	it	prioritized	the	development	of	the	agricultural	
sector and promised to redress the imbalance between the political and economic elite 
and	the	marginalized	class	of	workers	and	peasants.	First	of	all,	it	introduced	a	far-reaching	
land	reform	programme	for	the	benefit	of	 landless	farmers	and,	secondly,	 it	channelled	
huge investment into large-scale, centrally managed irrigation schemes, with large dams, 
ambitious land reclamation targets and wide support for the development of groundwater 
resources. The state’s strong ties to its rural support bases was further strengthened 
after President Hafez al-Assad came to power through an internal coup in the Ba’ath 
party	in	1970.	Originally	from	a	rural	village	in	the	Coastal	Mountains	near	Lattakia,	Assad	
highlighted	his	peasant	origins	and	cultivated	an	image	of	himself	as	a	“one	of	the	people”.	
In	a	speech	on	8	March	1980,	Assad	said:	“I	am	the	first	and	the	last	[...]	a	peasant	and	the	
1 	Badia is the Arabic word for steppe, an area with less than 200 mm of annual rainfall where the 
vegetation is mainly made up of low shrubs and grass. 
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son	of	a	peasant.	To	lie	amidst	the	spikes	of	grain	or	on	the	threshing	floor	is,	in	my	eyes,	
worth	all	the	palaces	in	the	world”	(Barnes	2009:	521).
The Ba’ath party nationalized much of the economy and introduced a central planning 
strategy	for	agriculture,	with	heavy	subsidization	of	“strategic	crops”2 such as wheat, barley, 
sugar	beet	and	cotton.	Syria	prided	itself	on	its	agricultural	development	and	self-sufficiency	
in certain main staples. Until the incidence of a severe drought in 2007, Syria was even one 
of	 the	only	Arab	countries	 to	export	wheat,	with	an	average	annual	production	of	4.25	
million	tonnes	for	the	period	1998-2007	(NAPC	2013).	Moreover,	it	had	more	than	doubled	
the	irrigated	surface	area	in	a	period	of	25	years	from	651,000	hectares	(ha)	in	1985	to	1,4	
million	ha	in	2011	(Ibid.).	
But	the	massive	investment	in	irrigation	projects	and	agricultural	development	failed	
to	provide	the	promised	returns,	both	on	a	financial	and	non-financial	level.	Elhadj	(2005)	
calculated	that	the	government	spent	about	US$	20	billion	on	agricultural	projects	between	
1960	and	2000,	the	equivalent	of	20%	of	the	country’s	total	investment	resources.	In	the	
period	 1995-2000,	 it	 allocated	 3.3%	of	 the	 country’s	Gross	Domestic	 Product	 (GDP)	 to	
agricultural	projects,	which	generated	a	 loss	of	US$	150	million	or	US$	1,087/ha.	Non-
financial	returns	were	also	poor	as	Syria	remained	dependent	on	the	country’s	capricious	
rainfall	patterns,	rural	to	urban	migration	continued	to	grow	and	–	except	for	wheat,	barley	
and	eggs	–	food	independence	was	not	achieved.	On	the	other	hand,	the	government’s	
policies	depleted	 large	volumes	of	Syria’s	 limited	water	reserves.	By	1997,	five	of	Syria’s	
seven water basins had a negative water balance, while the quality of the remaining 
reserves	had	been	degraded	(Elhadj	2005:	33).	In	2007,	the	country	–	historically	one	of	
the	most	water	rich	in	the	region	after	Iraq	and	Iran	–	had	a	water	deficit	of	an	estimated	
3.59	billion	cubic	metres	(BCM),	which	was	made	up	for	through	the	use	of	water	from	dam	
reservoirs	and	groundwater	reserves	(GTZ	and	SPC	2009).
Yet despite the clear signs that the country’s water and land resources were 
overstretched, the government continued to pursue an agricultural strategy aimed at 
further	increasing	production	and	expanding	the	irrigated	surface	area.	A	2001	Ministry	of	
Irrigation report outlines new plans for the construction of more dams and the reclamation 
of	nearly	500,000	ha	of	land	in	five	of	the	country’s	seven	basins	at	a	cost	of	around	US$	
2 	Every	year,	a	number	of	crops	such	as	wheat,	barley,	sugar,	cotton,	tobacco,	lentils	and	chickpeas	
were	designated	as	‘strategic’.	The	government	heavily	supported	these	crops	with	a	range	of	subsidies	
on	agricultural	inputs,	energy	and	water,	and	guaranteed	it	would	purchase	them	at	fixed	prices	that	
were announced prior to each planting season. From the mid-1980s there was a shift to a less tightly 
regulated	“indicative	planning”	system	and	from	the	1990s	onwards	efforts	to	cut	back	on	subsidies	
led to a reduction in the number of designated strategic crops so that by 2009 only wheat, cotton and 
sugar	beet	remained	(Syria	Report	2013;	Hinnebusch	1989;	Katana	2009).
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2.42	billion.3 This amount is almost equal to the investment in irrigation between 1988 and 
2000	(Elhadj	2005:	137).	While	certain	agricultural	policies	were	adjusted	–	the	cultivation	
of	water-intensive	crops	like	cotton	and	sugar	beet	was	forbidden	in	certain	governorates	
(Shamali	2009),	summer	irrigation	was	banned	and	new	laws	aimed	(but	failed)	to	prevent	
illegal	well	 drilling	 and	modernize	 irrigation	 systems	 –	no	 concession	was	made	 to	 the	
strategy	of	food	self-sufficiency	and,	more	specifically,	wheat	self-sufficiency.	In	meetings	
with	government	officials	and	water	experts	between	2006	and	2010,	I	was	repeatedly	told	
that	wheat	was	a	“red	line”.	
Moreover,	despite	the	evidence	that	much	of	the	land	in	the	north-east	of	the	country	
was not suited for intensive cultivation, the government continued to reclaim new land. 
Thus	in	March	2011,	the	Syrian	government	launched	a	US$	2.1	billion	mega-project	on	
the	Tigris	River	in	Syria’s	far	north-east	that	aimed	to	pump	an	annual	1,25	BCM of water 
to	 irrigate	200,000	ha	of	 land	 in	Hassakeh	Governorate	 (Ibrahim	and	Razzouk	2011).	 In	
addition, several new hydropower dams were being planned and built on the Euphrates 
and	Orontes	Rivers,	providing	electricity	and	irrigation	water	to	new	cropping	areas	in	the	
north	and	east	of	 the	 country.	All	 these	projects	have	obviously	been	halted	 since	 the	
outbreak	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	 Syria,	 but	 they	 underscore	 the	 Syrian	 government’s	 inability	
to	adapt	to	changing	environmental	and	economic	realities.	“Once	the	wrong	strategy	is	
put	 in	place	 it	 becomes	progressively	more	difficult	 for	 the	government	 to	 reverse	 the	
policy	[…].	[R]aising	the	operational	efficiency	of	desert	irrigation	projects	will	not	correct	
the	 original	 strategic	 flawed	 decision	 to	 achieve	 food	 self-sufficiency.	 […]	 Modifying	
a	wrong	strategy	 is	 like	 slowing	down	on	a	 road	which	 is	going	 in	 the	wrong	direction”	
(Elhadj	2005:38).	Effectively,	Syria’s	agricultural	sector	was	structured	around	the	abstract	
framework	of	food	self-sufficiency,	strategic	crops	and	subsidies,	rather	than	the	reality	of	
economic	or	environmental	constraints.	“…	Syria’s	political	leaders	paid	little	attention	to	
sound economic planning. They focused on short-term political solutions, ignoring the fact 
that	their	country	does	not	possess	sufficient	and	reliable	water	endowment”	(Ibid.:	142).	
From farming to real-estate management, nebk (2009) 
Continued government support for well drilling and the expansion of the irrigated surface 
area soon resulted in groundwater over-exploitation and a rapid drop in groundwater 
levels, with springs, streams and even rivers running dry in the 1990s and 2000s. This 
was	also	the	case	around	the	towns	of	Nebk	and	Yabroud	at	the	foot	of	the	Qalamoon	
Mountains,	an	area	 that	used	 to	be	 famous	 for	 its	grape	and	raisin	production.	 “In	 the	
1960s	there	were	thousands	of	hectares	of	vines	here,”	said	Abu	Mohammed,	a	former	
3 	Exchange	rate	2005	cited	in	Elhadj	(2005)	US$	1	=	SYP	50.
98
Part II
farmer	from	Nebk	who	turned	to	real	estate	development	when	the	water	ran	out	in	the	
1980s.	“The	crops	were	so	thick	that	the	soil	never	saw	the	light	of	the	sun;	the	air	was	the	
best in the world and the water was fresh and abundant. Now if a farmer owns 150 vines 
it’s	a	lot.	It	shows	he	has	lots	of	water.	Or	a	lot	of	money	to	drill	deep	wells.”	Today	the	town	
of	Nebk,	80	km	north	of	Damascus,	stretches	haphazardly	across	a	dusty	plain,	with	new	
neighbourhoods	and	half-finished	housing	projects	slowly	swallowing	 the	 land	that	was	
until	40	years	ago	covered	in	wheat	fields	and	vineyards.	
Situated	in	an	arid	zone	with	annual	precipitation	levels	of	just	250	mm,	the	area	of	
Nebk	and	Yabroud	historically	relied	on	seasonal	surface	water	in	the	form	of	melted	snow	
from	the	Anti-Lebanon	Mountains	and	groundwater	from	wells	and	qanat romani.4	While 
it	was	never	rich	in	water	resources,	this	area	was	nevertheless	known	for	its	agricultural	
wealth. The 12th-century	geographer	Ibn	Jubayr	said	Nebk	had	“much	running	water	and	
broad	arable	fields”,	while	the	13th-century	Yaqut	al-Hamawi	wrote	that	“[Nebk	 is]	a	fine	
village	with	excellent	provisions”	and	described	“a	curious	spring	which	runs	cold	 in	the	
summer,	 and	with	 clear,	 excellent	water.	 They	 say	 its	 source	 is	 at	 Yabrud”	 (Le	 Strange	
1890).	This	was	part	of	the	intricate	network	of	qanat romani that brought water down the 
valley	from	Yabroud	to	Nebk	and	the	surrounding	Salhiye	Plain.	In	1900,	the	British	writer	
Gertrude	Bell	also	recorded	her	visit:	“At	Nebk	the	desert	ended.	The	whole	valley	upwards	
was full of corn and to the north the mountains rose high with patches of snow on them. 
Yabrud	was	a	lovely	prosperous	village.	The	valley	narrows	and	is	bounded	by	fine	cliffs	
and	the	water,	the	fruit	trees,	the	corn	were	good	to	see	after	so	many	days’	desert”	(Bell	
1900).
Abu	 Mohammed	 also	 remembered	 such	 scenes	 and	 described	 Nebk’s	 traditional	
agricultural	 areas:	Wadi	al	Miya	 (the	Valley	of	Water);	Al	 Saqi,	 an	area	of	500	ha	where	
wheat, barley, sesame and burghul were cultivated on a mixture of rainfed and irrigated 
lands;	 and	 the	Mleita	 Plain,	which	 he	 described	 as	 “Nebk’s	 pantry”	 that	 “fed	 the	whole	
town”	and	where	 local	 farmers	grew	vegetables,	wheat,	chickpeas,	beetroot	and	barley.	
“But	that	was	in	the	old	days,”	he	said.	“I’m	not	talking	about	now.”	Indeed,	the	agricultural	
wealth	he	remembered	was	difficult	to	imagine	in	this	desolate	desert-like	landscape:	the	
Salhiye	Plain	had	become	a	residential	neighbourhood,	while	the	Mleita	Plain	was	a	dusty	
wasteland	where	a	couple	of	half-finished	apartment	blocks	withered	away	(Fig.	15).
“Twenty-five	 years	 ago	 you	 could	 still	 find	 water	 at	 15	 metres	 depth,”	 said	 Abu	
Mohammed.	“Each	farm	used	to	have	a	shallow	well	with	a	windmill	beside	it.	Then	in	the	
1980s,	the	water	dried	out.	You	can	still	see	the	windmills,	but	they	are	just	decoration.	
4 	A	qanat	is	a	network	of	tunnels	and	wells	that	taps	the	groundwater	and	provides	a	reliable	supply	
of water for human settlements and irrigation in hot, arid and semi-arid climates. Qanats are often 
referred to as qanat romani in Syria. 
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They	serve	no	purpose.	When	I	started	using	a	motor	pump	in	1984,	I	had	to	dig	down	to	
35 metres. Today, you have to go down to 250 metres. Water is a luxury now. That’s why 
everyone	in	Nebk	has	abandoned	agriculture.	People	just	have	small	vegetable	gardens	
as	a	hobby.”
Abu	Mohammed	explained	the	dramatic	changes	in	Nebk	as	a	combination	of	factors:	
more people, less rain- and snowfall and over-pumping of groundwater in the whole area 
since	the	1980s.	“There	has	always	been	low	rainfall	here,	and	agriculture	was	always	hard.	
In	winter	the	farmers	worked	their	fields,	 in	summer	they	went	to	the	city	to	find	work.	
From	the	Ottoman	times	onwards	people	started	migrating	further	away:	to	the	Damascus	
Ghuta,	to	Palestine	and	to	South	America.	The	emigration	to	the	Gulf	started	in	the	1950s.”	
But	people	always	kept	ties	with	the	homeland	and	many	returned.	“All	the	construction	
you	see	here	is	the	result	of	money	earned	in	the	Gulf.”	As	the	population	of	Nebk	grew	
from	9,000	in	1944	to	52,000	in	2007,	more	land	was	cultivated	and	the	groundwater	level	
gradually dropped, driving farmers to use motor pumps to extract water from greater 
depths.	While	detailed	figures	for	the	area	of	Nebk	and	Yabroud	are	not	available,	national	
figures	are	indicative	of	the	massive	increase	in	wells	from	135,089	in	1999	to	229,881	in	
2010	(NAPC	2013).	Around	57%	of	these	remained	illegal	in	2007,	despite	the	issuing	of	a	
decree in the late 1990s and the issuing of a new water law in 2005 that sought to license 
illegal	wells	and	prevent	further	illegal	drilling.	Abu	Mohammed	was	unfazed	by	this	failure	
Figure 15.	The	Mleita	Plain,	described	as	“Nebk’s	pantry”	 in	the	past,	with	the	town	of	Nebk	 in	the	
background,	2009.	Source:	Adel	Samara.	
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to	enforce	legislation.	“Law?	Good	God.	We	don’t	have	law,	there	is	something	called	‘law’,	
but	it’s	like	someone	who	is	called	Shereef,	but	who	isn’t	shereef (honourable).	Applying	for	
a	permit	to	drill	a	well	is	for	the	weak.	The	others	just	do	it.”	
Memories of a water landscape and a river, Damascus (2001, 2009)
Illegal well-drilling has also had a far-reaching impact on the surroundings of the capital 
Damascus,	an	area	once	 famed	 for	 its	abundant	 freshwater	 resources	and	 its	gardens	
and	orchards	(see	Chap.	2).	By	2001,	the	plain	around	Damascus,	the	Ghuta	Oasis,	had	
almost disappeared, as green space was replaced by a sprawling mass of mainly illegally 
built housing. In other parts of the oasis, springs had dried up and in the place of orchards 
there	was	a	flat	grey	wasteland	where	dead	tree	stumps	were	piled	up	waiting	to	be	used	
as	firewood.	Nizar	Hussein,	an	employee	at	the	General	Directorate	for	 Irrigation	in	the	
Barada	and	Awaj	Basins,	the	office	that	oversaw	water	management	in	Damascus	and	its	
suburbs,	took	me	to	the	heart	of	the	Ghuta	Oasis,	a	place	that	was	now	a	desert.	“All	this	
was	apricot	orchards,”	Nizar	said.	“As	far	as	the	eye	could	reach”.
While	the	entire	area	of	the	Ghuta	Oasis	was	officially	classified	as	agricultural	 land	
and construction was forbidden in 1977, uncontrolled growth and government failure to 
enforce legislation meant the urban sprawl steadily continued to infringe on green spaces. 
As the city spread into the oasis, farmers gradually shifted their agricultural activities 
eastward into the more arid steppe lands, where they drilled wells for irrigation. In 2010, 
nearly	a	quarter	(24.7%	or	56,961	wells)	of	the	country’s	wells	were	concentrated	in	the	
Damascus	region	and	more	than	three	quarters	of	these	were	illegal	(76%	or	43,246	wells).	
Overpumping	had	rapidly	 led	to	the	depletion	of	the	shallow	aquifer,	forcing	farmers	to	
drill	into	deeper	aquifers	(de	Châtel	2014b).	
“Ten	years	ago,	more	than	90%	of	the	wells	in	this	area	was	less	than	20	metres	deep,”	
Nizar	 told	me	 in	2001.	 “Now	we	have	 to	go	down	 to	200	metres.”	We	drove	 through	a	
deserted	village,	where	dust	clouds	flew	up	between	the	houses.	Nizar	pointed	to	an	empty	
water	channel.	“Five	years	ago,	this	was	a	good	spring,	Deir	Asafir.	It	flowed	at	200	L/s.	Now	
it’s	dry.”	Further	up,	the	Fayed	Spring	was	a	huge	crater	on	the	edge	of	the	village.	In	the	
past	it	had	been	a	small	freshwater	lake.	I	asked	what	the	government	was	doing	about	the	
situation	in	the	Ghuta.	Nizar	hesitated,	then	said:	“Arab	governments	have	no	idea	about	
long-term	planning.	They	have	no	vision,	no	plan.	The	Israelis,	when	they	took	water	from	
Lebanon,	Jordan	and	Syria	in	1967	and	1973,	they	were	clever.	They	were	planning.	They	
looked	ahead.	In	Syria,	we	are	all	sleeping.	And	maybe,	just	maybe,	once	the	water	really	
runs	out	and	we	face	disaster,	we	will	wake	up.”
The city’s main source of water, the Barada River, also dried up in 2000 as a result of 
excessive pumping in the area of the spring and the large-scale deviation of spring water 
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to	 supply	Damascus	with	 drinking	water	 (de	Châtel	 2014b).	 The	 exponential	 growth	of	
Damascus	 from	a	population	of	423,000	 in	1955	 (Lababedi	2008)	 to	an	estimated	4.12	
million	in	2010	(Syria	Today	2009)5 severely strained local water resources. The drying up 
of	the	river	also	affected	farmers	in	the	Barada	Valley.	In	2009,	Abu	Hassan	showed	me	
his	apple	and	quince	orchard	on	the	bank	of	the	Barada	River,	which	was	now	a	trickle	of	
water.	“That’s	rainwater,	it’s	not	from	the	spring,”	he	said	despondently.	The	60-something	
father	of	10	looked	helpless	and	defeated.	“It	never	used	to	be	like	this,”	he	said	of	the	land	
that	he	had	inherited	from	his	father.	“There	used	to	always	be	water,	summer	and	winter.	
The	Barada	used	to	be	famous.	Everyone	knew	about	it.	It	was	a	powerful	river,	six	or	seven	
metres deep and very cold. People drowned in its strong current. But eight years ago, the 
spring suddenly disappeared. If my father saw this, he wouldn’t believe it. He wouldn’t 
believe	that	the	Barada	has	died.	My	great-grandchildren	won’t	even	know	that	there	ever	
was	a	river	here”	(Fig.	16).	
While urbanization has obviously transformed landscapes across the world over the 
last	 century,	 the	 irrevocable	 rapidity	 with	 which	 Damascus’s	 green	 belt	 was	 destroyed	
is	shocking.	 In	2008,	a	35-year-old	Damascene	remembered	that	when	he	was	a	boy	in	
5 	Official	government	figure.	Others	estimated	the	capital’s	population	to	lie	closer	to	6–7	million,	a	
third of the country’s population before 2011.
Figure 16.	Abu	Hassan	standing	on	the	banks	of	the	dwindling	Barada	River	near	Damascus.	The	high	
banks	behind	him	indicate	the	river’s	former	depth,	2009.	Source:	Adel	Samara.	
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the	late	1970s	he	could	walk	from	his	home	near	the	Old	City	gate	of	Bab	Sharqi	to	his	
grandmother’s	village	in	the	Ghuta	Oasis	5	km	away	without	crossing	a	single	paved	road.	
In	2008,	Bab	Sharqi	was	flanked	by	a	six-lane	ring	 road	and	beyond	 there	was	only	an	
endless	stretch	of	concrete	and	bricks.	
HyDrauLIC anD SoCIaL EngInEErIng on THE EuPHraTES 
The promise of the Euphrates Basin Project
Until the 1980s, the sustained drive for agricultural growth improved living standards in 
rural areas, but this trend slowed in the 1990s as the limits of land and water resources 
were overstretched, particularly in the north and east of the country. Thus while Syria 
prided	itself	on	its	self-sufficiency	in	certain	main	staples	and	on	its	wheat	exports,	11.4%	
of its population lived in extreme poverty in 2005, unable to satisfy its basic food and non-
food needs.
Nonetheless, agriculture remained the largest sector throughout the 1990s and 
retained a prominent role even as the oil and industry sectors expanded. It remained the 
backbone	of	the	rural	economy	in	the	2000s,	even	though	the	agricultural	labour	force	was	
halved	to	15%	between	2000	and	2010.	Despite	the	impact	of	drought	in	the	late	2000s,	
which	 reduced	agricultural	exports,	 the	agricultural	 sector	accounted	 for	about	20%	of	
Syria’s	GDP	in	2010	(Syria	Report	2013).	But	farmers	and	herders	were	increasingly	forced	
to abandon agriculture even though there were few employment alternatives, especially 
in the impoverished north-east of the country where illiteracy rates were the highest.6 
This was also the only place where poverty levels had increased in the period between 
1996	and	2004,	with	58%	of	the	country’s	poor	living	in	this	region	(UNDP	2005).7 These 
disparities were exacerbated after 2000, when Bashar al-Assad acceded to power after 
his father’s death and started implementing policies to liberalize the economy and open 
Syria	up	to	world	markets.	Ba’athist	policies	were	abandoned	and	in	2005	the	government	
announced	a	 transition	 to	a	 social	market	economy,	which	 led	 to	 the	 cancellation	of	 a	
number of state subsidies including those on fuel and fertilizer in 2008 and 2009. These 
subsidy cuts coincided with a four-year drought between 2007 and 2010, which had a 
devastating	impact	in	the	north-east	(de	Châtel	2014a).	Agriculture	remained	an	important	
economic sector, but the government was much more focused on attracting foreign 
6 	For	example,	in	2004,	38.6	percent	of	the	population	of	Raqqa	Governorate	was	illiterate	according	
to a census by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Syria. 
7 	Syria’s	north-eastern	region	is	usually	defined	as	encompassing	the	governorates	of	Deir	ez-Zor,	
Hassakeh,	Raqqa	and	Qamishli.	However,	UNDP	(2005)	defines	north-eastern	Syria	as	including	Idleb,	
Aleppo,	Al	Raqqa,	Deir	ez-Zor	and	Hassakeh.	
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investment	 for	 the	 development	 of	 trade,	 housing,	 banking,	 construction	 and	 tourism.	
Moreover,	 despite	nominal	 government	efforts	 to	 attract	 investment	 to	 the	north-east,	
economic	activity	remained	concentrated	in	the	two	large	cities	Damascus	and	Aleppo	and	
along the coast. 
Yet	40	years	earlier,	the	Syrian	Ba’ath	party	had	had	high	hopes	for	the	north-eastern	
region,	also	locally	referred	to	as	the	Jezira,8 where it had aimed to create the new model of 
a	socialist	society.	With	encouragement	and	substantial	financial	support	from	the	Soviet	
Union,	 the	 Syrian	 state	 in	 1968	 embarked	 on	 a	 large-scale	 irrigation	 and	 reclamation	
project	that	would	transform	agriculture	in	the	Euphrates	Basin	from	small-scale	irrigation	
and	 dry-land	 farming	 into	 massive	 agricultural	 projects,	 with	 large-scale	 irrigation	 and	
drainage	systems	(Springborg	1981).
The	Euphrates	Basin	Project	that	was	launched	in	1968	was	a	showcase	of	Ba’athist	
development policies. Among its ambitious goals, it aimed to regulate the water of the 
flood-prone	 Euphrates	 River,9 boost agricultural production through the creation of 
640,000	 ha	 of	 new	 irrigation	 areas,	 and	 generate	 2.5	 billion	 kW/yr	 of	 electricity	 to	 run	
irrigation	pumps,	power	local	industry	and	electrify	villages.	The	project’s	centrepiece,	the	
Soviet-funded	Tabqa	or	Thawra	Dam,	was	among	 the	world’s	10	 largest.	Even	before	 it	
was	completed	in	1973,	it	became	an	emblem	of	Ba’athist	power,	a	fact	that	was	affirmed	
when	the	dam	reservoir	was	named	after	President	Hafez	al-Assad	 (Hinnebusch	1989).	
The	Euphrates	Basin	Project	became	a	main	priority	for	the	regime,	which	dedicated	25%	
of	the	national	budget	to	the	project	for	more	than	20	years	(Ababsa	2011:	88).	
The	project	 also	had	clear	 socio-political	 goals,	 aiming	 to	 instigate	 social	 change	 in	
the	backward	eastern	provinces	and	gain	political	 control	over	 the	unruly	 Jezira	 region	
by	breaking	down	the	strong	tribal	structures	and	constructing	a	new	progressive	rural	
society	based	on	socialist	methods	of	 cooperative	production	and	state	 farms	 (Ababsa	
2005:	17).	The	filling	of	the	Tabqa	Dam	reservoir	in	1973	flooded	250,000	ha	of	arable	land,	
66	villages	and	126	hamlets	in	the	fertile	Euphrates	Valley,	displacing	between	65,000	and	
75,000 people. The government planned to resettle this population on 15 model farms 
in	 the	pilot	 irrigation	project,	 dispersing	 the	displaced	 from	each	 village	 across	 several	
farms	in	an	effort	to	sever	tribal	ties.10 However,	poor	design	and	lack	of	space	in	these	
8 	‘Jezira’	means	island	in	Arabic	and	refers	to	the	region	situated	between	the	Tigris	and	the	Euphrates.
9 	With	a	 length	of	661	km	in	Syria,	 the	Euphrates	 is	the	country’s	most	 important	water	resource,	
providing	an	annual	average	5,574	MCM	of	water	or	more	than	40	percent	of	 the	country’s	water	
resources	 (GTZ	and	SPC	2009).	This	 transboundary	river	 that	 is	shared	with	upstream	Turkey	and	
downstream	Iraq	is	the	longest	river	in	Western	Asia	with	a	total	length	of	2,786	km	(UN-ESCWA	and	
BGR	2013).
10 	According	to	Ababsa	(2011:	94),	quoting	Hinnebusch	(1989),	260	families	from	67	different	villages	
and hamlets were installed on the Rabi’a farm. 
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new	villages	made	them	unattractive	to	the	communities	from	the	Euphrates	Valley	who	
strongly	 resisted	 the	move.	 In	 the	end	 the	government	offered	 to	 resettle	 them	 in	 the	
42	newly	built	villages11	in	the	Khabur	Basin	in	Hassakeh	Governorate.	Around	a	third	of	
the	displaced	population	made	the	move	to	Hassakeh,	while	only	9%	settled	in	the	pilot	
project’s	state	farms.	Many	more,	around	55%,	remained	in	the	area	and	built	new	villages	
in the steppe lands on the edge of the new dam reservoir. Some of them were herders 
with large numbers of sheep who would not have had enough space in the new villages 
and farms; others were landless or could not prove ownership of their land in the valley. 
Many	also	moved	to	Raqqa,	Aleppo	or	Damascus	(Hinnebusch	1989:	236;	Ababsa	2005:	
18;	Rabo	1986:	35).	
Like	many	other	“hydraulic	mission”	schemes	of	its	type,	the	Euphrates	Basin	Project	
failed to meet its targets, which were often unrealistic. As in Egypt, where the Soviet-
backed	 construction	 of	 the	 Aswan	 High	 Dam	 did	 not	 achieve	 far-reaching	 agricultural	
transformation,	 the	Tabqa	Dam	did	not	 turn	agriculture	 in	Syria	 into	a	highly	profitable	
enterprise. The annual reclamation target of 50,000 ha set by President Hafez al-Assad was 
never	attained,	let	alone	the	ultimate	goal	of	640,000	ha	(Springborg	1981).	Unexpected	
ecological problems posed serious challenges, slowing the pace, increasing costs, and 
considerably	 reducing	 the	project’s	scale.	The	salt	content	of	 the	Euphrates12 increased 
after	irrigation	started	in	south-eastern	Anatolia	in	Turkey	and	this	combined	with	the	hot,	
dry conditions, and rising groundwater levels made soil salinization a constant problem 
(Hinnebusch	 1989).13	 The	 problem	 of	 soil	 salinization	 in	 the	 Syrian	 Jezira	 was	 further	
exacerbated by the gypsiferous soils in this area, which have a high potential for salt 
mobilization	(UN-ESCWA	&	BGR	2013).	Between	1976	and	1985,	4,000	ha	of	arable	lands	
became salinized every year and by the early 1980s 20,000 ha had been lost to salinization 
and	a	further	35,000	ha	had	lost	half	its	productivity	due	to	salt	formation	(Ababsa	2011:	
91).	Furthermore,	the	high	gypsum	content	of	large	parts	of	the	area	made	reclamation	
11 	This	was	the	‘Arab	belt’,	a	280	km-long	and	10-15	km-wide	band	of	arable	land	along	the	Turkish	
border,	that	the	government	outlined	in	the	1960s	as	part	of	a	plan	to	‘Arabize’	this	predominantly	
Kurdish	 region.	 “The	 plan	 anticipated	 deportation	 of	 140,000	 Kurds	 living	 in	 332	 villages	 situated	
inside this band who were supposed to be replaced by Arabs. However, the plan was not realized 
until	1975	when	around	4,000	Arab	families	of	the	Walda	tribe	were	moved	to	forty-one	model	farms	
in	Jazira	as	well	as	to	fifteen	model	farms	north	of	ar’Raqqa.	The	Arabization	campaign	of	Jazira	was	
halted	by	Hafiz	al’Asad	in	1976.”	(DIS	&	ACCORD	2010:	8)
12 	The	high	salinity	of	Euphrates	water	can	partly	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	almost	all	of	the	river’s	
discharge	is	generated	in	the	headwaters	in	Turkey,	and	the	river	then	flows	through	semi-arid	and	
arid	areas	with	high	evaporation	for	over	1,500	km	(UN-ESCWA	and	BGR	2013).
13 	This	problem	started	in	the	1940s	and	1950s	when	rich	Aleppan	merchants	started	growing	cotton	
in	the	Jezira	region	and	pumping	water	from	the	river	without	proper	irrigation	or	drainage	systems	
(Ababsa	2011).	
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uneconomic	and	caused	the	collapse	of	irrigation	canals.	As	a	result,	only	60,000 ha	were	
irrigated	from	Lake	Assad	by	1984	(Collelo	1987).	In	2000,	the	irrigated	surface	had	risen	
to	124,000 ha,	or	nearly	20%	of	the	projected	640,000	ha	(Elhadj	2008).
The	 state	 farms,	 designed	 as	 “‘avantgarde’	 structures	 to	 train	 farm	 labourers	 with	
modern	techniques	of	production	and	to	diffuse	the	Ba’ath	Socialist	ideological	principles”	
(Ababsa	2011:	88),	 failed	 from	 the	 time	of	 their	establishment	 in	 the	1960s,	both	 from	
an economic and social point of view. Costs were higher than revenues and productivity 
remained	low.	In	2000,	the	income	of	all	state	farms	in	the	Euphrates	Project	was	SYP	25.5	
million	(US$	0.57	million)	while	production	costs	reached	SYP	645	million	(US$	14.3	million)	
(Ibid.:	94-95).14	Overall	costs	also	far	exceeded	initial	projections,	as	a	result	of	international	
inflation	and	the	other	unforeseen	complications.	Reclamation	had	been	estimated	at	SYP	
2	billion	 (US$	500	million),	but	by	1977	cost	estimates	had	been	adjusted	to	SYP	13-14	
billion	 (US$	 3.25-3.5	 billion)	 not	 counting	 the	 cost	 of	 resettlement.	 In	 comparison,	 the	
construction	of	 the	dam	and	the	adjacent	town	of	Thawra	had	only	cost	SYP	1.4	billion	
(US$	350	million)	 (Hinnebusch	1989).15 The dam itself had also failed to meet planners’ 
optimistic expectations so that two additional dams, Al Baath and Tishreen, were built in 
1986	and	1999	respectively	to	provide	additional	flood	regulation	and	hydroelectricity.	
A flood and three droughts (Tel al Banat, 2009)
The	 recent	history	of	Tel	al	Banat,	a	hamlet	on	 the	Euphrates	 that	 lies	around	100	km	
upstream from the provincial capital Raqqa, illustrates the far-reaching social repercussions 
of	the	Syrian	government’s	 infrastructural	and	political	projects	 in	the	Jezira	region	over	
the	last	50	years.	The	original	Tel	al	Banat	hamlet	was	flooded	by	the	construction	of	the	
Tishreen	Dam	and	the	creation	of	Lake	Tishreen,	and	its	inhabitants	were	scattered	across	
the	 country.	 Some	moved	 to	 the	newly	 reclaimed	 lands	 in	 the	Maskaneh	Pilot	 Project,	
one	of	the	seven	Euphrates	Basin	government	irrigation	schemes	situated	about	200	km	
south-west	of	Tel	al	Banat	in	a	vast	dusty	steppe	(Fig.	14).	Others	moved	to	Raqqa	or	the	
Damascus	 suburbs.	 Around	 50	 families	 remained	 in	 the	 area,	 and	 rebuilt	 their	 homes	
on	the	banks	of	Lake	Tishreen	on	the	edge	of	the	steppe.	Their	reasons	for	staying	were	
diverse: some could not prove ownership of their land in the valley and therefore received 
no	new	lands	in	the	Maskaneh	project,	others	received	such	small	plots	in	Maskaneh	that	
they	could	not	have	made	a	living.	Farming	and	settlement	are	officially	forbidden	on	the	
government-owned	lands	around	Lake	Tishreen.	But	local	communities	all	around	the	lake	
have	stayed,	illegally	cultivating	the	land	and	pumping	irrigation	water	from	the	lake.	The	
14 	Approximate	2000	exchange	rate:	US$	1=	SYP	45.
15 	Approximate	1975	exchange	rate	US$	1	=	SYP	4	(Hinnebusch	1989).	
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story	of	Tel	al	Banat	is	characteristic	of	many	of	the	flooded	villages	of	the	Euphrates	Valley	
whose	population	were	uprooted	and	scattered	through	Syria	and	Lebanon	after	1973	
(Fig.	17).
Figure 17. View	of	the	“new”	village	of	Tel	al	Banat	with	Lake	Tishreen	in	the	background,	2008.	Source:	
Adel Samara.
Ahmed	al	Yehya,	a	45-year-old	farmer	whose	family	had	lived	in	Tel	al	Banat	for	generations,	
remembers	that	the	flood	came	very	suddenly:	“We	had	been	hearing	about	it	for	10	years	
and	then	suddenly,	within	a	week,	it	was	there.	We	took	whatever	we	could	before	the	old	
family home disappeared in the water, even the wooden roof beams, and pushed it up the 
hill in carts. Some people didn’t want to leave. They were going to lose all their belongings 
in	the	flood.	They	said	they	would	rather	die	in	the	flood	than	move	to	the	new	lands	in	
Maskaneh.	And	some	did.	My	father	had	a	heart	attack	and	died	on	the	day	of	the	flood.”	
Like	many	other	farmers	in	the	Euphrates	Valley,	Yehya’s	family	could	not	prove	ownership	
of their land. They only had the deeds to the land on which their home was built, which 
made	 them	eligible	 to	a	0.4	ha	patch	of	 land	 in	Maskaneh.	This	would	have	had	 to	be	
shared	out	between	five	brothers.	“We	had	land	in	the	valley,	but	it	wasn’t	registered.	We	
didn’t	 think	to	register	 it	because	we	never	thought	 it	would	be	taken	from	us.	We	had	
been	farming	that	land	for	100	years	or	more,	but	we	had	no	papers	to	prove	it.	Only	one	
of	my	brothers	moved	to	Maskaneh,	the	three	others	are	in	Damascus.	I	am	the	only	one	
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who is still here. We are now illegally on this land, but the government leaves us in peace. 
[…]	The	land	here	is	much	poorer	than	the	land	in	the	valley,	it	is	weak.	We	started	farming	
it	in	2000	and	I	think	that	within	20	years	it	will	be	useless.	Many	of	the	lands	get	salinized.	
For	example,	people	who	started	farming	olive	trees	five	years	ago	have	had	to	abandon	
the land because the trees are dying. There are thousands of hectares of dead salinized 
land	now.	The	problem	is	that	the	quality	of	the	land	is	bad.	The	land	that	was	flooded	by	
the	dams	yielded	20	times	more	than	the	land	here	or	in	the	area	of	Maskaneh.	The	land	
is	poor	from	the	outset,	so	how	are	you	going	to	make	it	productive?	An	old	lady	won’t	ever	
be	a	bride,	even	if	you	put	make-up	on	her.”
By	 2009	 the	 farmers	 of	 Tel	 al	 Banat	 and	 the	 wider	 Jezira	 region	 were	 facing	 the	
third successive year of drought and drastic cuts on fuel and fertilizer subsidies, a lethal 
combination	that	was	forcing	many	to	abandon	their	land	(de	Châtel	2014a).	Three	quarters	
of	the	houses	in	Tel	al	Banat	were	boarded	up	after	families	had	left.	They	chose	Damascus	
and	the	southern	governorates,	more	than	600	km	from	the	Euphrates	Valley,	instead	of	
nearby	Aleppo.	“Aleppo	is	full,”	they	said,	with	migrants	who	could	not	find	work.	Not	that	
they	had	any	expectations	of	life	in	the	capital.	“Damascus	is	the	mother	of	the	poor.”	They	
knew	life	there	would	be	worse	than	in	Tel	al	Banat,	but	life	there	had	become	impossible.	
Abdullah Ahmed, a father of seven, stopped farming wheat and cotton on his 0.8-ha 
plot	of	 land	after	the	soil	 “died”.	 In	April	2009	he	was	preparing	to	 leave	Tel	al	Banat	to	
find	work	in	Damascus	or	Lebanon,	but	had	few	hopes	of	finding	a	better	life	for	himself	
or	his	children.	 “They	will	be	 like	 their	 father:	 they	will	be	alive,	 they	will	have	 food	and	
drink.	But	that’s	all.	We	don’t	have	 land	and	land	is	dignity.”	Agriculture,	 in	the	words	of	
one of Ahmed’s neighbours, was dead, but none of the farmers in Tel al Banat had any 
other	employment	options	–	most	had	barely	finished	primary	school.	“It	is	difficult	to	get	a	
government	job,”	said	Ahmed.	“One	needs	languages	and	computer	skills.	And	the	thing	is,	
we	are	farmers,	that’s	what	we	know	how	to	do.	What	am	I	going	to	do	in	a	factory?”	But	in	
the	end,	he	said,	he	would	have	no	choice:	he	would	move	to	Damascus	and	find	any	work	
he	could.	“Many	people	we	know	have	moved	to	Damascus,	they	are	living	in	tents	for	SYP	
1,000	(US$	21.27)	a	month.”16 
Leaving the land (Hamouriyeh/Mzeirieb/Lebanon, 2009)
Ahmed	al	Yehya’s	brother,	Mahmoud	Hamadeh,	locked	up	his	house	in	Tel	al	Banat	in	2008	
and	moved	to	the	Damascus	suburb	of	Hamouriyeh.	He	rented	a	plot	of	land	for	SYP	1,500	
(US$	31.90)	a	month	and	lived	in	a	woollen	Bedouin	tent	with	his	wife,	eight	children	and	
two	daughters-in-law.	His	wife	and	daughters-in-law	worked	on	nearby	farms	and	his	sons	
16 	2009	exchange	rate:	US$1	=	SYP	47
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tried	 to	get	odd	 jobs	as	builders	and	porters	 in	neighbouring	suburbs.	 “We	have	 faced	
many	difficulties	since	we	came	here,”	he	said,	sitting	outside	his	tent	by	the	roadside.	“It	
is	not	as	we	expected	it	to	be.	There	is	no	work	here	either,	but	we	had	no	choice	but	to	
leave	Tel	al	Banat.	We	had	to	eat.”	
Hamadeh’s tent bordered on a larger plot of land where three or four families from the 
Euphrates	Valley	had	been	living	in	squalid	conditions	since	the	flooding	of	Lake	Tishreen	
in	1999.	Like	thousands	of	others,	they	had	been	unable	to	prove	ownership	of	their	lands	
and	had	lost	everything	when	the	Euphrates	Valley	was	flooded.	Instead	of	staying	in	the	
area	though,	they	had	taken	their	chances	and	moved	to	Damascus	in	the	hope	of	finding	
a	better	life.	But	10	years	later	they	still	lived	in	a	haphazard	collection	of	makeshift	tents	
and	shacks	that	had	been	drawn	up	around	a	central	yard.	Half-naked	children	played	in	
the	mud,	women	filled	large	plastic	vats	with	water	that	they	had	bought	from	a	private	
vendor	(Fig.	18).	Like	Hamadeh’s	family,	these	families	survived	by	finding	temporary	farm	
and	construction	work.	None	of	the	children	went	to	school:	their	parents	could	not	afford	
the	10	SYP	(US$	0.20)	return	bus	fare,	or	the	notebooks,	pen	and	shoes	they	would	need.	
Moreover,	the	children	were	more	useful	if	they	worked	to	help	support	their	families	(De	
Châtel	2014a).
Figure 18. After	the	flooding	of	Lake	Tishreen	in	1999,	this	group	of	migrants	from	north-eastern	Syria	
moved	to	the	Damascus	suburbs	where	they	were	still	living	in	makeshift	tents	in	2009.	Source:	Adel	
Samara. 
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Makeshift	camps	like	this	one	and	larger	were	dotted	around	the	Damascus	suburbs	
and	 in	 the	 southern	 governorates	 of	Dara’a	 and	 Suweida.	 Ahmed	 al	 Yehya’s	 daughter-
in-law	 Fatima,	 20,	 grew	 up	 in	 one	 of	 the	 42	 “new	 villages”	 that	were	 built	 in	Hassakeh	
Governorate	after	the	flooding	of	Lake	Assad	in	1973.	Her	family	had	received	2.5	ha	of	
land there in compensation for the land they lost in the valley. They planted cotton and 
wheat, which they irrigated with groundwater. But in the early 2000s the water ran out and 
in	2007	the	whole	family	moved	to	a	camp	near	Mzeirieb,	a	village	in	Dara’a	Governorate	
near	the	Jordanian	border.	There	they	joined	hundreds	of	other	migrants	from	Qamishle,	
Hassakeh,	Deir	ez-Zor	and	Raqqa	Governorates.	There	was	also	a	small	group	of	Sudanese.	
Before	she	was	married	and	moved	to	Tel	al	Banat,	Fatima	also	lived	in	Mzeirieb.	“There	
was	no	electricity,	no	water,	no	bread	in	Mzeirieb	–	nothing,”	she	said.	“You	got	SYP	25/hr	
(US$	0.55)	to	work	on	other	people’s	land.”	According	to	farmers	in	Tel	al	Banat,	the	camp	
had existed since the early 2000s but started attracting more migrants after the drought 
started in 2007. 
Crammed	on	to	a	small	plot	of	land	on	the	edge	of	the	village,	the	camp	looked	like	a	
slum,	with	ragged	tents	sewn	together	from	odd	pieces	of	fabric	and	plastic	(Fig.	19).	The	
camp dwellers had developed a precarious contraption of electric wiring to tap power 
off	a	nearby	pylon,	a	system	which	they	quickly	dismantled	as	soon	as	they	saw	security	
forces	coming	to	the	camp.	Conflicts	regularly	broke	out	between	camp	inhabitants	and	
locals,	 but	 also	 among	 inhabitants	 themselves	 who	 originated	 from	 different	 regions	
and tribes. The local authorities were obviously aware of the camp on the edge of town, 
which	was	steadily	growing	as	more	migrants	fled	the	drought	in	the	north-east.	However,	
camp dwellers received no government support or food assistance. Even as the impact 
of the drought worsened and the government launched aid appeals to the international 
community, all food assistance was distributed in the north-east. International and Syrian 
aid organizations were not granted permission to provide support to migrants, who got 
financial	incentives	(20%	of	their	income	in	Dara’a)	to	return	to	the	north-east	(see	Chap.	
3).	
As water ran out across north-eastern Syria from the late 1990s onwards, many 
men	and	young	boys	also	left	their	families	in	Idleb,	Hassakeh,	Qamishle,	Raqqa	and	Deir	
ez-Zor	Governorates	to	seek	work	 in	Lebanon.	While	this	 form	of	temporary	or	circular	
migration	between	Syria	and	Lebanon	has	existed	 for	decades,	water	 scarcity	and	 lack	
of	 job	opportunities	 in	Syria’s	north-east	had	 led	 to	an	 increase	 in	 the	 late	1990s.	 The	
decision	to	migrate	to	Lebanon	was	spurred	by	the	abolition	of	visa	procedures	between	
the	two	countries	after	the	end	of	the	Lebanese	civil	war	in	1990,	easing	transit	between	
the	two	countries.	No	official	figures	exist	 for	Syrian	workers	 in	Lebanon,	but	estimates	
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range between 300,000 and 500,000 during the post-war period from 1990 to 2005, 
representing	10-15%	of	the	overall	Syrian	labour	force	(Di	Bartolomeo	et	al.	2012).
Ahmed	al	Yehya’s	nephew,	Ahmed,	28,	had	also	made	the	move	to	Lebanon	in	2005	
and	lived	in	the	disused	concrete	shell	of	a	half-finished	building	in	the	mountain	village	of	
Qartaba	above	Jbeil.	For	a	US$	20	monthly	rent,	he	shared	a	narrow	windowless	space	on	
the	ground	floor	–	probably	intended	as	a	storage	space	in	the	building’s	garage	–	with	15	
other	men,	mostly	from	the	village	of	Daife	near	Tel	al	Banat.	There	was	no	hot	water	and	
no	heating,	which	was	particularly	difficult	during	the	winter	months	when	temperatures	
can drop below zero and the village, which lies at an altitude of 1,250 m, can get snowed in 
(Fig.	20).	But	they	were	better	off	than	the	Syrians	across	the	road,	who	had	built	tents	from	
plastic	sheeting	in	an	unfinished	parking	garage	and	were	fully	exposed	to	the	elements.	
Ahmed	was	a	relative	newcomer	compared	to	Hassan	and	Abdul	Mustafa	who	had	been	
working	in	Lebanon	for	twelve	and	nine	years	respectively.	Since	then,	the	situation	back	
in	Daife,	where	their	wives,	children	and	extended	family	still	lived,	had	only	gotten	worse.	
“They	can’t	irrigate	anymore,”	Hassan	said.	“There	is	no	water.	There	is	nothing.	In	the	1980s	
life	was	good	in	the	Jezira,	there	was	water,	but	now	there	is	drought	and	the	price	of	diesel	
has	gone	up	from	US$	30	to	US$	100	per	barrel.	It’s	impossible	to	keep	farming.	Even	if	you	
have	land	these	days,	you	can’t	work	on	it.	The	land	has	given	us	nothing	since	the	1980s	
Figure 19. The	tent	camp	near	the	Syrian	town	of	Mzeirieb	on	the	Jordanian	border,	here	pictured	in	
2009, attracted migrants from across north-eastern Syria from the early 2000s. Source: Adel Samara.
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Figure 20. Syrian	workers	living	behind	a	disused	parking	garage	in	the	village	of	Qartaba,	Lebanon,	
2009. Source: Adel Samara. 
–	it	is	good	for	nothing,	fit	for	the	rubbish	[…].	If	I	had	had	an	education,	I	wouldn’t	be	here.	
It	is	the	same	for	our	children.	All	we	can	do	is	bring	them	here	to	Lebanon	and	put	them	
to	work	on	a	building	site.	It’s	desperate.	We	want	our	children	to	receive	an	education,	but	
most	of	the	teachers	in	Daife	don’t	last	long.	They	leave.”	
TragEDy oF THE CoMMonS In THE BaDIa
The country’s breadbasket runs dry (Bir Hassan, Beirut, Lebanon, 2009)
In 2009, the Beirut suburbs were teeming with Syrian migrants. There was even a corner 
of	Bir	Hassan,	near	the	Palestinian	refugee	camp	of	Burj	al	Barajneh,	where	you	only	saw	
Syrian licence plates. 
In	 2009,	 Adnan	 al-Sahn,	 a	 32-year-old	 bricklayer,	 had	 been	 living	 in	 Beirut	 for	 six	
years.	He	left	his	hometown	on	the	Khabur	River	in	Hassakeh	Governorate	following	the	
construction	of	the	Bassel	Dam	in	1999.	“As	soon	as	they	built	the	dam,	the	river’s	level	
was	lower,	but	we	tried	to	continue	farming	our	land,”	he	said.	“We	started	using	a	drip	
irrigation system, but soon there was no water at all anymore, and we were forbidden from 
taking	the	water	from	the	dam	reservoir	for	 irrigation. 	Before,	we	irrigated	most	of	our	
land with water from the river, some of it was rainfed. But if there is no rain, then there is 
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no	way	to	sustain	rainfed	land	either.	Over	the	last	10	years,	water	levels	have	constantly	
decreased. And now with the price of diesel going up, there is no point at all anymore in 
practising	agriculture.	Everyone	is	leaving	to	Dara’a,	Aleppo,	Damascus	and	Lebanon...”
It	was	quite	a	change	from	the	1990s	when	Hassakeh	Governorate	was	known	as	Al 
Khaleej Al Thaniy or the Second Gulf region for the wealth and the prosperity of its local 
population.	“We	used	to	have	employees	working	for	us,	now	we	have	to	work	for	others.	
We	have	had	to	abandon	our	homes	and	we	have	lost	our	dignity,”	said	Adnan	who	lived	
in	 a	 disused	 shed	behind	 a	 tall	 apartment	block	between	 the	 south	Beirut	 suburbs	of	
Burj	al-Barajneh	and	Bir	Hassan,	a	space	he	shared	with	eight	others.	They	all	used	 to	
work	as	farmers	and	shepherds	because	“that’s	the	kind	of	work	you	do	if	you	are	from	
Hassakeh,”	according	to	Adnan	who,	like	his	seven	brothers,	did	not	finish	primary	school.	
“The	situation	in	Syria	is	bad	and	it’s	getting	worse.	In	the	days	of	Hafez	al-Assad	it	wasn’t	
like	this.	Farmers	were	better	off	than	civil	servants.	Now	civil	servants	get	paid	more	for	
doing	nothing.	We	live	in	terrible	conditions:	we	earn	low	wages,	we	eat	bad	food…	Look	
at	me:	I’m	32	and	I’m	not	even	married	yet	–	I’ve	been	working	for	10	years.	And	for	what?	
What	happens	after	this?	Another	10	years	of	this?”
a perfect storm in the khabur Basin
The	transformation	of	the	area	around	the	Khabur	River	and	Hassakeh	over	the	last	75	
years illustrates how a series of human and environmental factors have disrupted the 
fragile	environmental	balance	in	the	semi-arid	steppe.	The	388-km	Khabur	River	originates	
in	 the	 Turkish	 Highlands	 and	 joins	 the	 Euphrates	 River	 near	 Deir	 ez-Zor	 as	 its	 most	
important	 tributary	 (Fig.	 14).	 Along	 its	 course,	 the	 river	 receives	water	 from	a	 series	of	
streams	and	from	the	springs	at	Ras	al	Ain,	which	was	once	one	of	the	largest	karst	springs	
in	the	world	 (UN-ESCWA	&	BGR	2013).	Until	75	years	ago,	this	area	had	a	small,	mainly	
nomadic	population,	with	a	 few	settlements	along	the	river.	 “In	1940,	 the	Khabur	could	
be considered a self-sustaining steppe for the pasturing of camels and sheep, with highly 
productive rainfed agriculture, and equally productive gravity irrigation along stretches of 
the	river.	Fishing	and	hunting	of	wild	gazelle	were	important	contributors	to	the	diet”	(Hole	
2009:	11).
The vast steppe was controlled by nomadic tribes, who grazed their sheep and camels 
seasonally. They applied the customary law of the tribal hima system, annually migrating 
to fresh pastures, which allowed the vegetation to regenerate. The steppe had a rich 
wildlife and diverse vegetation. According a description from the 1960s, it was full of wild 
gazelles,	rabbits,	foxes,	wolves,	hyenas,	while	goats	and	sheep	grazed	in	fields	dotted	with	
red	poppies	and	other	colourful	flowers	(Karabet	2013).	But	the	events	of	the	20th century 
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brought far-reaching change and soon disrupted the steppe’s fragile ecological balance. 
After	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 the	 traditional	 migration	 routes,	 which	 had	
spanned	 from	 the	 Turkish	 Highlands	 into	 current-day	 Iraq,	 Jordan	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia,	
were	cut	off	by	the	closing	of	the	borders,	thus	limiting	the	freedom	of	movement	of	the	
Bedouin.	At	the	same	time,	during	the	1940s	and	1950s,	tribal	sheikhs	leased	large	tracts	
of steppe land to urban merchants from Aleppo who mainly cultivated irrigated cotton 
(Hole	et	al.	2007).	Around	13,000	motor	pumps	were	installed	along	the	Euphrates	in	the	
1950s	and	the	area	dedicated	to	irrigated	cotton	in	the	Jezira	rapidly	increased	from	10,000	
ha	 in	1952	 to	120,000	ha	 in	1962	 (Ababsa	2005:	14).	However,	 the	absence	of	proper	
drainage rapidly led to problems of salinization. The abolishment of the hima system and 
the nationalization of the steppe in 1958 led to further changes in land use patterns in the 
steppe from pastoralism and extensive rainfed agriculture to intensive irrigated cultivation 
of wheat and cotton. Nomadic tribes were encouraged to settle and plough the land so 
that	the	majority	of	pastures	 located	in	areas	of	between	200	mm	and	350	mm	rainfall	
were converted to crops.
	As	a	result,	the	population	of	Hassakeh	Governorate	increased	exponentially	from	the	
low ten thousands in 1950 to more than 1.1 million in 2007, centred around the regional 
capital	Hassakeh	but	also	scattered	in	several	smaller	cities	and	hundreds	of	villages	and	
hamlets. Besides the high birth rates that are common across Syria, this sharp rise can be 
explained through the settlement of nomadic tribes in the region from the 1950s and the 
resettlement	of	families	displaced	by	the	dams	in	the	Euphrates	Valley	in	the	1970s	and	
1980s	(Hole	2009).	
 As Syria started expanding irrigated agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
development	of	the	Khabur	Basin	was	prioritized,17 and with substantial foreign aid, three 
dams	were	put	 into	operation	on	the	Khabur	and	its	tributaries	in	the	1990s,	supplying	
the	 large-scale	Khabur	River	Basin	 Irrigation	Project.	Land	 “irrigated	by	surface	water	 in	
Hassakeh	Governorate	increased	eightfold	from	7,400 ha	to	65,000 ha	between	1990	and	
2000.	Over	this	period,	Hassakeh	became	the	most	important	agricultural	region	in	Syria,	
producing	around	40%	of	the	country’s	wheat	and	cotton	supply,	two	of	the	main	irrigated	
crops	in	Syria”	(UN-ESCWA	and	BGR	2013:	92).	
Groundwater formed a much more important source for irrigated agriculture in the 
Khabur	Basin,	with	more	 than	87%	of	 the	 irrigated	 surface	 area	 supplied	by	wells	 and	
generous government subsidies for the drilling of wells until the 1990s. Soon massive over-
17 	 Following	 the	 results	of	 the	nationwide	survey	of	 soils	and	water	 resources	carried	out	by	 the	
United	States	Department	of	Agriculture	in	1978,	which	saw	great	potential	for	irrigation	in	the	Khabur	
Basin	(Hole	2008).
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extraction	in	Syria	and	Turkey	caused	a	rapid	fall	in	water	tables	and	major	springs	ran	dry.	
The	Ras	al	Ain	Springs,	which	used	to	discharge	45 m3/s, disappeared completely in 2001 
and	groundwater	levels	in	this	area	dropped	at	an	average	rate	of	1.68 m/yr	between	1999	
and	2003	(UN-ESCWA	and	BGR	2013).	As	a	result,	most	wells	in	the	basin	pumped	from	
depths	of	more	than	100	m.	According	to	figures	from	2003,	the	Khabur	Basin	had	a	3.1	
BCM	water	deficit,	the	largest	water	deficit	of	all	basins	in	Syria	(Varela-Ortega	et	al.	2003).	
Moreover,	 the	poorly	developed	and	shallow	soils	 in	 the	arid	steppe	suffered	 from	
the	massive	intensification	of	agriculture.	Deep	ploughing	removed	native	vegetation	and	
exposed	soils	to	wind	and	water	erosion,	while	the	use	of	flood	irrigation	without	adequate	
drainage and the failure to observe fallowing cycles and crop rotation caused widespread 
soil salinization, which in turn lowered productivity. Nonetheless, the state continued 
to	encourage	expansion,	with	plans	 in	1988	to	cultivate	100%	of	 the	 “potentially	arable	
land”,	which	inevitably	resulted	in	further	degradation	of	the	rangeland	to	the	point	where	
it	was	not	even	suited	 for	grazing.	Cultivation	of	 the	steppe	was	finally	banned	 in	1994	
though	 licensed	wells	were	allowed	to	operate	until	1997	(Hole	et	al.	2007).	Meanwhile	
overgrazing	also	rapidly	took	its	toll,	primarily	due	to	the	massive	increase	in	the	sheep	and	
goat population, which more than doubled between 1985 and 2007.18 Moreover,	in	areas	
of the steppe that had been ploughed, shrub cover and the soil crust had been removed 
and were exposed to wind erosion. This in turn led to the abandonment of farms. By 
2008,	“the	entire	landscape	ha[d]	been	modified	by	humans”	and	the	region	that	was	once	
considered	the	breadbasket	of	Syria	was	described	as	“in	danger	of	agricultural	collapse”	
(Hole	 2009:	 5).	 Nearly	 all	 native	 vegetation	 had	 disappeared,	 groundwater	 levels	 had	
dropped below levels of economic extraction and wind and water erosion had removed 
the thin steppe soils. As land and water resources were exhausted, poverty levels rose and 
settlements were gradually abandoned.
The economic and social implications of desertification (Palmyra, 2009)
Desertification	was	 increasingly	becoming	a	problem	throughout	eastern	Syria	 in	2009.	
The	 government	 was	 keen	 to	 blame	 this	 on	 external	 factors	 like	 drought	 and	 climate	
change,	but	both	Syrian	and	 foreign	experts	and	even	some	officials	at	 the	Ministry	of	
the	 Environment	 identified	 overgrazing,	 over-exploitation	 of	 groundwater,	 poor	 land	
management, the expansion of agriculture in the steppe and the removal of vegetation 
and	trees	for	use	as	firewood	as	the	main	culprits	(Sharaa	2010).
18 	Nationally,	Syria’s	sheep	population	rose	from	around	11	million	in	1985	to	nearly	23	million	in	
2007. Successive years of drought after 2007 forced many herders to sell or slaughter their sheep, 
resulting in a drop in the sheep population to 18 million in 2011. The goat population more than 
doubled	in	the	same	period	from	about	1	million	in	1985	to	2.3	million	in	2011	(NAPC	2013).
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	Gianluca	Serra,	an	ecologist	who	worked	on	several	conservation	projects	in	the	Syrian	
steppe	between	2000	and	2010	warned	in	2009	of	the	implications	of	desertification,	which	
he	said	was	spreading	at	an	alarming	pace	in	the	area	of	Palmyra	where	he	was	working	to	
rehabilitate	parts	of	the	Syrian	desert.	“The	Bedouins	tell	us	that	the	badia [the steppe] was 
covered	in	thick	vegetation	until	20	or	30	years	ago,”	he	said.	“Now	it’s	becoming	a	rocky	
desert.	 There	were	many	animals	 like	 gazelles,	 so	 it	was	 rich	 in	biodiversity.	Nowadays	
you	are	lucky	if	you	see	a	hare	or	a	rabbit,	it	is	very	hard	to	see	anything	at	all.”	According	
to Serra, locals also reported an increase in dust storms, indicating that the removal of 
vegetation had caused soil erosion. 
“Desertification	is	a	serious	matter.	I’m	not	saying	this	out	of	concern	for	the	environment;	
it	is	not	because	I	care	about	nature	and	we	love	birds	and	flowers.	Natural	resources	are	
the	 base	 of	 the	 economy,	 especially	 here	 in	 the	 desert	where	 people	 live	 off	 livestock	
grazing.	Ecosystems	have	a	major	economic	value,	so	trying	to	combat	desertification	is	
important	 for	 the	 national	 economy.”	 Serra	 pointed	 out	 that	 desertification	 could	 also	
fuel	socio-economic	conflict	and	wars,	as	in	Darfur	and	Somalia.	He	added	that	people	in	
Syria’s	eastern	governorates	were	“very	angry”	and	that	there	was	suffering	and	growing	
poverty.	“I	think	Syria	is	facing	a	risk.	Demographic	growth	is	putting	huge	pressure	on	the	
country’s natural resources. The government is aware of this, to a point, but there is a lot of 
indulgence in saying that the causes are external, saying that it is climate change and that 
it	is	drought.	Of	course,	climate	change	and	drought	are	facilitating	and	accelerating	this	
process, but the main cause is the mismanagement of the natural resources of the desert, 
which	are	the	pastures,	the	vegetation	and	water”	(Serra	2009).	
ConCLuSIon
Sadly, Serra’s premonitions in 2009 proved to be more valid than anyone could have 
imagined.	Years	of	land	and	water	mismanagement,	growing	water	deficits,	the	dismantling	
of the state subsidies and the growing disenfranchisement in rural areas spurred the 
outbreak	of	the	first	protests	against	the	government	of	Bashar	al-Assad	in	March	2011.	
Starting	 in	 the	 agricultural	 area	 around	 Dara’a	 in	 southern	 Syria,	 the	 protests	 spread	
to	 other	 rural	 areas	 such	 as	 Homs,	 Hama,	 but	 also	 the	 suburbs	 of	 Damascus	 where	
many	migrant	workers	 from	the	 Jezira	had	settled.	The	 initially	peaceful	protests,	which	
demanded	freedom,	dignity	and	an	end	to	corruption,	soon	made	way	for	armed	conflict	
and	escalating	violence	across	the	country	(de	Châtel	2014a).	Now,	after	more	than	three	
years, the human, economic and environmental cost of war can hardly be measured. The 
country has been physically, economically and socially destroyed: more than 100,000 
people have died, one third of the population has had to leave their homes and the 
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economy	is	shattered.	Looking	forward,	there	is	no	end	in	sight	to	the	conflict	and	no	clear	
prospect	of	what	the	Syria	of	the	future	will	look	like.	However,	when	reconstruction	begins	
it will be crucial to emphasize the importance of a sustainable and sound natural resource 
management	system	that	can	provide	sufficient	fresh	water	to	a	growing	population.	As	
Serra said in 2009, this is not because of a love of the environment; natural resources 
form the basis of the local rural economy in this arid region. The experience of the last 50 
years shows that disregarding the balance of ecosystems and exploiting natural resources 
beyond their sustainable limit comes at a high cost. Without a reliable and safe supply 
of fresh water and a policy that includes sound water management and sustainable 
agricultural practices, it will be impossible to rebuild a stable country. 
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The	Lower	Jordan	River	flowing	south	from	Lake	Tiberias	to	
the	Alumot	Dam,	Israel,	2013.	Source:	Francesca	de	Châtel.	
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CHaPTEr 5
Bathing in Divine Waters: Water and Purity in Judaism 
and Islam
InTroDuCTIon
In	Judaism	and	Islam,	as	in	Christianity,	purification	through	water	is	a	means	of	attaining	
spiritual purity. The underlying common belief is that water has certain sacred qualities 
that give it the capacity to cleanse the mind, wash away sin and elevate the spirit to a 
higher	realm.	In	Judaism,	immersion	in	the	ritual	bath	filled	with	the	sacred	“living	waters”	
symbolises a spiritual cleansing, bringing the believer to an elevated spiritual status. Islam 
requires purity of body and mind in worship, and water is considered the ultimate means 
of attaining a state of ritual cleanness. 
In	this	article	I	will	discuss	the	role	of	water	in	Judaism	and	Islam,	both	in	the	scriptures	
and	 in	 the	 respective	purification	 rituals.	Besides	describing	 the	 various	water	 rituals,	 I	
will examine the spiritual qualities attributed to the water. In doing so, it is important to 
differentiate	between	the	concepts	of	purity	and	impurity	in	a	ritual	sense	and	“cleanliness”	
and	“dirt”	in	a	strictly	physical	sense.	The	article	will	also	discuss	the	evolution	of	the	varying	
practices	through	history	and	in	different	cultural	settings,	and	show	how	the	often	blurred	
distinction	between	 ritual	 purity	 and	physical	 cleanliness	was	 –	 and	 still	 is	 –	 frequently	
confused.  
In	 Judaism,	 the	scriptures	describe	 the	various	water	rituals	as	strictly	spiritual	acts	
that do not remove dirt, while the state of impurity is emphatically dissociated from the 
idea of physical uncleanness. In practice though, the concepts of purity and impurity have 
through the centuries often become associated with physical hygiene and dirt, leading to 
the development of alternative practices. In Islam the distinction between the physical and 
spiritual	value	of	the	various	rituals	is	more	difficult	to	discern	as	the	body	and	the	soul	are	
seen as a single entity in matters of worship. In practice, the water rituals are considered to 
have a religious meaning, but they are also practiced for hygienic purposes, health reasons 
and as purely social and leisure activities.
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WaTEr In THE SCrIPTurES
Judaism	 and	 Islam	 acknowledge	 water	 as	 a	 primary	 element,	 the	 source	 of	 all	 life.	 As	
such, both religions consider water to be a holy good, a gift from God that symbolises his 
benevolence and mercy. Water features prominently in both the Hebrew Bible and the 
Koran,	but	also	 in	the	Talmud,1 the Hadith2 and in prayers and blessings. Water is a gift 
and	a	blessing	from	God.	Conversely,	both	the	Hebrew	Bible	and	the	Koran	warn	believers	
that if they disrespect their God and turn away from his teachings, he will withhold water 
(Tanakh Deuteronomy	11:17)	or	make	it	bitter (The Qur’an	56:68-70).	
Water in the Hebrew Bible 
Water is an important theme in many biblical stories: in the Hebrew Bible there are more 
than	580	direct	references	to	water	(mayim)	and	many	more	indirect	references	to	rivers,	
wells,	dew	and	rain	(Hillel	1994:	26).	Right	from	the	first	lines	of	the	Book	of	Genesis,	water	
plays a prominent role. It is the source of creation, the element that was present when the 
earth	was	still	“unformed	and	void”.	Water	features	in	the	story	of	the	flood,	the	crossing	
of	the	Red	Sea	and	the	crossing	of	the	Jordan	River,	while	springs,	wells	and	rivers	form	a	
key	theme	in	the	stories	about	Abraham,	Isaac,	Lot	and	Moses.	Here	water’s	scarcity	often	
made	it	a	source	of	conflict.	
The	 Hebrew	 Bible	 dedicates	 extensive	 passages	 to	 the	 description	 of	 the	 Land	 of	
Israel	and	its	environment.	In	the	book	of	Deuteronomy,	God	tells	the	Israelites	that	the	
land	they	are	about	to	enter	(Israel)	is	not	like	Egypt,	where	the	grain	had	to	be	irrigated.	
“The	land	you	are	about	to	cross	into	and	possess,	a	land	of	hills	and	valleys,	soaks	up	its	
water	from	the	rains	of	heaven.	It	is	a	land	which	the	Lord	your	God	looks	after,	on	which	
the	 Lord	 your	God	always	 keeps	his	 eye,	 from	 year’s	 beginning	 to	 year’s	 end.” (Tanakh 
Deuteronomy	11:10-13)	But	 this	 life-giving	gift	 from	God	 is	not	accorded	 freely	and	He	
warns	the	believers	that	if	they	turn	away	from	Him,	they	will	be	punished:	“Take	heed	lest	
your heart be deceived, and you turn aside and serve other gods and worship them, and 
the	anger	of	the	Lord	be	kindled	against	you,	and	he	shut	up	the	heavens,	so	that	there	be	
no	rain,	and	the	land	yield	no	fruit,	and	you	perish	quickly	off	the	good	land	which	the	Lord	
gives	you”	(Ibid.:	11:16-17).
The	 importance	of	water	 in	 Israel’s	 arid	desert	environment	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 rich	
vocabulary the Hebrew language has for rain. Thus yoreh	 designates	 the	 first	 rains	 of	
1	The	Talmud	is	the	collection	of	ancient	rabbinic	writings	consisting	of	the	Mishnah	and	the	Gemara,	
constituting	the	basis	of	religious	authority	in	Orthodox	Judaism.
2	The	Ahadith	(sg.	Hadith)	are	a	collection	of	texts	that	record	the	actions	and	sayings	of	the	Prophet	
Muhammad.	Together	they	form	the	Sunna.	The	Ahadith	form	a	supplement	to	the	Koran	as	a	source	
of Islamic religious law.
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autumn and malkosh	the	late	rains	of	spring,	while	there	are	several	words	for	different	
types	of	floods	and	drought	(Tal	2002:	199).	Water	is	also	the	subject	of	prayers.	Tefillat 
Hageshem,	 the	Prayer	 for	Rain,	 is	recited	on	the	eighth	day	of	Sukkoth,	 the	Feast	of	 the	
Tabernacles,	marking	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 rainy	 season	 in	 Israel.	 Composed	 in	 the	 8th 
century,	the	prayer	is	pronounced	by	Jews	around	the	world,	who	pray	for	rain	in	the	Holy	
Land.	During	the	festival	of	Passover,	the	Prayer	for	Dew, Tefillat Tal, is recited to express 
the hope for fertilization of the land in Israel. 
In the Hebrew scriptures, rain is deemed more precious than the Torah and creation 
itself,	as	these	rabbinical	sayings	show:	“The	sending	of	rain	is	an	event	greater	than	the	
giving	of	the	Torah.	The	Torah	was	a	joy	for	Israel	only,	but	rain	gives	joy	to	the	whole	world,	
including	birds	and	animals,”	and	“The	day	of	rainfall	is	greater	than	resurrection;	[…]	than	
that	whereon	the	Law	was	given	to	Israel	[…];	than	when	the	heaven	and	the	earth	were	
made”	(Isaacs	1998:	159).	Again,	these	prayers	and	blessings	show	how	valuable	water	was	
in	the	arid	Middle	Eastern	climate	in	which	Judaism	developed.
Water in the koran
As a religion born in the deserts of Arabia, Islam ascribes the most sacred qualities to 
water, as a life-giving, sustaining and purifying resource. It is the origin of all life on earth, 
the	substance	from	which	God	created	man	(The Qur’an:	25:54)	and	the	Koran	emphasises	
its	centrality:	 “We	made	from	water	every	 living	thing”	(Ibid.:	21:30)	Water	 is	the	primary	
element	that	existed	even	before	the	heavens	and	the	earth:	“And	it	is	He	who	created	the	
heavens	and	the	earth	in	six	days,	and	his	Throne	was	upon	the	waters”	(Ibid.:	11:7)	The	
word	water	(ma’)	occurs	more	than	60	times	in	the	Koran,	rivers	over	50	times	and	the	sea	
(bahr,	which	also	signifies	lakes	or	large	rivers)	over	40	times	(Hillel	1994:	26).
The	water	of	rain,	rivers	and	fountains	runs	through	the	pages	of	the	Koran	to	symbolise	
God’s	benevolence:	“We	send	down	pure	water	from	the	sky,	so	that	we	can	revive	a	dead	
land	with	it,	and	We	give	it	as	a	drink	to	many	animals	and	people	We	have	created”	(The 
Qur’an:	25:48-49).	At	the	same	time,	the	believers	are	constantly	reminded	that	it	is	God	
who	gives	them	sweet	water,	and	that	he	can	just	as	easily	withhold	it:	“Consider	the	water	
you	drink	–	was	it	you	that	brought	it	down	from	the	rain-cloud	or	We?	If	We	had	wanted,	
We	could	make	it	bitter:	will	you	not	be	thankful?”	(Ibid.:	56:68-70)	In	this	verse	the	believers	
are	warned	that	they	are	only	the	guardians	of	God’s	creation	on	earth;	they	must	not	take	
His	law	in	their	own	hands.	The	Koran	also	makes	a	distinction	between	fresh	water	and	
sea	water,	comparing	the	two.	“The	two	are	not	alike,	the	one	is	fresh,	sweet	and	pleasant	
to	drink	from,	while	the	other	is	salt	and	bitter”	(Ibid.:	35:12).
 Water is frequently used as a metaphor for paradise, righteousness and God’s mercy. 
Koranic	paradise	is	made	up	of	spacious	gardens	where	one	feels	neither	the	heat	of	the	
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day,	nor	the	cold	of	the	night	(Toelle	1999:	33).	The	rivers	and	streams	that	flow	through	
and	 underneath	 the	 gardens	 are	 filled	 with	 fresh,	 flowing	 and	 rushing	 waters	 (Abdel	
Haleem	1999:	97),	suggesting	sparkling,	cooling	and	enlivening	sounds (The Qur’an:	15:45;	
44:52;	51:15;	55:50;	76:6).	Besides	 these	springs	of	 clear	water,	 there	are	also	scented	
rivers	and	the	Koran	states	that	the	believers	will	be	rewarded	for	their	piety	by	“rivers	of	
water	forever	pure,	rivers	of	milk	forever	fresh,	rivers	of	wine,	a	delight	for	those	who	drink,	
rivers	of	honey,	clarified	and	pure”	(Ibid.:	47:15).	Water	is	also	compared	to	moral	qualities	
in	paradise:	“In	the	garden	is	no	idle	talk;	there	is	a	gushing	fountain”	(Ibid.:	88:11-12).
The	enchantments	of	paradise	stand	in	stark	opposition	to	hell,	which	is	dominated	
by	scalding	fires	and	unbearable	heat.	Instead	of	the	vast	open	spaces	of	paradise,	hell	is	
a	deep	abyss	surrounded	by	a	curtain	of	flames	which	rise	up	in	tall	columns	and	close	in	
on	the	occupants.	The	single	source	in	hell	is	filled	with	boiling	water	that	never	quenches	
the	thirst	of	the	occupants	(Toelle	1999:	33).
The	many	 descriptions	 of	 the	 gardens	 of	 paradise	 in	 the	 Koran	 inspired	 Muslims	
across	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	to	replicate	the	heavenly	delights	in	earthly	parks	
and gardens, creating luxuriant green spaces with elaborate water features, pools and 
fountains	(Lehrman	1980:	32).	The	gardens	of	the	Alhambra	in	Spanish	Granada,	the	Bagh-
é-Tarikhi	in	Iran’s	Kashan	and	the	Taj	Mahal	in	India	were	inspired	by	the	image	of	Koranic	
paradise. 
The	English	word	“paradise”	is	derived	from	the	Ancient	Greek	paradeisos, which was 
in	turn	adopted	from	the	Old	Persian	pairidaeza,	a	walled	enclosure	(pairi	–	around;	daeza 
–	wall).	The	earthly	equivalent	of	such	a	heavenly	walled	garden	is	the	hayr, a word that is 
derived from the word ha’ir which	means	“tank”	and	was	extended	to	include	the	garden	
that was watered from it, again indicating the importance of water as the base of such a 
paradisiacal	space	(Ibid.:	31).	The	Oriental	enclosed	garden	with	artificial	irrigation	in	fact	
predates	Islam;	it	was	often	inspired	by	the	oases	which	offered	a	welcome	respite	from	
the waterless desert environment. Islamic gardens are often centred around a fountain or 
a	water	tank,	which	symbolise	the	overflowing	sources	of	paradise,	while	four	watercourses	
symbolise	the	four	rivers	of	paradise:	Jayhan,	Sayhan,	the	Nile	and	the	Euphrates	(Dickie	
1992:	1016).	These	rivers	of	Koranic	paradise	are	inspired	by	the	rivers	that	flowed	from	
the Garden of Eden and which are mentioned in the Bible as Pishon, Gihon, Tigris and 
Euphrates (Tanakh	Genesis	2:10-14).
The story of Hagar and Ishmael
The	poignant	story	of	Hagar	and	Ishmael	–	or	Hajir	and	Ismail,	as	they	are	known	in	Islamic	
tradition	–	who	are	sent	into	the	wilderness	by	Abraham,	is	recorded	in	both	the	Jewish	and	
Islamic	tradition	(Tanakh	Genesis	21;	Bukhari	55:583).	Abraham’s	second	wife,	Hagar,	an	
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Egyptian	slave	woman,	bears	Abraham’s	first	son,	as	his	wife	Sarah	cannot	conceive.	After	
Hagar’s child, Ishmael, is born, Sarah also falls pregnant and gives birth to Isaac. She grows 
resentful	of	Hagar	and	her	child,	and	asks	Abraham	to	send	them	away.	The	Hebrew	Bible	
records that Abraham is greatly distressed, but, heeding God’s words, he sends Hagar 
and	Ishmael	into	the	desert	with	some	bread	and	a	skin	of	water.	Hagar	wanders	in	the	
wilderness of Beer-Sheba and when her water runs out, she despairs, fearing that her son 
will die. She leaves him under some bushes and sits down at a distance, waiting for him to 
perish.	It	is	then	that	God	hears	the	crying	child	and	speaks	to	Hagar,	revealing	a	“well	of	
water”	from	which	she	makes	the	child	drink.	
In	 Islamic	 tradition	 it	 is	 recorded	 that	 Abraham	 accompanied	 Hajir	 and	 Ismail	 all	
the	way	to	Mecca.	Here	he	leaves	them	in	a	desolate	valley,	assuring	Hajir	that	God	has	
ordered him to do so. When her water runs out, she frantically crosses the valley in search 
of	 a	 spring,	 running	 seven	 times	between	 the	mountains	of	 Safa	 and	Marwa3 until she 
hears	a	voice	and	sees	an	angel	digging	the	earth	with	his	heel	until	water	starts	flowing.	
She	makes	a	basin	around	the	source	to	contain	the	water	and	fills	her	water	skin	with	it.	
This	is	the	Zamzam	spring	that	still	lies	in	Mecca	today.	It	is	considered	to	be	a	source	
of life-giving water that can satisfy both hunger and thirst,4 and cure illness. Pilgrims are 
recommended	to	drink	Zamzam	water	and	to	sprinkle	 it	on	their	head,	 face	and	chest,	
while some also dip their pilgrimage clothes in the holy water. These white robes are then 
preserved and used as burial clothes when they die; thus the believer will go to the grave 
touched by Zamzam water. Because of the water’s healing and nourishing qualities,5 it 
is	also	a	popular	gift	for	pilgrims	to	take	home	to	friends	and	relatives.	Saudi	authorities	
have prohibited the commercial export of Zamzam. Nevertheless, the holy water can be 
found	on	sale	in	many	countries	around	the	world.	Often	these	bottles	of	holy	water	are	
fakes.	In	2006,	the	British	government	environmental	agency	tested	purported	Zamzam	
water	that	was	on	sale	in	London,	and	found	high	arsenic	levels	in	much	of	it,	making	the	
water	not	only	fraudulent,	but	also	dangerous	(Environmental Health News 2006).	The	holy	
Kaaba,	the	large	granite	structure	inside	the	mosque	in	Mecca	that	forms	the	holiest	place	
in Islam, is also washed twice a year with Zamzam mixed with rose water. The ritual is led 
by members of the Saudi royal family and attended by prominent representatives of the 
Saudi	government	and	ambassadors	from	Islamic	countries	(Arab News 2005).
3	Hajir’s	desperate	running	to	and	fro	is	today	remembered	during	the	yearly	hajj, the pilgrimage to 
Mecca,	when	pilgrims	walk	back	and	forth	seven	times	between	the	two	hills.	
4	 In	 the	Ahadith	of	Sahih	Muslim,	Book	31,	number	6046,	 the	Prophet	says:	 “It	 [Zamzam	water]	 is	
blessed	(water)	and	it	also	serves	as	food.”
5 Research	 has	 shown	 that	 Zamzam	 water	 contains	 calcium	 and	 magnesium	 salts	 and	 natural	
fluorides.	
128
Part III
PurITy anD HoLy WaTEr
Having	discussed	the	role	of	water	in	the	respective	scriptures,	I	will	now	look	at	the	role	
of	water	in	religious	rituals,	as	a	means	of	purification	and	spiritual	cleansing.	To	do	this,	
it	is	important	to	first	examine	the	concepts	of	purity	and	impurity	in	Judaism	and	Islam.
The concept of purity in Judaism
In	 Judaism,	the	terms	 tahara “pure”	and	 tamei, “impure”	are	complex,	abstract	concepts	
that are often misinterpreted and associated with physical cleanliness and uncleanness. 
In fact, they should be understood in a ritual context. Tahara and tamei describe one’s 
status	after	touching	a	source	of	impurity,	and	the	acts	of	purification	that	can	remove	that	
impurity.	“If	you	touch	a	reptile,	you	may	not	be	dirty,	but	you	are	unclean.	If	you	undergo	a	
ritual	immersion,	you	may	not	be	free	of	dirt,	but	you	are	clean”	(Neusner	1973:	1).
The	 laws	of	 purity	 as	outlined	 in	 the	biblical	 books	of	 Leviticus	 and	Numbers	date	
back	 to	 the	 time	of	 the	Second	Temple	 in	 Jerusalem.6	 To	be	 able	 to	bring	offerings	or	
participate in the Temple service, worshippers had to be in a state of ritual purity. The 
biblical	 books	 of	 Leviticus	 and	 Numbers	 devote	 extensive	 passages	 to	 the	 concept	 of	
purity with detailed descriptions of the types and causes of impurity and which procedure 
should be followed to restore the believer to the state of purity. The sources of impurity 
include	certain	animals,	 the	woman	after	childbirth,	skin	ailments,	mildew	 in	the	house,	
bodily	discharges,	especially	menses	and	seminal	flux,	sexual	misdeeds	and	the	corpse	
(Neusner	1975:	17).	A	believer	who	had	been	defiled	by	any	of	these	sources	first	had	to	
purify himself before he could enter the Temple precinct. Ritual immersion in the mayim 
chayim,	or	living	waters	–	the	water	of	rain,	rivers	or	seas	–	was	one	of	the	main	means	
of	purification.	After	the	destruction	of	the	Second	Temple	in	70	AD,	many	of	the	laws	of	
purity were no longer applicable as the purity of the Temple sanctuary no longer needed 
to be protected. Instead, the rabbis who replaced the priests of the Temple increasingly 
used the concepts of purity and impurity metaphorically, and associated them with sin, 
such as sexual misdeeds, idolatry, or unethical behaviour. 
The metaphors of purity and impurity are used by the rabbis because the 
community	of	Israel	now	is	regarded	as	the	Temple.	What	kept	people	out	of	the	
sanctuary in olden times will now exclude them from the life of the community. 
[…]	Just	as	the	rabbi	is	the	new	priest,	study	of	Torah	is	the	new	cult	and	deeds	
6 	Situated	on	 Jerusalem’s	Temple	Mount,	 the	Temple	was	 the	centre	of	ancient	 Judaism.	The	first	
temple, Solomon’s Temple, was destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 BC. The second temple, which 
was built after return from Babylonian captivity in 536 BC and rebuilt by Herod in 19 BC, was destroyed 
by	the	Romans	in	70	AD.	
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of	loving	kindness	are	the	new	sacrifice,	so	the	community	formed	on	the	basis	
of	the	rabbinic	Torah	is	going	to	be	protected	from	social	uncleanness	just	as	the	
old Temple was protected from cultic uncleanness. This accounts not only for the 
preservation, but for the considerable elaboration and extension, of the cultic 
symbols	of	uncleanness.	(Ibid.:	23)
The	concern	for	purity	continued	in	the	period	of	Talmudic	Judaism,	and	over	the	centuries	
the laws of purity, particularly those pertaining to the menstruant woman, were studied 
and	elaborated.	The	various	rituals	of	purification	carried	out	today	recall	the	Temple,	but	
are at the same time seen as spiritual acts in which the water changes the status of the 
believer, cleansing the mind and the soul and washing away sin, thus bringing him closer 
to God. 
Jewish water rituals
The ritual of Nitilat Yada’im	(literally	“the	lifting/washing	of	the	hands”),	consists	of	pouring	
water over each hand from a two-handled cup. Before eating bread, before rising in the 
morning,	before	 touching	 the	scriptures,	and	after	having	been	near	death	–	 returning	
from	a	funeral	for	instance	–	Nitilat Yada’im	marks	a	transition	that	prepares	the	believer	
for what is to come, giving water a mystical value. Today this ritual is mainly carried out by 
Orthodox	and	observant	Jews.
The ritual of Tashlich,	 that	 is	 performed	 on	 the	 Jewish	 New	 Year,	 Rosh	 Hashanna,	
illustrates water’s ability to spiritually cleanse and in this case wash away sin. Tashlich, 
which	literally	means	“you	will	cast	away”,	refers	to	a	custom	dating	back	to	the	14th century 
or	earlier,	that	is	probably	based	on	the	following	verse	from	the	Book	of	Michah:	“…he	will	
have compassion upon us; he will subdue our iniquities; and thou wilt cast all their sins into 
the	depths	of	the	sea”	(Tanakh	Michah	7:19)	The	Tashlich prayer, which consists of certain 
chapters	from	the	Psalms	and	the	verses	quoted	above,	is	recited	on	the	first	day	of	the	
New Year near a body of water. Some believers also throw breadcrumbs into the water 
while reciting the prayer to symbolise the casting away of sin.7 
Water	is	also	associated	with	death	in	the	following	verse	from	the	Book	of	Samuel:	“…
for we must needs die, and are as water spilt on the ground, which cannot be gathered up 
again” (Tanakh	2	Samuel	14:14).	In	a	medieval	custom	still	practiced	by	some	today,	which	
is possibly derived from this biblical phrase, mourners pour out the water that is stored 
in	their	homes,	sending	news	of	the	loss	flowing	through	the	streets.	Water	was	thought	
to act as a barrier against the spiritual forces that accompanied death and prevented 
7 	Explanations	of	the	rituals	of	Nitilat Yada’im and Tashlich	were	given	by	Rabbi	Michael	Cohen,	Kibbutz	
Ketura,	Israel,	February	2006.
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them	from	causing	any	more	harm.	At	death,	the	body	is	also	purified	through	the	ritual	
of tahara,	in	which	a	number	of	attendants	pour	water	over	the	body	in	a	continuous	flow	
while reciting prayers.
Mikvah, the Jewish ritual bath
The ability of water to bring spiritual purity and change is however most clearly represented 
in	the	mikvah	ritual,	which	involves	immersion	in	a	special	bath	filled	with	mayim chayim. At 
first	sight	the	mikvah	appears	to	be	a	plain	bathing	house,	similar	to	those	found	elsewhere	
in	the	Middle	East	since	time	immemorial	–	the	Greek	and	Roman	baths	and	the	Islamic 
hammam.	But	unlike	its	regional	counterparts	and	despite	the	fact	that	the	ritual	involves	
immersion	in	water,	it	has	nothing	to	do	with	physical	purification.	
The	mikvah	 ritual	 is	 one	of	 the	613	 commandments	 that	God	gave	 to	man.	 It	 is	 a	
chukk, a commandment that cannot be understood, over which the human mind can form 
no	 judgement.	Observing	 the	 chukkim shows real devotion, the obeying of God’s word 
without	questioning.	The	 immersion	ritual	 is	 thus	not	about	physical	purification;	 it	 is	a	
spiritual	purification	through	which	the	believer	achieves	an	elevated	spiritual	status.	The	
12th-century	Jewish	rabbi	and	philosopher	Moses	Maimonides,	who	codified	the	laws	of	
purity	and	the	rules	of	mikvah	in	his	commentary,	Mishnah	Torah,	explains:	“It	is	plain	that	
the laws about immersion as a means of freeing oneself from uncleanness are decrees 
laid down by Scripture and not matters about which human understanding is capable of 
forming	a	judgement.[…]	Now	‘uncleanness’	is	not	mud	or	filth	which	water	can	remove,	but	
is	a	matter	of	scriptural	decree	and	dependent	on	the	intention	of	the	heart”	(Maimonides	
Bk	10	Yad	Mikva’ot	11:12).	This	commentary	again	shows	how	the	original	laws	of	purity	
pertaining to worship in the Temple were over time abstracted and interpreted as rituals 
of	spiritual	purification.	One	could	argue	that	just	as	the	act	itself	evolved	to	be	a	metaphor	
of	 the	original	 cleansing,	 the	water	 that	was	used	 for	 the	purification	also	acquired	an	
abstract and sacred value that enabled it to cleanse away ritual impurity and sin. 
The	use	of	the	mikvah	is	closely	connected	to	the	concepts	of	tahara and tamei and goes 
back	to	Temple	times	in	Jerusalem	when	worshippers	had	to	perform	a	ritual	immersion	in	
the	waters	of	the	mikvah	before	being	allowed	to	enter	the	Temple	precinct.	Scribes	also	
had	to	immerse	themselves	in	the	mikvah	before	writing	God’s	name,	and	on	Yom	Kippur	
the	High	Priest	even	immersed	himself	five	times	before	entering	the	Holy	of	Holies	where	
the	Stone	Tabernacles	were	 kept.	 (Hagg	1998:	10)	After	 the	destruction	of	 the	Second	
Temple, the ritual immersion became less relevant and was mainly applied to proselytes 
converting	to	Judaism	and	menstruant	women	who	immersed	themselves	as	part	of	the	
laws of niddah. According to these laws, which are based on the biblical texts but were 
considerably expanded in rabbinic times, a woman is impure during her menstruation 
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and	for	seven	days	after.	During	this	time,	she	is	niddah, separated, and must not have 
any physical contact with her husband; she may not touch him or sleep in the same bed 
with	him.	After	counting	at	least	five	days	for	her	menstruation	and	seven	additional	“clean	
days”	during	which	she	 looses	no	blood	anymore,	she	returns	 to	a	state	of	purity	after	
immersion in the ritual bath. But before immersing herself she has to be scrupulously 
clean. All barriers or chatzitzot have	to	be	removed:	any	dirt,	jewellery	or	make-up,	even	the	
smallest	piece	of	grime	below	the	nails	or	a	knot	in	the	hair,	can	make	the	ritual	invalid.8 
In accordance with the laws of purity and the concept of tamei and tahor, the scriptures 
explain that the status of niddah does	not	entail	dirt	or	a	lack	of	physical	hygiene.	Rather,	it	
refers	to	Judaism’s	vision	of	cycles	of	life	and	death.	The	Torah	considers	sexual	intercourse	
between husband and wife to be extremely holy. Not only does it represent the possibility 
of	new	life;	it	is	also	a	sacred	joining	of	the	flesh	and	the	spirit.	Menstruation	on	the	other	
hand represents death, in that the potential life that can be born in a woman’s womb every 
month	 is	being	removed	 through	 the	menstrual	blood.	 Just	as	 the	 laws	of	 the	kashrut9 
consider	the	mixing	of	milk	and	meat	products	to	be	a	confusion	of	categories,	the	laws	of	
niddah	forbid	the	“confusion”	of	having	sexual	intercourse	–	which	embodies	the	possibility	
of	life	–	with	the	death	of	that	potential	life.
The	 rabbis	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 use	 of	 the	 mikvah	 by	 menstruant	
women. Women who failed to observe the laws of niddah and men who had intercourse 
with a niddah were liable to karet or excommunication, while children conceived when a 
woman was in a state of impurity were considered as mamzerim	or	bastards	(Wasserfall	
1999:	13).	The	observance	of	the	mikvah	ritual	was	therefore	essential	for	the	perpetration	
of	 the	 Jewish	 family	 according	 to	 Jewish	 law.	 The	 halakhah,	 Jewish	 law,	 states	 that	 the	
mikvah	is	more	important	than	the	synagogue.	Indeed,	private	or	communal	prayer	can	
take	place	anywhere,	so	that	the	synagogue	is	not	essential	to	the	religion’s	survival.	The	
absence	of	a	mikvah	however,	makes	the	perpetration	of	the	Jewish	family	according	to	
Jewish	law	impossible.	The	Talmud	even	says	that	its	value	surpasses	that	of	a	Torah	scroll	
and a synagogue, as both can be sold in order to raise funds for the construction of a 
mikvah.	In	fact,	a	community	is	not	recognised	as	a	village	or	a	town	by	Jewish	law	until	it	
has	a	mikvah	(Slonim	1995:	xxviii).
8 	 The	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	 mikvah	 ritual	 and	 its	 significance	 were	 given	 by	 Mrs.	 Elisheva	
Shushan,	a	mikvah	attendant	and	expert	on	Jewish	family	 law	from	Ramat	Shlomo	near	 Jerusalem,	
Israel,	March	2004
9 	The	body	of	Jewish	dietary	law.
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Mikvah use through the centuries and across cultures 
Despite	the	stringency	of	the	laws	of	niddah and the emphasis on the importance of the 
mikvah in	rabbinical	texts,	the	ritual	has	through	history	been	subject	to	reinterpretation	
and	 adaptation,	 leading	 rabbis	 to	 complain	 about	 “incorrect”	 practice	 in	 the	 various	
Jewish	communities	across	North	Africa,	Europe	and	 the	Americas.	 Influences	 from	the	
host cultures and developments such as secularisation and assimilation meant that the 
purification	ritual	for	the	menstruant	woman	was	practiced	in	diverse	ways.	In	19th-century 
Europe,	the	mikvah	was	massively	abandoned	by	women	who	perceived	the	immersion	as	
humiliating	and	unnecessary.	Today	it	is	being	“rediscovered”	by	members	of	the	Reform	
movement	who	interpret	the	immersion	as	a	spiritual	moment	and	seek	to	dissociate	it	
from the laws of niddah.
In 12th-century	Egypt,	many	women	had	adopted	the	practice	of	aspersion,	of	asking	
another	woman	to	sprinkle	them	with	water	in	order	to	purify	them	from	the	niddah status. 
Others	used	“drawn	water”	–	i.e.	water	from	a	tap	–	instead	of	the	prescribed	“living	waters”	
to	effect	the	purification.	The	practice	of	sprinkling,	which	was	described	by	the	Egyptian	
rabbi	Maimonides	and	other	rabbis	as	“heresy”,	was	common	practice	among	the	Karaites,	
a	sect	of	Judaism	that	rejects	rabbinic	authority	and	law	and	conforms	to	the	written	Torah	
and	its	rules.	Following	the	rules	outlined	in	Leviticus	15,	these	women	considered	that	a	
woman was impure for seven days only, that she did not have to observe the additional days 
and	that	she	did	not	need	to	immerse	in	a	mikvah	to	be	purified.	Instead,	they	practiced	
purification	through	sprinkling.	After	trying	to	eradicate	this	“heretical”	practice	for	several	
years,	Maimonides	and	his	colleagues	issued	an	edict	in	1176	in	which	they	threatened	the	
recalcitrant women with divorce and the loss of their marriage settlement. The move had 
immediate	effect	and	many	marriage	contracts	issued	after	this	date	include	the	promise	
by	the	two	spouses	to	observe	rabbinic	laws	on	sexual	purity	(Wasserfall	1999:	91).	
Elsewhere,	in	medieval	Byzantium	(Greece	and	Asia	Minor),	Spain,	France	and	Germany,	
leading religious experts also complained that women were not immersing themselves 
“properly”.	They	were	either	using	plain	water,	transforming	the	purification	into	a	simple	
bath	 and	 making	 the	 ritual	 invalid,	 or	 not	 respecting	 the	 seven	 days	 of	 “whitening”.	
Texts from the period show that the women were in fact concerned about purity after 
menstruation,	 as	 they	 did	 perform	 some	 form	of	 purification.	However,	 they	 saw	 their	
practices as being at least as legitimate as those of the rabbis and several communities 
also resisted the rabbinical reforms. 
Following	 the	expulsion	of	 Jews	 from	Spain	at	 the	end	of	 the	15th century and the 
persecution	of	Jewish	communities	in	Eastern	Europe	in	the	16th and 17th centuries, the 
Jewish	 communities	 that	 settled	 in	 Poland	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 sought	 to	 reforge	 the	
Chapter 5: Bathing in Divine Waters
133
unity	of	the	Jewish	people.	They	resisted	assimilationist	practices	by	reinforcing	religious	
practices,	 especially	with	 regards	 to	wedding	 customs	 and	 conjugal	 rights.	 The	 laws	 of	
niddah were	therefore	applied	with	great	stringency	in	Ashkenazi10 communities	(Ibid.:	122-
123).	The	views	regarding	the	menstruant	woman	in	this	period	were	also	influenced	by	
the 6th-century	book	Beraita de Niddah, an	anonymous	work	that	described	the	menstruant	
woman as an abomination, leading to a number of extreme rabbinic commentaries 
on menstrual laws. Among them was the idea that the gaze of a menstruating woman 
“poisoned	 the	air”,	 that	her	breath	brought	about	evil	 and	 that	 the	ground	she	walked	
on	was	as	impure	as	the	ground	that	was	contaminated	by	the	bones	of	the	dead	(Hagg	
Ibid.:	31).	Menstruant	women	were	also	prohibited	from	entering	a	synagogue	or	lighting	
the	Sabbath	candles,	while	all	 the	utensils	and	objects	 they	 touched	and	the	 food	they	
prepared became impure. As a consequence of such derogatory comments, and with the 
secularisation	and	liberal	reform	of	Jewish	life	in	Europe,	many	women	stopped	using	the	
mikvah	from	the	19th century onwards, considering the practice to be primitive, sexist and 
Orthodox	(Wasserfall	1999:	32-33). 
In	the	Jewish	communities	of	the	Middle	East,	the	mikvah	was	perceived	quite	differently	
than	in	Europe.	These	communities	living	in	Muslim	cultures	which	also	observed	rules	of	
purity	were	often	more	flexible	with	the	application	of	the	rules	of	niddah (Ibid.:	123).	In	
these	communities	the	mikvah ritual became associated with the Islamic bathing house, 
the hammam, as women visited the latter to cleanse themselves thoroughly before 
dipping	in	the	mikvah	(Ibid.:	13).	Just	as	in	Ashkenazi	communities,	the	mikvah	ritual	was	a	
private	affair,	except	on	the	occasion	of	the	first	visit	prior	to	the	wedding	day,	when	the	
immersion	in	the	mikvah	formed	part	of	weeklong	festivities	in	preparation	of	the	wedding	
day. In early 20th-century Algeria, these celebrations included, among other things, the 
painting of the bride with henna, and a visit to the Islamic bathing house, the hammam, 
where	the	bride	spent	an	afternoon	with	female	family	members	and	friends,	enjoying	the	
waters,	singing,	dancing	and	sharing	cakes	and	other	sweets	that	were	meant	to	presage	
a	“sweet”	marriage.	The	visit	to	the	mikvah	took	place	after	the	party	at	the	hammam	and	
was much more solemn. The ritual, which was carried out unquestioningly by observant 
and non-observant women, was seen as a blessing on the future couple. Instead of being 
seen	as	a	ritual	purification,	the	water	of	the	mikvah	was	considered	to	be	a	source	of	life	
and	attributed	with	fertilizing	and	beneficial	powers	for	conception.	
Subsequent	monthly	 visits	 to	 the	mikvah	 took	 place	 quietly	 and	 often	women	 felt	
ashamed of having to undress in front of the attendant and share intimate details about 
their marital life. The meaning of the ritual had also been lost to many, who saw it merely 
10 	Jews	descended	from	the	medieval	Jewish	communities	of	the	Rhineland.
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as	something	one	was	“meant	to	do	because	it	had	always	been	that	way”.	As	such,	many	
women abandoned the ritual as soon as they had private bathrooms, considering that 
taking	a	bath	in	running	water	at	home	effected	the	same	purification	as	the	mikvah.	Like	
in medieval Byzantium and Egypt, the distinction between ritually pure and physically clean 
had been lost and the only reason for adhering to the practice was a strong, superstitious 
belief that immersion in running water would bring beautiful, healthy children. 
Interestingly,	many	Algerian	Jewish	women	who	emigrated	to	France	after	1962	are	
today rediscovering the traditions of their home country and incorporating old traditions 
in	their	wedding	festivities.	The	mikvah	is	conspicuously	absent	from	these	celebrations,	
while	joyous	events	like	the	henna	ceremony	and	hammam	parties	are	increasingly	popular	
among	Jewish	brides	of	Algerian	origin.	As	a	place	associated	with	fear	and	mystery,	the	
mikvah	 is	 overshadowed	 by	 more	 simple	 and	 light-hearted	 celebrations.	 Women	 who	
observe	 Jewish	 tradition	 and	 superstition,	 but	who	have	 little	 real	 knowledge	of	 Jewish	
culture,	consider	that	using	their	bathroom	to	perform	the	purification	is	sufficient.	The	
spiritual	and	non-hygiene-related	aspect	of	the	ritual	has	thus	been	lost	(Ibid.:	199).
A	quite	separate	and	particular	case	 is	 that	of	 the	Ethiopian	 Jews	of	the	Beta	 Israel	
tribe	who	lived	isolated	from	other	Jewish	communities	for	centuries.	As	part	of	their	strict	
rules	of	 female	purity,	menstruating	women	and	women	who	had	 just	given	birth	were	
segregated	 in	 special	 “huts	 of	 blood”	 for	 seven	 to	 80	days.	During	 this	 time	 they	were	
effectively	 excluded	 from	 the	 community	 and	 certainly	 forbidden	 from	 preparing	 food	
for their family or even consuming food with them. After the period of segregation,11 the 
woman	carried	out	 the	purification	by	 immersing	herself	 in	a	nearby	river,	washing	her	
clothes	and	cutting	her	fingernails.	Then	after	fasting	all	day,	she	returned	to	the	family	
hut at sunset. 
Following	 the	 mass	 airlift	 of	 Ethiopian	 Jews	 from	 their	 native	 Gondar	 region	 in	
northern	Ethiopia	to	Israel	in	1991,	anthropologist	Lisa	Anteby	carried	out	several	years	
of	fieldwork	among	the	Ethiopian	Jews	in	Israel,	examining	how	they	were	adapting	to	the	
new conditions. As the refugee centres, caravan sites and apartments in which the new 
immigrants were accommodated did not include a facility that could serve to segregate 
impure women, they sought other ways to deal with female impurity by creating special 
spaces and, later on, creating separate sleeping arrangements within one caravan. 
Anteby recorded that over time, certain traditions were abandoned and rules faded. 
Because women could no longer bathe in a river at the end of their period of segregation, 
11 	The	period	of	segregation	in	Ethiopian	tradition	was	seven	days	for	menstruating	women	or	for	
women	who	had	miscarried.	After	giving	birth,	women	were	secluded	for	40	or	80	days,	depending	on	
whether it was a boy or a girl, in accordance with the degrees of impurity caused by childbirth stated 
in	Leviticus	(12:1-8)
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they	adopted	the	shower	to	perform	the	ritual	purification.	The	Ethiopian	women	were	
not	familiar	with	the	mikvah	and	rejected	it	as	“dirty”	and	unsuitable	for	ritual	purification,	
as	the	water	contained	in	the	mikvah	is	not	in	a	strict	sense	“running	water”	as	stipulated	
in	Leviticus	 (Ibid.:	166-186).	The	different	 interpretations	of	 the	ritual	purification	 led	 to	
tense situations and disagreement between the new immigrants, who saw their practice 
as	 legitimate,	and	the	 Israeli	authorities	who	rejected	 it	and	failed	to	accommodate	the	
immigrants’ needs. 
Today	the	mikvah	is	predominantly	used	by	the	Orthodox	community,	where	women	
adhere strictly to the rules of niddah.	Some	Orthodox	men	also	use	 the	mikvah	before	
the	 Sabbath	 and	 important	 holidays.	 Besides	 the	 Orthodox	 community,	 only	 a	 small	
percentage	of	 Jewish	women	use	 the	mikvah	on	a	 regular	basis	and	many	continue	 to	
perceive	the	bath	as	“dirty”.	In	Israel	the	rabbinate	still	tries	to	enforce	the	observance	of	
menstrual	laws	as	much	as	possible.	The	most	significant	opportunity	they	have	to	do	this	
is	before	a	wedding.	All	weddings	in	Israel	are	conducted	by	religious	officials	selected	by	
the state and the Israeli Religious Authority requires brides to hand over a note from the 
mikvah	attendant	attesting	that	they	have	performed	the	ritual	purification.	This	“forced”	
immersion has become a source of contention between the observant and secular 
communities in Israel, and many women consider it to be a form of religious coercion 
(Ibid.:	35-36).
 Conversely, the Reform and Reconstructionist movements have in the last 20 years 
created	 new	 interest	 in	 the	 mikvah,	 encouraging	 women	 to	 “reclaim”	 the	 ritual	 as	 a	
moment of spirituality, and as a ritual that can also be practiced outside of the context 
of niddah, for example after an unsuccessful relationship, miscarriage, illness or trauma, 
such	as	rape	or	assault.	Several	mikvahs	in	the	United	States	have	also	started	introducing	
new immersion rituals for men.12 Finally,	the	immersion	in	the	ritual	bath	is	also	the	final	
stage	in	the	conversion	to	Judaism,	transforming	a	non-believer	into	a	Jew.	Observant	Jews	
also	use	the	mikvah	to	immerse	new	dishes	and	kitchen	utensils	and	make	them	kosher	
(Slonim	1995:	xxvi).
The mikvah and Christian baptism
Christian	baptism	traces	its	roots	to	the	Jewish	practice	of	proselyte	baptism,	the	baptisms	
of	John	in	the	Jordan	river	and	the	periodic	baths	for	ritual	purity	in	Judaism	(see	Chap.	6).	
At	the	beginning	of	the	Christian	era,	Jews	adopted	a	new	custom	of	baptizing	proselytes	
seven	days	after	their	circumcision.	To	become	Jewish,	 the	candidate	had	to	undergo	a	
series	 of	 special	 interrogations	 before	 being	 circumcised.	 Baptism	 in	 a	 pool	 of	 flowing	
12 	http://www.mishpacha.org/gender-mikveh.shtml	and	www.mayyimhayyim.org
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water	 in	 front	of	 a	 group	of	witnesses	 formed	 the	final	 stage	 in	 the	 conversion.	 It	was	
believed	that	after	he	immersed	naked	in	the	water,	the	new	convert	emerged	as	a	true	
son	of	Israel.	This	baptism,	which	formed	a	rite	of	unification	with	the	believers,	was	seen	
as	a	new	birth.	“Every	proselyte	is	like	a	newborn	child”	(Babylonian	Talmud,	Yeb.,	22a).	
The	ministry	of	John	the	Baptist	in	the	Judean	Desert	announced	the	coming	Reign	of	
God	and	called	for	baptism	in	the	Jordan	River	as	a	sign	of	repentance,	symbolically	linking	
immersion	 to	 a	 new	 and	 supernatural	 life.	 John	 administered	 the	 baptism	 of	 water	 to	
erase	sin.	However,	by	performing	the	ritual	in	the	Jordan	River	and	not	in	the	ritual	water	
of	the	mikvah,	he	made	a	clear	departure	from	official	practice.	John	baptized	Jesus,	but	
the	manifestations	of	the	Father	and	the	Holy	Spirit	during	Jesus’s	baptism	gave	it	a	new	
dimension.	The	baptism	of	Jesus	also	inaugurated	his	public	ministry,	and	he	subsequently	
gave his disciples the mission of baptizing in the name of the Holy Trinity. The apostles 
continued	to	practice	the	baptism	of	water	as	carried	out	by	 John,	but	emphasized	the	
necessity for an inner conversion preceding the profession of the Trinitarian faith. 
The	apostle	Paul	was	the	first	to	define	the	theological	and	symbolic	significance	of	
Christian baptism, associating the converts’ immersion in water to Christ’s death and 
rebirth	to	a	new	spiritual	life	through	resurrection	(The	Holy	Bible,	Rom.	6:3-4).	In	Titus	3:5,	
he	describes	baptism	as	the	gift	of	“a	bath	of	regeneration	and	renewal”.	The	flowing	water	
brings about change, symbolizing the death of the old, sinful man and the emergence of a 
new man from the waters of life. This is very similar to the spiritual renewal that the waters 
of	the	mikvah	effect.	Talmudic	texts	say	that	the	believer	emerges	from	the	mikvah	as	pure	
and	clear	as	the	first	man	and	woman	created	by	God	in	Eden	(Slonim	1995:	xxviii).	The	
major	difference	of	course	is	that	Christian	baptism	is	only	performed	once,	as	an	initiation	
rite,	while	 immersion	 in	 the	 living	waters	 takes	place	periodically.	Early	Christian	writers	
compared	baptism	to	the	 Jewish	practice	of	circumcision	as	a	sign	of	 inclusion	 into	the	
covenant community. By the 5th	century	these	theological	ties	to	Judaism	had	largely	been	
lost and baptism was understood to be an act of salvation, ensuring the eradication of sin 
and	more	particularly	original	sin	(Kessler	&	Wenborn	2005:	47-48).	
The belief that every child is born in original sin, a sin inherited by all humans from 
Adam,	is	unique	to	Christianity.	Muslims	believe	that	Adam	was	expelled	from	the	Garden	
of Eden for his sin and that God accepted his repentance; this means that each child 
is	 born	 sinless	 and	 innocent.	 While	 mainstream	 Judaism,	 both	 in	 antiquity	 and	 today,	
acknowledges	 that	each	person	 is	 responsible	 for	his	or	her	guilt,	 it	 also	describes	 the	
existence of an innate sinfulness in each human being. A teaching in the Talmud for 
instance states that the serpent seduced Eve and impregnated her with spiritual-physical 
“dirt”	which	was	inherited	through	the	generations.	However,	the	revelation	at	Sinai,	when	
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Moses	received	the	Torah,	cleansed	Israel	of	this	sin	(Ibid.:		323-324).
In the early period of the church, baptism was only carried out on adults, to ensure 
that they realized the full consequences of conversion. Baptism of children only became 
common from the 10th century onwards and was also associated to the belief in original 
sin:	 children	 or	 babies	 who	 died	 before	 being	 christened	 would	 not	 be	 saved	 (Jones	
2005:780-781).	 The	baptismal	 ritual	 itself	 also	evolved	over	 time:	 from	 the	14th century 
baptism by immersion was replaced in the Western Church by the pouring of water over 
the child’s head. In the 16th and 17th centuries, these practices were once again questioned 
by dissident Christian movements such as the Anabaptists, who insisted on adult baptism, 
arguing that children were not conscious of their salvation through Christ. The American 
Baptists founded their beliefs on the theological baptism of Paul and insisted on a return 
to strict apostolic practice with baptism through immersion. The tradition of immersion 
was	always	maintained	in	the	Orthodox	Church.	
THE ConCEPT oF PurITy In ISLaM
The	Prophet	Mohammed	said	that	cleanliness	is	half	of	faith	(Muslim	2:	432).	These	well-
known	 and	 oft-repeated	 words	 reveal	 not	 only	 the	 importance	 of	 purity,	 but	 also	 the	
essential	role	water	plays	in	Islam.	Purity	(tahara)	plays	a	central	role	in	Islam:	in	manuals	
of	Islamic	law	(fiqh),	purification	is	always	the	first	section,	just	as	ritual	purification	is	the	
preliminary	to	most	acts	of	Islamic	practice	(Reinhart	1990:	2). The	Muslim	concept	of	purity	
incorporates both physical and spiritual aspects. Purifying oneself shows submission to 
the will of God and washes away sin, but it also implies physical cleanliness of body and 
clothes. 
The fact that in Islam purity refers to both spiritual and physical cleanness is related 
the	Islamic	belief	 in	the	unity	of	body	and	soul.	 Islam	means	“surrendering	to	God”	and	
Muslims,	“those	who	have	surrendered	to	God”,	do	so	entirely.	Most	religious	obligations	
in Islam, such as prayer, fasting in the holy month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to 
Mecca,	have	both	a	spiritual	and	physical	component.	The	Muslim	prayer	is	performed	in	
the	direction	of	Mecca	and	involves	a	series	of	movements.	Fasting	requires	both	physical	
and	 spiritual	 commitment:	 besides	 abstaining	 from	 food,	 drink	 and	 sexual	 intercourse,	
believers are encouraged to avoid arguments and sinful thoughts. This means that to 
attain a state of ritual purity believers must be physically and spiritually pure. 
One	fundamental	difference	between	the	 Jewish	and	Muslim	concept	of	purity	and	
impurity	is	that	in	Islam	impurity	is	not	“contagious”,	in	the	sense	that	an	impure	person	
does	not	contaminate	the	objects	he	touches.	Thus	the	strictures	imposed	on	the	Jewish	
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menstruant	woman	in	certain	circles	and	periods	are	not	applicable	to	Muslim	menstruant	
women.	While	 the	Muslim	woman	 is	 considered	 impure	 during	 her	menstruation,	 she	
cannot	transfer	that	impurity	to	objects	or	people	around	her.	
Muslim water rituals
The	 Koran	 tells	 believers	 “God	 loves	 those	 that	 seek	 to	 purify	 themselves”	 (The Qur’an 
9:108)	and	instructs	them:	“You	who	believe,	when	you	are	about	to	pray,	wash	your	faces	
and	your	hands	up	to	the	elbows,	wipe	your	heads,	wash	your	feet	up	to	the	ankles	and,	
if required, wash your whole body […] God does not wish to place any burden on you: He 
only	wishes	to	cleanse	you	and	perfect	his	blessing	on	you,	so	that	you	may	be	thankful	
[…]”	 (Ibid.).	 Purification	 through	 ablution	 is	 obligatory	 before	 prayer,	 touching	 or	 even	
reading	the	Koran;	prayers	carried	out	in	impure	state	are	not	valid.	This	means	Muslims	
are	obliged	to	carry	out	ritual	ablution	before	each	of	the	five	daily	prayers.	In	addition,	a	
more	thorough	ritual	is	required	on	specific	occasions.
Entire chapters of the Ahadith are dedicated to ablutions, detailing when and how they 
should be performed, and explaining in which order the various parts of the body should 
be	washed,	how	the	feet	are	to	be	cleaned,	how	the	head	should	be	rubbed	–	even	how	
often the nostrils should be cleared. They also specify that the water used for ablutions 
should be pure, mutlaq, which means it should not be mixed with any other liquid. Water 
from	rain,	wells,	flowing	water	 from	taps,	 rivers	and	streams,	and	still	water	 from	 lakes,	
ponds, seas and oceans, are all considered to be pure and suitable for ritual ablution 
(Muslim	Bk	2;	Bukhari	Bk	4,	5).
There are three types of ablution. Wudu’	–	the	minor	purification	carried	out	before	
prayer	–	consists	of	washing	the	hands,	the	face,	the	forearms,	the	head	and	the	feet.	It	is	
required	after	going	to	the	toilet,	after	touching	a	person	of	the	opposite	sex	(with	desire),	
or	after	touching	the	genitals,	but	also	after	laughing,	coughing	or	sleeping	(Reinhart	1990:	
10).	It	is	however	also	a	spiritual	purification:	the	Ahadith	explain	that	by	performing	wudu’ 
the	believer	washes	away	sin,	and	that	each	drop	of	water	that	falls	in	the	hand	makes	the	
devil	flee.	It	is	also	recorded	that	the	Prophet	Mohammed	said:	“He	who	performs	ablution	
well,	his	sins	would	come	out	from	his	body,	even	coming	out	from	under	his	nails”	(Muslim	
2:0476).	
The Hadiths describe wudu’ in a very physical way, as though the sin were a visible 
stain, an insidious little demon that clings to the believer and can only be chased away 
with water. Thus when a believer washes his face during wudu’, the Ahadith say that every 
sin that he contemplated with his eyes is washed away from his face with the last drop of 
water;	when	he	washes	his	hands,	every	sin	they	wrought	is	effaced;	and	when	he	washes	
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his	feet,	every	sin	toward	which	his	feet	have	walked	is	washed	away,	until	he	comes	out	
pure	of	all	sins	(Muslim	2:0475).
The	major	purification,	known	as	ghusl, cleanses the whole body from impurities by 
pouring water over it, and is required after sexual intercourse, menstruation, childbirth, 
before adopting Islam, and at death, but also before important celebrations and during 
the hajj. 
Through wudu’ and ghusl believers can attain a state of tahara, which allows them to 
worship	and	read	the	Koran.	As	such,	these	rituals	include	a	spiritual	component,	which	
means	that	even	if	one	is	physically	clean,	but	has	not	carried	out	the	purification	in	a	ritual	
fashion,	one	cannot	touch	the	Koran	(Abdel	Haleem	1999:	32).	This	prohibition	has	nothing	
to	do	with	physical	purity	–	whether	one	has	clean	hands	or	whether	one	might	stain	the	
pages	of	the	holy	book	for	example.	It	is	purely	a	question	of	reverence	towards	the	word	
of God. 
Ablution should not be carried out mechanically, but only after niyyat or intention, the 
silent expression of sincerity and obedience to God. This is the spiritual component of 
the	purification	ritual:	while	the	body	is	purified	with	water,	the	mind	must	be	completely	
focussed on God. Carrying out wudu’ or ghusl simply for refreshment in hot weather for 
example	makes	them	invalid.	In	practice,	ghusl is of course often combined with washing 
and the religious, spiritual component merges with the physical.
The	Ahadith	also	offer	advice	 for	 times	of	scarcity,	using	 the	Prophet’s	actions	as	a	
guideline: one day when the Prophet was travelling through the desert with his companions, 
his	wife	Aisha	 lost	her	necklace.	They	spent	time	searching	for	 it	and	when	prayer	time	
came, the company was nowhere near a water source. It was then that God revealed the 
ritual of tayammum or	“dry	wudu’”	to	the	Prophet:	“O	you	who	believe,	[…]	if	you	are	ill,	on	
a	journey,	have	relieved	yourselves,	or	had	intercourse,	and	cannot	find	any	water,	then	
find	some	clean	sand	and	wipe	your	faces	and	hands	with	it”	(The Qur’an	4:43)	This	is	the	
third	form	of	purification	in	which	clean	earth	or	sand	can	thus	be	used	as	a	substitute	for	
water.	This	again	underlines	the	spiritual	component	of	the	purification	ritual:	the	use	of	
dust	does	not	cleanse	the	believer	physically,	but	makes	him	ritually	clean	and	allows	him	
to worship. 
This	principle	of	dry	ablution	is	also	mentioned	in	the	Talmud:	“If	someone	does	not	
have	water	with	which	 to	wash,	he	should	clean	his	hands	with	dust,	a	 rock	or	a	piece	
of	wood”	 (Brandt	1910:	11).	Even	 in	biblical	 times,	 Israel	was	an	arid	 land	with	a	harsh	
climate and in the months of drought, people commonly used sand or earth to cleanse 
themselves, both in everyday life and in the context of religious ritual.
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The hammam, between heaven and hell
Water’s	importance	in	Islamic	culture	has	over	the	centuries	also	left	its	mark	on	the	design	
of the city. The fountains, cisterns, and public baths that can still be found today in cities 
around the Islamic world survive as a physical testimony to the central role water plays 
in	Muslim	society.	In	Cairo	the	water	fountain,	the	sabil, was traditionally donated to the 
community by rich or powerful citizens as a charitable and pious deed. Sometimes they 
were part of a mosque or medrasa complex,	but	during	the	Ottoman	period	they	evolved	
into freestanding structures. Sabils soon became architectural features in the urban 
texture,	expressing	the	value	of	water	and	reminding	passers-by	of	the	Koranic	obligation	
to share water. 
Thus the development of the sabil	 is	directly	 linked	to	the	Islamic	law	that	says	that	
water should be freely available to all. It also draws upon the Prophet’s words that the two 
greatest	mercies	are	“water	for	the	thirsty	and	knowledge	for	ignorant”,	and	many	sabils 
are combined with small medrasas,	Koranic	schools,	on	the	first	floor.	They	are	called	“sabil-
kuttub”,	literally	“fountains	of	books”	or	“fountain	schools”.	Today	some	of	the	schools	still	
function but the sabils themselves have all fallen into disuse since most of Cairo’s houses 
are	connected	to	the	central	water	supply	system	(Parker	et	al.	1985:	27-35).
The public bathhouse or hammam is another element of the Islamic city that shows the 
importance	of	water	in	Muslim	societies.	Already	in	the	Middle	Ages,	it	was	unimaginable	
for a town not to have a hammam: in 10th-century Baghdad, chroniclers boasted there 
were 27,500 baths for a population of 60,000 and, depending on the prosperity of the 
inhabitants,	even	the	smallest	village	would	have	a	bathhouse	(Grotzfeld	1970:	13).	Middle	
Eastern	bathing	culture	long	predates	Islam,	going	back	to	prehistoric	times.	The	tradition	
was	handed	down	through	ancient	Mesopotamian	and	Egyptian	cultures	via	the	Greeks	
and Romans to the Arabs. Islamic tradition has however attributed the creation of the 
bathhouse	 to	 King	 Solomon:	 the	 11th-century Stories of the Prophets,	 a	 book	 about	 the	
Prophet	Mohammed’s	predecessors,	describes	how	he	built	the	first	hammam	for	Bilqís	
–	known	in	Hebrew	tradition	as	Balquis	–	the	Queen	of	Sheba	(Buitelaar	1996:	105).	While	
this	story	is	also	recorded	in	the	Koran,	the	hammam itself is not mentioned and scholars 
generally agree that the Prophet never visited one. Writing in a seemingly random order 
about	the	Prophet’s	habits,	one	of	his	companions,	Ibn	al-Khajjim,	claims	that	the	Prophet	
never ate garlic or onions and never entered, or even saw, a bathing house.
Despite	 its	popularity,	 the	hammam was an ambiguous space in the eyes of many 
theologians and Islamic scholars. While medieval medical experts praised the medicinal 
value of the steam and hot water of the hammam, early Islamic scholars saw it as a space 
on the edge between heaven and hell. The word hammam is related to hamiem, the 
boiling	waters	of	hell,	 implying	a	demonic	element	 (Ibid.:	7).	The	Arabic	expression	 “the	
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whole	world	is	a	mosque,	except	the	graveyard	and	the	hammam”	further	illustrates	the	
duality: the whole world is pure enough for prayer, except the bathhouse and the burial 
place.	Al-Ghazali	also	wrote	about	the	paradoxical	nature	of	the	hammam:	thus	Ibn	Omar,	
the son of the second caliph, was once seen standing blindfolded and facing the wall of 
a	 bathhouse,	 so	 shocked	was	 he	 by	 the	 shameless	 display	 of	 flesh	 there.	 Yet	 later	 he	
was	quoted	as	saying	that	the	bathhouse	is	a	“heavenly	blessing	created	by	man”	(Ibid.:	
97).	Similarly,	 authoritative	sources	affirm	 that	 the	Prophet	Mohammed	only	once	ever	
mentioned	the	hammam,	declaring	that	Jesus	was	as	pure	as	if	“he	had	just	emerged	from	
the	bathhouse”.	Again,	ambiguously,	other	versions	of	this	tradition	mention	not	Christ	but	
the Antichrist, al Dajaal, in	this	context	(Ibid.:	108).
Water is strongly associated with spirits and genies in Islamic culture. Springs and 
caves,	but	also	hammams,	are	believed	to	harbour	djinns	and	demons.	They	like	to	dwell	
in	impure	places	–	toilets,	garbage	dumps	–	and	places	that	mark	a	transition:	the	edge	of	
the	desert,	burial	grounds,	spaces	between	light	and	dark	and	the	hammam, which	marks	
the spaces between ritual purity and impurity. In normal circumstances, one can shield 
oneself	 from	demons	or	other	evil	 forces	by	 invoking	the	protection	of	God.	But	 in	 the	
bathhouse one is neither pure nor impure, so that it is forbidden to pray or recite passages 
from	the	Koran.	The	belief	in	spirits	and	demons	goes	beyond	superstition;	it	forms	part	
of	traditional	 Islamic	belief.	One	Koranic	tradition	even	records	a	conversation	between	
God	and	the	Devil,	in	which	the	Devil	tells	God:	“My	Lord,	you	have	let	me	descend	upon	
the	earth	and	cursed	me.	Now	give	me	a	house!”	God	answers:	 “The	bathhouse.”	 (Ibid.:	
109-115)
The hammam today, religious and social meanings
Because of its ambiguous character, women were initially forbidden from using the 
hammam,	except	in	exceptional	circumstances	–	after	menstruation,	childbirth	or	illness.	
Over	time	however,	women	did	gain	access	to	the	baths	and	today	hammams	often	have	
separate men and women’s sections or are exclusively male or female. The hammam in 
fact acquired a very important role in the lives of women, not only as a bathing facility, 
but also as a social meeting place, one of the few public spaces where they could feel 
completely relaxed away from male eyes and exchange gossip and news with friends and 
relatives. 
At the same time, its ambiguous nature as a liminal space between purity on the one 
hand and impurity, sin and temptation on the other, continues to taint its image to the 
extent that some husbands are still reluctant to allow their wives to visit the bathhouse. 
But despite the fact that many houses have bathrooms and that the ritual ablutions can 
therefore be performed at home, the hammam continues to serve an important religious 
142
Part III
and	social	role	both	in	the	Middle	East	and	in	Muslim	communities	in	Europe.	
Anthropological	 studies	 conducted	 in	Morocco	 in	 the	1990s	 (Ibid.:	 1-18)	 show	 that	
many	women	in	Morocco’s	cities	continue	to	visit	the	hammam	on	a	weekly	basis.	Asked	
whether there was a connection between the baths and their faith, they usually responded 
negatively,	 but,	 as	 the	 researcher	 observed,	 “there	 often	 is	 a	 difference	 between	what	
people	do,	what	they	think	they	do	and	what	they	say	they	do”	(Ibid.:	121).	Thus	many	of	
the	women	interviewed	saw	the	hammam	as	a	predominantly	Muslim	space,	and	some	of	
them	even	said	they	would	refuse	to	share	it	with	Christians	or	Jews	because	they	were	
“dirty”,	 i.e.	unclean	 in	a	 ritual	 sense.	 It	 is	also	during	 the	weekly	 visit	 to	 the	hammam	–	
often	on	a	Friday	(the	Muslim	holy	day)	or	before	important	holidays	–	that	most	women	
perform the large ablution, ghusl. And while this ritual can in principle be performed in 
any other bathing space, it has become so strongly associated with the hammam, that 
most	women	say	they	do	not	feel	really	“clean”	unless	they	have	spent	at	 least	an	hour	
scrubbing	themselves	in	the	hammam.	Certain	Moroccan	bathhouses	are	also	associated	
with	a	specific	saint,	giving	the	water	in	this	hammam	–	often	a	warm	spring	–	“baraka”,	holy	
powers from God. The water of certain hammams is thus believed to have healing powers, 
bring	good	luck	or	make	women	more	fertile.
Perhaps more important than its religious role, is the hammam’s role as a social 
meeting	place	and	a	place	of	relaxation.	In	Morocco,	women	often	visit	the	hammam	with	
relatives	and	help	each	other	wash	their	hair	and	scrub	each	other’s	backs.	Besides	being	
a treasured moment of relaxation and rest, the visit to the hammam is also an occasion 
for women to discuss health issues, exchange news and catch up on gossip. The visit to 
the hammam is also an important preparation for a wedding. The bride is carried to the 
hammam by female friends and family members and traditionally spends an afternoon 
both celebrating and washing herself before the big day. There is nevertheless also an 
element	of	 shame	attached	 to	 the	hammam.	As	 the	 ritual	purification	 that	 takes	place	
there is often carried out after sexual intercourse, women do not want to be seen in the 
hammam too often. 
In	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Belgium,	 both	 countries	 with	 large	Moroccan	 and	 Turkish	
populations, several hammams have opened since the 1980s. These bathhouses are used 
by	Moroccans,	Turks	and	locals	and	fulfil	an	important	social	function	as	a	meeting	place	for	
foreign	women.	Because	they	now	all	have	showers	at	home,	many	Moroccan	and	Turkish	
women said they were worried that their husbands would prevent them from going to the 
hammam	as	it	was	not	strictly	necessary.	For	many	Muslim	women	in	the	Netherlands	it	is	
a real treat to go to the hammam; it is one of the few places where they feel really at home. 
Visiting	a	Dutch	hammam	one	can	observe	how	Moroccan	and	Turkish	women	there	seem	
much more self-assured and relaxed than in other contexts. It is as though the roles had 
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been	reversed:	Dutch	women	often	feel	uncomfortable	and	awkward,	while	the	Muslim	
women	are	proud	to	show	them	how	to	use	the	various	facilities	(Ibid.).	
Social	 workers	 in	 larger	 cities	 like	 The	 Hague,	 Amsterdam	 and	 Utrecht	 found	 that	
the	hammam	can	play	a	key	role	 in	taking	women	out	of	 the	social	 isolation	they	often	
live	 in.	Many	 immigrant	women	 living	 in	 the	Netherlands	have	 lost	 the	 social	 networks	
within	which	they	operated	in	their	country	of	origin	and	do	not	speak	Dutch,	leading	to	
feelings of loneliness and often even health problems. Instead of organizing group therapy 
sessions	at	the	 local	community	centres,	which	were	often	experienced	as	artificial	and	
forced,	social	workers	found	that	communal	hammam	visits	really	allowed	women	to	relax	
and share their troubles as they had in their local hammams in their country of origin. Thus 
the hammam and the water rituals associated with it continue to play an important socio-
cultural	and	religious	role	for	Muslims,	as	a	space	for	meeting	friends	and	relatives,	but	also	
as	a	Muslim	space	that	is	strongly	associated	with	Islamic	practice,	even	if	the	importance	
of	the	rituals	themselves	is	often	overshadowed	by	other	social	functions	(Ibid.).
ConCLuSIon
Water	is	rich	in	meanings	and	symbolism	–	it	is	a	source	of	life	and	fertility,	but	also	of	purity	
and	 refreshment.	On	a	more	abstract	 level	water	has	a	deep	spiritual	 value:	 it	has	 the	
capacity	to	wash	away	sin	and	cleanse	the	mind.	The	water	rituals	described	in	the	Jewish	
and	Muslim	 scriptures	 reflect	 this	 symbolism	and	emphasize	 that	water	 is	 the	primary	
means through which believers can attain a state of ritual purity. 
The	spiritual	value	of	water	 is	especially	emphasized	in	 Judaism,	where	the	concept	
of ritual purity is emphatically dissociated from ideas of physical hygiene. In Islam, the 
belief	in	the	unity	of	body	and	soul	means	that	the	water	used	in	purification	rituals	also	
serves	a	dual	purpose	of	washing	away	physical	and	spiritual	impurities.	Over	the	centuries	
the	practice	and	 interpretation	of	 the	various	water	rituals	has	evolved.	 In	 Judaism,	 the	
dispersion	 of	 Jewish	 communities	 around	 the	world	meant	 that	 different	 communities	
interpreted	the	scriptures	differently,	as	in	the	case	of	Ethiopian	Jewry	who	used	running	
water	to	perform	the	purification	and	rejected	the	Israeli	use	of	the	mikvah.	The	distinction	
between	purity	and	cleanliness	was	also	often	confused.	This	meant	that	the	mikvah	ritual	
was	 in	 certain	 cases	 interpreted	as	 a	physical	 purification,	 leading	women	 to	use	plain	
water	instead	of	the	sacred	“living	waters”.	The	confusion	between	the	ideas	of	“dirty”	and	
“impure”	also	lent	a	negative	connotation	to	the	mikvah	ritual,	with	many	women	rejecting	
the practice in the 19th and 20th	centuries.	The	association	with	the	mikvah	as	something	
shameful, mysterious and private, contributed to its decline. 
In Islam, water rituals continue to play a much more central role. This is on the one 
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hand	due	to	the	fact	that	a	larger	percentage	of	Muslims	are	observant	and	practice	their	
faith	actively,	but	also	because	of	the	importance	of	the	idea	of	purity	in	Islam.	In	Judaism,	
the laws of purity are articulated in reference to worship in the Second Temple, and many 
of them are no longer relevant or applicable. The laws of niddah form a notable exception, 
but they are seen by many as arcane. In Islam, the laws of purity are in a way much more 
practical and down-to-earth. They include an important spiritual component but they also 
reflect	concerns	for	health	and	hygiene.	 In	addition,	 the	hammam	continues	to	 fulfil	an	
important social function as a place of leisure, relaxation and social exchange.   
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CHaPTEr 6
Baptism in the Jordan river: Immersing in a Contested 
Transboundary Watercourse
Figure 21. Baptism	 in	 the	 Jordan	River	 at	Qasr	 al	 Yehud,	West	Bank,	 2013.	 Source:	 Francesca	de	
Châtel.
InTroDuCTIon 
Dressed	in	white	gowns,	the	group	of	Russian	pilgrims	gathered	silently	by	the	steps	that	
led	into	the	river.	The	priest,	a	tall	figure	with	shoulder-length	hair	and	a	beard,	intoned	a	
hymn	and	the	pilgrims	joined	in,	bowing	their	head	in	prayer.	Barely	five	metres	away	on	
the	opposite	shore,	two	Jordanian	soldiers	looked	on	from	the	shelter	of	a	reed-covered	
platform	–	no	visitors	had	come	to	visit	 their	side	of	the	river	yet	today.	As	the	pilgrims	
sang, the priest slowly descended into the muddy water, which reached only to his thighs, 
so that he almost had to lie down to immerse himself fully. He emerged with closed eyes, 
gasping for breath. The women, their heads covered, lined up on the steps, some holding 
young	children	by	the	hand.	One	by	one,	they	descended	into	the	water,	knelt	in	front	of	
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the priest and crossed themselves before he placed his hand on their head and immersed 
them	in	the	water.	Three	times	–	in	the	name	of	the	Father,	the	Son	and	the	Holy	Spirit	
(Fig.	21).	
Meanwhile,	a	group	of	young	Americans	sat	in	the	shade	of	some	palm	trees	on	the	
bank	and	listened	to	their	guide,	an	American	woman	wearing	a	safari	hat	and	khaki	desert	
trousers.	They	 took	 turns	 to	 read	excerpts	 from	the	Bible	and	 the	guide	explained	 the	
significance	of	this	holy	river.	“You	can	see	that	the	river	is	quite	muddy,”	she	said	as	she	
pointed	to	the	timid	murky	flow,	“but	it’s	actually	not	dirty,	because	there’s	so	many	bends	
in	the	river.”	Her	audience	nodded	and	one	girl	complained	it	was	too	hot.
The	Russian	baptism	ritual	completed,	the	pilgrims	emerged	from	the	water	and	took	
photos	of	each	other	by	the	river,	while	three	young	boys	started	a	water	fight	in	a	corner	
of	 the	baptismal	pool.	Their	mothers	scolded	them	loudly	and	dragged	them	off	to	the	
showers.	Half	an	hour	later,	both	groups	were	getting	back	on	their	Israeli	tourist	buses,	
off	to	the	next	stop	on	their	day	tour	of	biblical	sites.
Compared	 to	other	well-known	 transboundary	 rivers	 in	 the	Middle	East	and	North	
Africa	(MENA)	region	such	as	the	Euphrates,	the	Tigris	and	the	Nile,	the	Jordan	River	was	
never more than a stream.1 Yet	from	biblical	times,	its	cultural-religious	significance	as	the	
boundary	of	the	Holy	Land	and	the	site	of	the	baptism	of	Jesus	has	dominated	popular	
imaginations, magnifying the river to mythical proportions well beyond its physical size. 
Thus	one	of	 the	earliest	 cartographic	 representations	of	 the	Holy	Land,	 the	6th-century 
Madaba	Map,	represents	key	sites	such	as	Jerusalem,	but	also	the	Jordan	River,	on	a	larger	
scale	to	emphasize	their	importance	as	biblical	sites.	Over	the	centuries,	the	image	of	the	
“mighty	Jordan”	has	been	elaborated	through	hymns	and	songs,	which	were	mainly	written	
and sung by people who lived in distant places and had never seen the river before, thus 
further increasing the discrepancy between the physical river and its symbolic counterpart. 
This	widening	gap	between	the	actual	river	and	its	magnified	image	clearly	came	to	
the fore in the 19th	 century	when	US	Navy	Commander	William	F.	 Lynch	undertook	an	
expedition	to	explore	the	Jordan	River	and	the	Dead	Sea	with	the	aim	of	assessing	their	
viability	as	a	shipping	route	(Fig.	22).	Driven	by	his	religious	beliefs	and	very	literal	readings	
of	the	Old	Testament,	Lynch	was	able	to	convince	the	US	Navy	to	fund	the	expedition	and	
provide him with a crew of 13 men, even though accounts from earlier travellers clearly 
indicated	that	the	winding	course	of	the	Jordan	River	with	its	many	rapids	made	it	unsuited	
for	shipping.	He	“was	consumed	with	biblical	descriptions	of	the	‘mighty	Jordan’	and	the	
1 	With	a	total	length	of	just	223	km	and	a	historic	annual	discharge	of	1,300	MCM,	the	Jordan	River	
has always been considerably smaller than the region’s other transboundary rivers such as the Nile 
(6,825	km,	84	BCM),	the	Euphrates	(2,786	km,	25	BCM)	and	the	Tigris	(1,800	km,	26	BCM).	(UN-ESCWA	
and	BGR	2013;	Collins	1996).
Chapter 6: Baptism in the Jordan River
151
multitudes	of	Israelites	crossing	it	en	route	to	Palestine.	His	impression	of	the	Jordan	was	
of	a	wide	and	significant	river,	 like	those	he	was	accustomed	to	sailing	 in	the	Americas”	
(Hallotte	2007:	15).	The	discrepancy	between	Lynch’s	mental	image	of	the	Jordan	River	and	
its much smaller and unwieldy physical state shows the enduring strength of its symbolic 
value, which subsequently also inspired the founding father of Zionism, Theodor Herzl. In 
his	utopian	book,	Alt-Neuland, he described his vision of hydraulic engineers transforming 
the	Jordan	River	Valley	into	a	productive	agricultural	region	where	rice,	sugarcane,	tobacco	
and	 cotton	 fields	 were	 irrigated	 by	 river-	 and	 rainwater	 that	 was	 stored	 in	 dams	 and	
barrages	(Herzl	1919:	201).
Figure 22. Illustration	from	Commander	William	Lynch’s	narrative	account	of	his	expedition	to	the	
Jordan	River	and	the	Dead	Sea.	Source:	Lynch	1853.
The	river’s	symbolic	significance	became	evermore	layered	and	complex	in	the	20th century, 
while the physical river and its tributaries underwent far-reaching infrastructural changes 
that severely reduced water levels and impaired water quality. Following the collapse of the 
Ottoman	Empire	and	the	creation	of	the	state	of	Israel	in	1948,	the	Jordan	River	was	drawn	
deep	 into	the	Arab-Israeli	conflict.	 It	became	one	of	 the	most	contested	transboundary	
rivers	in	the	MENA	region,	and,	after	1967,	a	heavily	militarized	political	border	between	
Jordan	to	the	east	and	Israel	and	the	Palestinian	West	Bank	to	the	west.	Hydrologically,	
large-scale	unilateral	water	resource	development	in	Israel,	Jordan	and	Syria	transformed	
the	river	 into	a	utilitarian	and	largely	artificial	water	resource	system	made	up	of	dams,	
drinking	water	 conduits,	 irrigation	 canals	 and	 sewage	 drains.	 However,	 in	 the	 religious	
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realm,	 the	 Jordan	 River’s	 mythical	 status	 and	 its	 association	 with	 defining	 moments	
of	 Jewish	 and	 Christian	 biblical	 history	 continued	 to	 dominate	 collective	 imaginations.	
Today,	 hundreds	of	 thousands	of	pilgrims	 continue	 to	 visit	 the	 Jordan	River	 every	 year	
to	remember	the	baptism	of	Jesus	Christ	and	immerse	themselves	in	the	river’s	holy,	but	
severely degraded, water.
This	 article	 traces	 the	 history	 of	 baptism	 in	 the	 Jordan	 River	 from	 biblical	 times	
to the present day. It is divided into three parts. After a short description of the river 
course,	the	first	part	of	the	article	examines	the	role	of	the	Jordan	River	in	the	Bible	and	
explores	different	aspects	of	early	baptismal	practice.	In	particular,	it	looks	at	the	role	of	
the	Jordan	River	 in	defining	the	Christian	concept	of	holy	water.	The	second	part	of	the	
article	presents	a	brief	review	of	early	pilgrimage	to	the	Jordan.	Finally,	the	third	part	of	the	
article examines baptismal practice today. It discusses how infrastructural developments 
and	ongoing	regional	conflict	have	caused	severe	environmental	degradation	and	limited	
access	 to	 the	river.	The	article	 then	 looks	at	efforts	 to	 rehabilitate	 the	river	as	a	single,	
interconnected ecosystem. The article combines historic accounts, biblical exegeses and 
literature	with	fieldwork	and	interviews	that	were	carried	out	in	Jerusalem,	Amman	and	at	
the	three	baptism	sites	in	the	Jordan	Valley	in	June	2013.	
THE CHangIng CourSE oF a HoLy rIVEr
Topographically,	the	Jordan	River	lives	up	to	its	name	as	the	river	that	“descends”.2 From its 
sources at altitudes of around 2,000 metres above sea level on the western and southern 
slopes	of	Mount	Hermon,	the	river	winds	its	way	through	the	Jordan	River	Valley	over	a	
distance	of	about	223	km	to	discharge	 into	the	Dead	Sea,	 the	 lowest	point	on	earth	at	
422	metres	below	sea	level	(UN-ESCWA	and	BGR	2013)	(Fig.	23).3 The river’s headwaters, 
the	Dan,	Hasbani	and	Banias,	originate	in	Israel,	Lebanon	and	the	Israeli-occupied	Golan	
Heights	respectively	and	meet	inside	Israel	to	form	the	Upper	Jordan	River.	
From	here	it	flows	south,	first	into	the	Hula	Valley,	a	former	wetland	that	was	drained	
in	 the	 1950s,	 and	 then	 into	 Lake	 Tiberias,4	 historically	 a	 naturally	 brackish	 lake.	 In	 the	
mid-1960s,	Israel	started	diverting	the	water	from	saline	springs	along	the	shores	of	Lake	
Tiberias	through	the	Saline	Water	Carrier	(SWC)	to	the	Lower	Jordan	River.	As	a	result,	Lake	
Tiberias gradually became less saline and has today become Israel’s largest freshwater 
reservoir that supplies approximately one third of the country’s annual water requirements. 
2 	Yarden	in	Hebrew	=	to	descend.	Palestinians	refer	to	the	river	as	Al-Shariah	meaning	“place	from	
which	one	descends	to	water”	but	also	“law”	(Mallat	1995:	128).	
3 	From	the	confluence	of	the	headwaters	to	the	Dead	Sea.
4 	Lake	Tiberias	is	also	known	as	Lake	Kinneret	and	the	Sea	of	Galilee.
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Israel	annually	uses	a	total	of	between	538	million	cubic	metres	(MCM)	and	640	MCM	from	
the	Jordan	River	basin,	of	which	about	329	MCM	are	diverted	from	Lake	Tiberias	through	
the	National	Water	Carrier,	a	120	km	water	conveyance	system	that	supplies	the	country’s	
coastal and southern regions. 
The	Jordan	River	resumes	its	course	south	of	Lake	Tiberias,	covering	a	distance	of	143	
km	to	the	Dead	Sea.	Historically,	the	Lower	Jordan	River	received	water	not	only	from	Lake	
Tiberias	but	also	from	the	Jordan	River’s	largest	tributary,	the	Yarmouk,	as	well	as	several	
smaller seasonal wadis. Today, water levels in this part of the river have been sharply 
reduced	due	to	large-scale	regulation	and	diversion	works	in	Israel,	Jordan	and	Syria.	The	
Degania	and	Alumot	Dams	in	Israel	regulate	water	flow	from	Lake	Tiberias	into	the	Lower	
Jordan	River,	while	the	flow	of	the	Yarmouk	River	has	dropped	from	a	historical	450-500	
MCM	 to	 around	40	MCM	as	 Jordan	and	Syria	both	 store	 and	divert	water.	 In	 addition,	
Israel,	 Jordan	and	Syria	all	abstract	 large	amounts	of	groundwater	in	the	upper	parts	of	
the	Yarmouk	River	basin,	further	reducing	the	river’s	natural	flow.	Lebanon,	which	shares	
one	of	the	Jordan	River	headwaters,	the	Hasbani,	has	made	limited	use	of	the	river,	mainly	
for political reasons.5 Syria	has	no	access	to	the	river	itself	since	the	1967	Six-Day	War	but	
controls	the	sources	of	the	Yarmouk	River.	The	Palestinians	have	not	had	access	to	the	
Jordan	River	since	1967,	as	 it	either	 falls	under	 the	 Israeli-controlled	and	-administered	
Area	C	or	has	been	fenced	off	as	a	closed	military	area	(UN-ESCWA	and	BGR	2013).
By	2009,	the	Lower	Jordan	River’s	historic	annual	flow	of	1,300	MCM	had	been	reduced	
to	an	estimated	20-30	MCM.	Moreover,	most	of	the	fresh	water	 in	this	part	of	the	river	
has	been	replaced	with	saline	flows	from	Israel’s	SWC	and	water	from	fishponds,	sewage	
and	 agricultural	 run-off.	 The	 transnational	 Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian	 environmental	
organization	Friends	of	the	Earth	Middle	East	has	extensively	documented	the	impact	of	
damming	and	diversion	on	river	flows	and	water	quality,	describing	the	Lower	Jordan	River	
as	a	“severely	degraded	river	system”	that	has	been	reduced	to	less	than	2%	of	its	historic	
flow.	It	warns	that	parts	of	the	river	will	run	dry	if	fresh	water	is	not	urgently	returned	to	
the	river	(FoEME	2010).	
Two of the three baptism sites that are currently in operation lie along this lower 
stretch	of	the	river,	just	north	of	the	Dead	Sea.	The	Al	Maghtas/Baptism	Site	in	Jordan	and	
the	Israeli-operated	Qasr	al	Yehud	in	the	occupied	Palestinian	West	Bank	lie	straight	across	
from	each	other	so	that	pilgrims	immersing	in	the	water	are	just	metres	apart,	separated	
only by the invisible borderline that runs through the middle of the river. The river here 
has been reduced to a small, extremely saline muddy stream, barely three metres wide. 
Yet	staff	on	both	sides	of	the	river	insists	that	pollution	does	not	pose	a	public	health	risk	
5 	See	UN-ESCWA	&	BGR	2013;	Zeitoun	et	al.	2012.
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to	pilgrims	immersing	in	the	water.	Further	upstream,	the	Yardenit	Baptismal	Site	lies	just	
south	of	Lake	Tiberias	on	 the	short	stretch	between	 the	Degania	Dam	and	 the	Alumot	
Dam.	
THE JorDan rIVEr In THE BIBLE
The	Jordan	River	plays	an	important	role	in	the	Old	Testament	as	the	border	of	the	land	
that God gives to the Israelites. It is repeatedly mentioned as a geographical boundary, as 
for	example	in	Deuteronomy	27:2:	“[…]	when	ye	shall	pass	over	Jordan	unto	the	land	which	
the	Lord	thy	God	giveth	thee”.	The	river	not	only	marks	the	eastern	border	of	the	biblical	
Land	of	Israel,	but	also	serves	as	a	“legal,	temporal,	and	territorial	boundary”	(Havrelock	
2011:	19),	separating	“the	old	era	and	the	new,	the	foreign	and	the	familiar,	the	other	and	
self,	 chaos	 and	 law,	death	 and	 life,	 exile	 and	homeland”	 (Ibid.	 2011:	 88).	Deuteronomy	
12:10	clearly	delineates	 the	area	 “over	 Jordan”,	west	of	 the	 Jordan,	as	a	place	of	 safety	
where	the	tribes	of	Israel	will	be	protected	from	“all	your	enemies	around	you”,	while	the	
areas to the east are characterized as foreign spaces of exile.6
The	Book	of	Joshua	describes	the	crossing	of	the	Jordan	River	into	the	Land	of	Israel	
as	a	miraculous	episode	in	which	“the	water	flowing	down	stopped	and	piled	up	in	a	single	
heap	 […].	 The	 downstream	waters	 that	 flow	 into	 the	 Sea	 of	 Arabah/the	 Salt	 Sea	 were	
completely	cut	off	and	so	the	nation	crossed	near	Jericho.	The	Kohanim,	who	bore	the	Ark	
of	God’s	Covenant,	stood	on	dry	land	at	exactly	the	middle	of	the	Jordan,	while	all	Israel	
crossed	over	on	dry	land,	until	the	entire	nation	had	finished	crossing	the	Jordan”	(Joshua	
3:15-17,	 in	Havrelock	2011:	91-92).	This	miraculous	 “piling	up”	of	 the	waters	 recalls	 the	
“flowing	heap”	of	water	 that	rose	up	at	 the	parting	of	 the	Red	Sea,	 thus	reinforcing	the	
symbolic	significance	of	the	episode.
The	 Jordan	River’s	 ritual	 role	 in	 the	Old	Testament	 is	 carried	 forward	 into	 the	New	
Testament,	where	John’s	baptism	of	Jesus	marks	a	seminal	moment	in	the	life	of	Christ	and	
a	defining	event	in	the	Christian	Church.	But	where	in	the	Old	Testament	the	Jordan	River	
functions	as	a	territorial	marker	dividing	Israel	from	other	lands	and	separating	home	from	
exile,	 in	the	New	Testament	it	marks	the	divide	between	heaven	and	earth,	which	Jesus	
bridges	by	descending	into	the	Jordan	and	emerging	reborn	to	receive	the	Holy	Spirit	as	
the heavens open up. 
The	coming	of	the	Messiah	had	been	announced	by	John,	who	received	the	word	of	
God	in	the	wilderness	and	went	to	“all	the	country	about	Jordan,	preaching	the	baptism	
of	repentance	for	the	remission	of	sins”	 in	preparation	of	 the	coming	reign	of	 the	Lord	
6 	All	quotes	from	the	Old	and	New	Testaments	of	the	Bible	are	taken	from	the	King	James	Version,	
unless	otherwise	specified.	
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(Luke	3:2ff).	As	people	flock	to	the	Jordan	River	to	confess	their	sins	and	be	baptized	by	
John,	he	tells	them	that	“[t]here	cometh	one	mightier	than	I	after	me,	the	latchet	of	whose	
shoes I am not worth to stoop down and unloose. I indeed baptized you with water: but 
he	shall	baptize	you	with	the	Holy	Ghost”	(Mark	1:7-8).	Then	Jesus	comes	from	Nazareth	
to be baptized. 
And	Jesus,	when	he	was	baptized,	went	up	straightaway	out	of	the	water;	and	lo,	
the heavens were opened unto him, and he saw the Spirit of God descending 
like	a	dove,	and	lighting	upon	him:	And	lo	a	voice	from	heaven,	saying,	This	is	my	
beloved	Son,	in	whom	I	am	well	pleased	(Matthew	3:16-17).
The	baptism	of	 Jesus	marked	 the	beginning	of	his	public	ministry	 and	 continues	 to	be	
celebrated	today	in	the	Orthodox	Church	during	the	feast	of	Theophany7 in	January.	
Early	biblical	commentators	drew	a	number	of	parallels	with	key	events	described	in	
the	Old	Testament,	which	in	their	view	prefigured	Jesus’s	baptism	in	that	same	river.	Thus	
both	Israel’s	crossing	of	the	Red	Sea	out	of	Egypt	(Exodus	14:22-29)	and	the	crossing	of	
the	Jordan	River	into	the	Promised	Land	(Josh	3)	were	seen	as	a	foreshadowing	of	Jesus’s	
baptism	in	the	Jordan	River.	In	his	letter	to	the	Corinthians,	Paul	described	the	crossing	of	
the	Red	Sea	as	a	baptism	in	water	and	the	Holy	Spirit	(1	Corinthians	10:1-4).	Reference	was	
also	made	to	Psalm	114,	which	commentators	interpreted	in	the	context	of	baptism:	“The	
sea	looked	and	fled,	Jordan	turned	back.”	This	was	seen	as	a	foretelling	of	John’s	command	
to	stop	the	Jordan	River	when	Jesus	was	baptized	(Jensen	2011),	a	miracle	that	was	later	
reported as recurring by the Piacenza Pilgrim in the 6th century and that is still celebrated 
today	in	Orthodox	communities	during	the	Great	Blessing	of	the	Waters	on	the	Feast	of	
Theophany.	Another	event	that	was	seen	as	prefiguring	the	baptism	of	Jesus	was	Elijah’s	
parting of the waters, his subsequent ascent to heaven and his son Elisha’s parting of the 
river	(2	Kings	2:9-14).	
In	 this	 context,	 Havrelock	 (2011)	 describes	 the	 Jordan	 River	 as	 a	 site	 of	 prophetic	
succession	(Moses-Joshua;	Elijah-Elisha;	John-Jesus)	that	marks	the	transition	from	old	to	
new	eras.	“Moses	and	Elijah	both	appoint	their	successors	on	the	east	side	of	the	Jordan	
River, and the successors carry the spirit of their teachers into the new era by crossing the 
Jordan	from	east	to	west”	(Ibid.:	136).	The	story	of	Jesus’s	baptism	draws	on	these	scenes,	
using	certain	narrative	aspects	but	also	consciously	reversing	elements.	Thus	Joshua	and	
7 	 “This	 feast	 is	 also	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 Epiphany	 by	 English-speaking	Orthodox	 Christians,	
but that name more properly refers to the Western Christian feast falling on that same day and 
commemorating	the	visit	of	the	Magi	to	the	child	Jesus.	The	term	epiphany does appear in some of the 
service	texts	for	this	feast,	however.”	(Orthodoxwiki	2013)
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Elisha	fulfil	the	mandates	of	their	predecessors,	but	remain	spiritually	subordinate	to	them.	
Conversely,	John	the	Baptist,	the	last	of	the	prophets,	is	positioned	as	subordinate	to	Jesus.	
He	is	the	forerunner	who,	very	soon	after	he	has	baptized	Jesus,	is	arrested,	beheaded	and	
thus	effectively	removed	from	the	narrative	so	that	the	focus	is	placed	on	Jesus.	Also	unlike	
his	predecessors,	Jesus	does	not	cross	the	Jordan	from	east	to	west	into	a	new	era,	but	
instead	immerses	himself	in	the	water	“thereby	tilting	the	temporal	axis	of	the	biblical	plot	
from	horizontal	to	vertical”	(Ibid.:	140).
The	biblical	story	of	Naaman,	the	Syrian	general	afflicted	with	leprosy,	is	also	evoked	
as	a	foretelling	of	Jesus’s	baptism	and	a	sign	of	the	Jordan	River’s	holiness.	Having	travelled	
to	 the	Promised	Land	upon	his	maid’s	advice,	Naaman	was	cured	of	his	affliction	after	
the	Prophet	Elijah	told	him:	“Go	and	wash	in	Jordan	seven	times	and	thy	flesh	shall	come	
again	to	thee,	and	thou	shalt	be	clean”	(2	Kings	5:11).	After	some	initial	resistance	to	the	
idea	of	washing	in	the	Jordan	(for	why,	Naaman	asks,	are	the	waters	of	Abana	and	Pharpar,	
the	rivers	of	Damascus,	not	better	 than	all	 the	waters	of	 Israel?),	he	does	as	Elijah	tells	
him	and	after	dipping	seven	times	in	the	Jordan	“his	flesh	came	again	like	unto	the	flesh	
of	a	little	child	and	he	was	clean”	(2	Kings	5:	14).	This	was	seen	as	a	clear	allusion	to	the	
baptism	of	Jesus.	In	a	4th-century	sermon	to	mark	the	feast	of	Epiphany,	Bishop	Gregory	
of	Nyssa	said	that	the	cleansing	of	the	sick	man	in	the	Jordan	was	clearly	an	indication	of	
what	should	come	“both	by	the	use	of	water	generally,	and	by	the	dipping	in	the	river	in	
particular.	For	Jordan	alone	of	rivers,	receiving	in	itself	the	first-fruits	of	sanctification	and	
benediction	conveyed	in	its	channel	to	the	whole	world,	as	by	itself,	the	grace	of	Baptism”	
(Gregory	of	Nyssa	in	Jensen	2011:	119).	The	healing	of	Naaman’s	flesh	to	that	of	a	“little	
child”	strengthened	the	 idea	that	those	baptized	 in	the	Trinitarian	faith	were	reborn,	as	
Paul	wrote:	“For	ye	are	all	the	children	of	God	by	faith	in	Christ	Jesus”	(Gal	3:26).	Equally,	
those	seeking	to	be	baptized	are	to	accept	the	kingdom	of	God	with	child-like	innocence	
as	Jesus	tells	his	followers:	“whosoever	shall	not	receive	the	kingdom	of	God	as	a	little	child,	
he	shall	not	enter	therein”	(Mark	10:15	in	Havrelock:	186).
Early baptismal practice
Eliade	 (2005)	has	written	extensively	about	 the	role	of	water	 in	religion	as	 fons et origo, 
the source and origin of all existence, universally worshipped for its life-giving, healing and 
cleansing properties. Across cultures and cults, water is central to cosmogony, mythology, 
ritual	and	iconography.	Water’s	purifying	qualities	gained	literal	and	symbolic	significance	in	
ancient	Indian,	Iranian,	Greek	and	Roman	cults:	ablution	in	water	could	purify	from	crime,	
the presence of death and insanity; it abolished sin and reversed processes of physical 
or mental disintegration. Immersion in water symbolizes the regression to the pre-formal 
state, a total regeneration. By disintegrating every form and abolishing all history, water 
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possesses	this	virtue	of	purification,	regeneration	and	rebirth:	what	is	immersed	in	it	“dies”	
and	emerges	from	the	water	like	a	child,	sinless	and	without	history,	able	to	receive	a	new	
revelation	and	to	start	a	new	“clean”	life	(Ibid.:	204).
	Jewish	laws	of	purity,	which	date	back	to	the	Second	Temple	period	(530	BC-70	AD),	
required believers to immerse in mayim chayim	or	“living	waters”	–	the	water	of	rain,	rivers	
or	seas	–	to	cleanse	themselves	of	ritual	impurity	before	accessing	the	Temple	precinct.8 
After	 the	destruction	of	 the	Second	Temple	 in	70	AD,	many	of	 the	 laws	of	purity	were	
no longer applicable. However, the ritual of immersing in living waters continued to be 
practiced, evolving into an act of spiritual cleansing. The ritual immersion became a 
metaphor of the original cleansing and the water acquired an abstract and sacred value 
that	enabled	it	to	cleanse	away	ritual	impurity	and	sin	(De	Châtel	2009).	
The	baptisms	 that	 John	carried	out	 in	 the	 Jordan	River	were	 inspired	by	 the	 Jewish	
rituals	of	purification	and	the	practice	of	proselyte	baptism,	though	instead	of	cleansing	
ritual	 impurity	 this	was	 “a	 baptism	of	 repentance	 for	 the	 remission	of	 sins”	 (Mark	 1:4).	
The	Apostle	Paul	defined	the	theological	and	symbolic	significance	of	Christian	baptism,	
associating immersion in water to Christ’s death and his rebirth to a new spiritual 
life	 through	 resurrection	 (Rom.	 6:3-4).	 In	 Titus	 3:5,	 he	 describes	 baptism	 as	 “a	 bath	 of	
regeneration	and	renewal”.	The	flowing	water	brings	about	change,	symbolizing	the	death	
of the old, sinful man and the emergence of a new man from the waters of life. This is 
very	similar	to	the	spiritual	renewal	effected	 in	the	 Jewish	purification	 in	the	ritual	bath,	
the	mikvah	(see	Chap.	5).	Talmudic	texts	say	that	the	believer	emerges	from	the	mikvah	
as	pure	and	clear	as	the	first	man	and	woman	created	by	God	in	Eden	(Slonim	1995).	In	
Christianity,	baptism	is	a	pre-condition	for	entry	into	the	kingdom	of	Heaven	as	stated	in	
John	3:5:	“No	one	who	has	not	been	born	again	in	water	and	the	Holy	Spirit	can	enter	the	
kingdom	of	Heaven.”
However,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 stringent	 Jewish	 laws	 of	 purity	 and	 their	 meticulous	
specification	of	the	effectiveness	of	different	types	of	water	to	cleanse	impurity,	Christian	
prescriptions were much more lenient. Thus the early 2nd-century Didache states that cold, 
running water is preferable, but that other types may also be used: 
Concerning	baptism,	baptise	thus:	[…]	‘baptise	in	the	Name	of	the	Father	and	of	
the Son and of the Holy Spirit,’ in running water; 2 but if thou hast no running 
water, baptise in other water, and if thou canst not in cold, then in warm. 3. But if 
thou	hast	neither,	pour	water	three	times	on	the	head	‘in	the	Name	of	Father,	Son	
and	Holy	Spirit’	(Lake:	319).
8 	Sources	of	 impurity	 include	certain	animals,	 the	woman	after	childbirth,	skin	ailments,	mildew	in	
the	house,	bodily	discharges	–	especially	menses	and	seminal	flux	–	sexual	misdeeds,	and	the	corpse	
(Neusner	1975).
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The 2nd-century	Christian	author	Tertullian	even	states	that	any	water	will	do:	“[i]t	makes	
no matter whether one is washed in the sea or in a pond, a river or a fountain, a cistern or 
a	tub:	and	there	is	no	difference	between	those	whom	John	baptized	in	Jordan	and	those	
whom	Peter	baptized	in	Tiber”	(Evans	1964:	11).	Water	is	a	symbol,	and	the	physical	act	of	
washing or immersion is a metaphor for the spiritual renewal and the cleansing of sin that 
takes	place.	“[J]ust	as	in	baptism	itself	there	is	an	act	(carnalis actus)	that	touches	the	flesh,	
that	we	are	immersed	in	water,	but	a	spiritual	effect	(spiritualis effectus),	that	we	are	set	free	
from	sins”	(Ibid.:	17).	
Historians have often assumed that early baptisms were carried out by submersion 
or	immersion	in	flowing	water.	The	word	“baptism”	comes	from	the	Greek	words	bapto or 
baptizo,	to	plunge	or	dip	into	water.	However,	Jensen	(2011)	has	found	that	archaeological	
and iconographic evidence is ambiguous as most surviving baptismal fonts are too shallow 
to	 have	 allowed	 for	 submersion.	 Many	 images	 of	 early	 baptism	 show	 the	 candidates	
standing	in	a	shallow	pool	while	water	was	poured	over	their	head	(affusion).	Nevertheless,	
most ancient documents specify baptism by immersion.9	Thus	John	Chrysostom	instructs	
priests to push the candidate’s head down in the water three times with his right hand 
(Jensen	2011),	according	to	the	Trinitarian	formula	of	baptizing	in	the	name	of	the	Father,	
the	Son	and	the	Holy	Spirit,	which	was	commonly	in	use	by	the	time	the	Gospel	of	Matthew	
was	written	(Evans	1964).	
While	other	texts	refer	to	baptism	by	affusion	or	sprinkling,	the	full	submersion	of	the	
body	more	accurately	expressed	“the	action	of	dying	to	an	old	life,	being	buried,	and	rising	
newly	born	 from	the	 font”	 (Jensen	2011:	141).	 In	 the	words	of	Pope	Leo	 I	 (ca.	447	AD):	
“For,	in	the	rite	of	baptism,	death	comes	from	the	slaying	of	sin,	and	the	triple	immersion	
imitates	the	three	days	of	burial,	and	the	rising	out	of	the	water	is	like	his	rising	from	the	
tomb”	(Ibid.).	
Early	baptisms	were	carried	out	in	flowing	water,	i.e.	in	rivers	or	streams,	or	by	water	
that	flowed	or	was	poured	from	above.	Examples	of	this	can	be	found	in	the	mosaics	in	
the	Arian	and	Neonatian	Baptisteries	in	Ravenna,	which	show	Jesus	being	baptized	by	John	
in	the	running	waters	of	the	Jordan	River	(Fig.	24).	The	preference	for	flowing	waters	can	
be	traced	to	Jewish	tradition	regarding	ritual	purity.	The	Mishnah	distinguished	six	types	of	
water supply, ranging from water in cisterns, ditches and caverns to rain water, well water, 
salty	or	hot	spring	water	and	“living	waters”	–	cold,	running	water	from	streams	or	rivers	
(Ibid.).	
Early	 Christian	 texts	 and	 iconography	 suggest	 that	 the	 baptism	 ritual	 took	 place	
outdoors,	with	converts	being	led	to	the	water	–	presumably	a	river	or	spring	where	flowing	
water	would	be	available	–	and	then	being	brought	back	to	pray	with	the	community	(Ibid.).	
9  Tertullian, Homily on Baptism; Hippolytus, Apostolic Tradition;	Zeno	of	Verona	Invitatio fontis cited in 
Jensen	(2011:	139).
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The	early	 3rd-century	 Roman	priest	Hippolytus	 also	 specified	 that	 the	 ritual	 should	be	
carried	out	first	thing	in	the	morning	“when	the	cock	crows”	in	“water	flowing	into	a	font	or	
flowing	from	above”,	another	indication	of	the	preference	for	living	water	(Cramer	1993:	9).	
The practice of outdoor baptism gradually disappeared with the construction of 
churches	and	baptisteries	 from	 the	4th century onwards, even though the iconography 
continued to depict baptisms in natural settings, with lush vegetation, birds, animals, 
fish	and	starry	skies.10 This may also be explained by the fact that nearly all iconography 
from	this	period	represents	or	alludes	to	Jesus’s	baptism	in	the	Jordan	River.	Such	images	
usually	show	the	baptizer	standing	on	a	bank	or	a	rock	surrounded	by	trees,	shrubs	or	
grass, while the candidate is shown partly immersed or standing in a running stream or 
under	a	waterfall.	The	Jordan	River	is	also	represented,	personified	as	a	third	figure	in	the	
scene	and	often	turning	his	back	in	reference	to	Psalm	114	(Jensen	2011)	(Fig.	24).
The move from outdoor to indoor baptisms also meant it was no longer possible to 
use	flowing	and	fresh	water	in	the	same	way.	While	the	use	of	living	water	is	not	mentioned	
10 	 The	 presence	 of	 fish,	 an	 early	 Christian	 symbol,	 in	 the	 iconography	 emphasized	 the	 “living”	
character	of	the	water	and	symbolized	spiritual	rebirth.	(Daniélou	1961:	56).	Thus	Tertullian	writes:	
“But	we,	being	little	fishes,	as	Jesus	Christ	is	our	great	Fish,	begin	our	life	in	the	water”	(Tertullian	1.9-
11).	This	association	predates	Christianity	and	can	also	be	found	in	Jewish	art	where	waters	containing	
fish	signify	resurrection.	(Daniélou	1961:	56).
Figure 24.	John	baptizing	Jesus	with	the	personified	Jordan	on	the	left.	Arian	Baptistery,	Ravenna,	Italy	
(late	5th-early 6th	c).	Source:	Sharon	Mollerus,	2011.
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after the 3rd	century,	its	symbolic	significance	was	preserved	by	simulating	flow	in	baptismal	
fonts with drains, which allowed the water to circulate, but also fountains, which simulated 
the	flow	of	a	spring.	Nonetheless,	the	literal	purifying	power	of	water	became	increasingly	
abstracted.	 Baptism	 scenes	 from	 this	 early	 period	 featuring	 angels	 or	 the	 personified	
Jordan	River	suggest	that	the	water	in	baptismal	fonts	was	sanctified	or	exorcised.	Texts	
confirm	that	by	the	late	3rd	century,	baptismal	water,	which	was	by	then	mainly	kept	indoors	
in	fonts,	had	to	be	sanctified.	After	a	priest	invoked	the	Holy	Spirit	over	the	water,	it	would	
be	transformed	from	ordinary	to	sacred	(Ibid.).	
Thus	the	link	 in	Christianity	between	“living”	and	holy	water	 is	complex	and	layered.	
In the non-religious realm, the term living water designates spring water as opposed to 
stagnant water. In its ritual sense it designates baptismal water. In the biblical sense it 
designates	God	as	a	source	of	life,	and	finally	in	its	Christian	sense	it	symbolizes	the	Holy	
Spirit.	 These	 different	 meanings	 are	 not	 necessarily	 linked:	 for	 example	 references	 to	
living water in a baptismal context do not necessarily entail that the ritual was carried 
out in running water, but rather that the water used in the ritual is considered to be holy 
(Daniélou	1961).
Tertullian	 says	 that	water,	 “having	 received	holiness	 from	 the	Holy,	 itself	 conceived	
the	power	to	make	holy”,	suggesting	that	all	water	 is	by	 itself	holy.	However,	 further	on	
he	specifies	that	a	blessing	 is	required	as	 “all	waters,	when	God	 is	 invoked,	acquire	the	
sacred	significance	of	conveying	sanctity:	for	at	once	the	Spirit	comes	down	from	heaven	
and	stays	upon	the	waters,	sanctifying	them	from	within	himself,	and	when	thus	sanctified	
they	absorb	the	power	of	sanctifying”.	He	warns	that	without	such	a	blessing,	water	could	
also	pose	a	danger	as	the	devil	also	uses	water	in	baptism	and	“unclean	spirits	do	settle	
upon waters […] as witness shady springs and all sorts of unfrequented streams, pools in 
bathing-places	[…]	and	those	wells	called	snatching-wells”	(Evans	1964:	13;	see	also	Chap.	
5	on	the	ambiguity	of	the	hammam).	
The Jordan river and interpretations of holy water 
As	for	the	role	of	the	Jordan	River	itself	in	defining	the	meaning	of	holy	water, early Christian 
texts	assert	that	Jesus’s	baptism	in	the	Jordan	River	made	all	water	holy	and	that	he	had	
been	“born	and	baptized,	in	order	that	by	his	passion,	he	might	purify	water”	(Ignatius	of	
Antioch	in	Jensen	2011:	135).	This	resolved	the	paradox	of	why	Jesus,	who	was	born	pure	
and	without	sin,	needed	to	be	baptized:	through	his	baptism,	he	sanctified	the	water	of	the	
Jordan,	which	in	turn	made	all	water	holy.	For	the	5th-century	writer	Maximus	of	Turin,	the	
baptism	of	Christ	was	not	a	washing	of	Christ	but	a	washing	of	the	water.	Thus	the	Jordan	
was	seen	as	the	prototypical	“river	of	life”,	but	also	the	site	of	a	divine	manifestation	of	God,	
for	just	as	water	had	been	the	primeval	element	that	witnessed	God’s	creation,	the	Jordan	
162
Part III
had	witnessed	the	beginning	of	the	Gospels	(Jensen	2011).	Hilary	of	Poitiers	had	a	similar	
reasoning,	adding	that	the	descent	of	the	Holy	Spirit	after	Jesus	emerges	from	the	water	
of	the	Jordan	River	signals	the	birth	of	the	Son,	which	marks	the	beginning	of	a	new	way	of	
existing	and	acting	(McDonnell	et	al.	1991).
The 3rd-century	Christian	 theologian	Origen	saw	 the	baptism	of	 Jesus	as	 the	model	
of	Christian	baptism	and	extolled	the	qualities	of	the	Jordan	River,	which	is	“of	sovereign	
virtue	and	very	good	to	drink.	 Just	as	no	man	 is	good	save	God	the	Father,	so	no	river	
is	good	except	the	Jordan”.	 It	 is	the	holiest	of	rivers	“capable	of	receiving	twice-over	the	
graces	of	the	Spirit	and	ready	to	welcome	the	Spirit.	The	dove	of	the	Spirit	does	not	fly	
over	any	other	river”	(Origen,	On	John	6:48,	in	McDonnell	et	al.	1991:	146).	Elsewhere,	he	
equates	the	river	to	Jesus.	“‘Jordan’	means	‘descending’.	But	the	descending	river	of	God,	
one	running	with	a	vigorous	force,	is	the	Lord	our	Savior.	Into	him	we	are	baptized	with	
true	water,	saving	water”	(Origen,	Homilies	on	Luke	21:3-4	in	Havrelock	2011:	190).
EarLy PILgrIMagE To THE JorDan rIVEr (300-1500 aD)
With	the	rise	to	power	of	the	Byzantine	Emperor	Constantine	in	the	4th	century	AD,	the	Holy	
Land	started	attracting	a	growing	number	of	pilgrims.	Their	first	destination	was	Jerusalem,	
which	both	Jews	and	Christians	considered	to	be	centre	of	the	Land	of	Judah	and	of	the	
world. Thousands of pilgrims visited the holy sites before the Crusades, but few wrote 
about	their	experiences.	The	first	written	account	of	a	pilgrimage	to	Jerusalem	was	left	by	a	
Christian	who	travelled	from	Bordeaux	in	333,	the	so-called	Bordeaux	Pilgrim.	Other	early	
sources	on	pilgrimage	to	the	Holy	Land	include	Egeria,	a	woman	who	spent	three	years	in	
the	Holy	Land	in	the	4th	century;	St.	Jerome,	who	accompanied	the	Roman	noblewoman	
Paula	 on	 a	 pilgrimage	 in	 385	 AD;	 the	 6th-century Piacenza Pilgrim; and Adomnan, who 
reported	on	 the	Gallic	 Bishop	Arculf’s	 travels	 through	 the	Holy	 Land	 in	 the	7th century 
(Wilkinson	1977).	
Many	 of	 these	writers	 also	 visited	 the	 Jordan	River	 and	went	 to	 pray	 and	perform	
baptism	at	the	site	where	John	baptized	Jesus	at	Bethany	Beyond	the	Jordan.	Especially	
during	the	feast	of	Epiphany,	this	site	attracted	large	congregations.	Depending	whether	
pilgrims	went	on	foot,	by	donkey	or	by	camel,	the	journey	from	Jerusalem	to	the	baptism	
site	on	the	Jordan	River	took	one	to	two	days	along	a	road	that	ran	east	from	Jerusalem	
to	Jericho	and	across	the	Jordan	River	to	Heshbon	near	the	biblical	Mount	Nebo,	where	
Moses	died.	
The	 baptism	 site	 itself	 was	 described	 in	 some	 detail	 in	 different	 sources.	 The	 6th-
century geographer Theodosius relates that a marble column topped by an iron cross 
had	been	erected	at	the	place	where	Jesus	was	thought	to	have	been	baptized.	He	also	
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describes	the	Church	of	St	John	the	Baptist,	built	by	the	Emperor	Anastasius,	which	“stands	
on	great	vaults	which	are	high	enough	for	the	times	when	the	Jordan	is	in	flood”	(Ibid.:		69).
Perhaps the most vivid description of early pilgrimage to the baptism site comes from 
the 6th-century	Piacenza	Pilgrim	who	celebrated	Epiphany	there	and	reported	that	“special	
miracles”	took	place	on	Epiphany	at	the	place	where	Jesus	was	baptized.	
There	 is	an	obelisk	 there	surrounded	by	a	screen,	and	 in	 the	water,	where	the	
river	 turned	back	 in	 its	bed,	 stands	a	wooden	cross.	On	both	banks	 there	are	
marble steps leading down to the water. The eve of Epiphany is a solemn vigil with 
an	enormous	congregation.	They	begin	matins	at	the	fourth	or	fifth	cock-crow	and	
at dawn, when matins is over, the ministers come outside, and accompanied by 
deacons, the priest goes down into the river. The moment he starts blessing the 
water	the	Jordan	turns	back	on	itself	with	a	roar	and	the	water	stays	still	till	the	
baptism	is	finished	(Ibid.:	82).
The Piacenza Pilgrim also describes how ship owners from Alexandria sent men to the 
site	on	that	day	to	draw	holy	water	that	was	sprinkled	on	their	ships	before	they	set	out	to	
sea.	The	sick	and	disabled	also	came	to	the	Jordan	for	healing,	as	Jacinthus	the	Presbyter	
relates in the late 11th	century:	“On	the	feast	of	the	Epiphany	cripples	and	sick	people	come	
and, using the rope to steady themselves, go down to dip themselves in the water: women 
who	are	barren	also	come	here”	(Ibid.:	72).	Pilgrims	collected	mementos	of	their	visit	to	
the	Holy	Land,	such	as	souvenir	ampullae	and	medals	depicting	scenes	of	the	life	of	Jesus	
and his baptism. Examples of such souvenirs from the 6th	century	show	John	baptizing	a	
nude	Jesus,	while	one	or	two	angels	look	on	and	a	dove	descends	from	heaven.	For	those	
who	were	too	sick	to	make	the	journey	to	the	Jordan	River,	water	could	also	be	drawn	from	
the river and brought to them. Thus the late 12th-century Russian Princess Euphrosine of 
Polatsk,	who	had	come	to	Jerusalem	to	die,	was	unable	to	travel	to	the	Jordan	River,	but	
an	acquaintance	brought	her	holy	water	from	the	river	in	a	bottle	“which	she	received	with	
joy	and	gratitude,	drinking	it	and	spreading	it	over	her	body	to	wash	away	the	sins	of	the	
past”	(Sumption	1975:	129).	
However,	more	generally,	baptism	in	the	Jordan	River	was	seen	as	a	spiritual	cleansing	
that	washed	away	sins.	One	of	the	most	popular	legends	of	the	Middle	Ages	was	the	story	
of the 5th-century	Mary,	a	prostitute	 from	Alexandria	who	undertook	the	 journey	to	the	
Holy	Land	not	as	a	pilgrimage	but	in	search	of	more	partners	to	satisfy	her	wild	lust.	She	
continued	prostituting	herself	when	she	arrived	 in	 Jerusalem,	but	also	went	 to	visit	 the	
Church	of	the	Holy	Sepulchre	on	the	feast	of	the	Invention	of	the	Cross.	As	she	joined	the	
crowds entering the church, she was mysteriously prevented from crossing the threshold. 
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Realizing	 that	 this	was	because	of	her	 impurity,	 she	 repented	and	prayed	 to	 the	Virgin	
Mary.	After	venerating	the	relic	of	the	True	Cross	and	praying	to	an	icon	of	the	Virgin	Mary,	
she	heard	a	voice	telling	her	that	if	she	crossed	the	Jordan	she	would	find	“glorious	rest”.	
She	subsequently	walked	from	Jerusalem	to	the	monastery	of	St	John	the	Baptist	on	the	
Jordan	River,	where	she	prayed	and	received	Holy	Communion.	She	washed	her	face	and	
her	hands	in	the	Jordan	and	drank	its	water.	The	following	day	she	sailed	across,	taking	
with her only two and a half loaves of bread, and lived as a hermit in the wilderness east of 
Jordan	for	48	years.	She	told	her	story	to	the	priest-monk	Zosimus	who	encountered	her	in	
the	desert	beyond	the	Jordan	when	he	was	on	a	retreat.	The	story	of	St	Mary	the	Egyptian	
was hugely popular during the 11th and 12th centuries, seen as proof that by reliving the 
baptism	of	Christ,	St	Mary	had	erased	the	sins	of	her	past	and	been	reborn.	Her	story	
was repeated as part of sermons, poems and in sculptures. After the Christian conquest 
of	Jerusalem,	the	door	through	which	she	had	been	unable	to	enter	and	the	place	of	her	
baptism	were	marked	so	pilgrims	could	pray	there	(Ibid.).	
By	 the	 later	Middle	Ages,	 the	 Jordan	was	 venerated	almost	exclusively	 as	a	 relic.	A	
late-13th-century	guidebook	gave	just	one	reason	for	immersion	in	the	river:	“these	are	the	
waters	which	came	into	contact	with	the	body	of	Christ,	our	Redeemer”	(Ibid.:	130).	Writing	
in	1483,	Felix	Faber	described	how	several	knights	of	his	party	had	jumped	into	the	Jordan	
fully clothed, convinced that their clothes would become impenetrable to enemy weapons. 
Others	dipped	bells	in	the	river	and	believed	that	these	would	be	able	to	stave	off	lightning	
or	thunder	if	they	were	rung.	Pilgrims	also	took	bottles	of	holy	water	and	burial	shrouds	
dipped	in	the	river	home	with	them	and	cut	branches	off	the	reeds	on	the	riverbanks.
Thus	the	Jordan	River	has	since	biblical	times	been	more	than	just	a	river.	Imbued	with	
powerful symbolic meanings, it is also a boundary and a crossing point, a site of prophetic 
succession, a metaphor for spiritual rebirth and salvation, and a source of holy water. It 
has for centuries existed on multiple levels: on the one hand a rushing river that winds its 
way	down	through	the	Jordan	Valley	to	the	Dead	Sea;	on	the	other	an	abstract	idea	and	
site	of	religious	ritual	with	strong	symbolic	connotations	in	Christianity	and	Judaism.	The	
powerful imagery that developed around the abstracted river rapidly overshadowed the 
river per se, creating a discrepancy between the mythical holy river and the reality of an 
increasingly	modest	muddy	stream.	As	the	American	Reverend	 J.	L.	Leeper	wrote	when	
he	visited	Palestine	in	1900:	“Least	beautiful	and	least	useful	perhaps	of	all	rivers,	there	is	
none	the	world	will	go	so	far	to	see”	(Leeper	1900:	326).	
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THE JorDan rIVEr In THE 21ST CEnTury 
The	 Jordan	 River	 has	 undergone	 far-reaching	 changes	 over	 the	 last	 century.	 It	 is	 no	
longer simply a river and a pilgrimage site, but also a geopolitical border, a contested 
transboundary watercourse, a threatened ecosystem and a tightly regulated water 
resource	system.	The	strength	of	these	different	geopolitical,	hydrological,	environmental	
and	religious	narratives	is	sharply	crystallized	on	the	Lower	Jordan	River	where	holiness,	
pollution, hydropolitics and national boundaries collide. 
The 20th-century	 transformation	 of	 the	 Jordan	River	 has	 been	 extensively	 analysed	
from the perspective of international relations, international law, politics, geography, 
history,	hydrology,	ecology	and	social	studies.	It	has	been	placed	in	conceptual	frameworks	
and	used	as	a	textbook	example	of	the disputed transboundary watercourse in a water-
scarce	 region	par	excellence,	caught	 in	 the	middle	of	a	protracted	political	conflict	and	
subject	to	multilateral	power	struggles.	
This extensive body of research and analysis has only further fragmented and 
abstracted	perceptions	of	the	river.	Thus	the	river	that	flows	from	the	foothills	of	Mount	
Hermon	 to	 the	Dead	Sea	 is	now	commonly	described	and	analysed	as	a	 composite	of	
separate	units:	the	Upper	Jordan	River,	Lake	Tiberias/Lake	Kinneret,	the	Yarmouk	River	and	
the	Lower	Jordan	River.	The	drastic	infrastructural	interventions	along	the	river,	which	have	
fundamentally	altered	flow	regimes,	water	quality	and	local	ecosystems,	are	schematically	
represented	in	conceptual	flow	diagrams.	
Historically	 described	 as	 “the	most	 crooked	 river	 in	 the	world”	 (Leeper	 1900:	 424),	
“sometimes	dashing	along	in	rapids	by	the	base	of	a	mountain,	sometimes	flowing	between	
low	banks”	(Lynch	1853:	217),	the	river	is	now	a	system	that	has	been	transformed	into	
a	series	of	 contiguous	and	artificially	 controlled	water	bodies.	Even	 the	water	 itself	has	
been	dissected,	quantified	and	qualified:	separating	 the	saline	 from	the	 fresh,	diverting	
drinking	 water	 away	 from	 the	 valley	 and	 pumping	 raw	 sewage	 back	 into	 the	 river,	
abstracting irrigation water from side wadis, tributaries and dam reservoirs and releasing 
contaminated	return	flows	back	into	the	river.	
Yet despite the extensive infrastructural developments which have led to a dramatic 
drop in water levels and deterioration in water quality, public awareness of the slow 
demise	of	the	Lower	Jordan	remains	low.	The	main	reason	for	this	is	that	the	river	itself	has	
been largely inaccessible and thus invisible since 1967. As the geopolitical border between 
Jordan	to	the	east	and	Israel	and	the	Palestinian	West	Bank	to	the	west,	the	Lower	Jordan	
River	remains	a	largely	closed	–	and	in	many	places	mined	–	military	zone	that	can	only	
be	reached	at	a	few	points	along	its	course.	The	only	place	where	Jordanians	can	visit	the	
river	is	at	the	Al	Maghtas/Baptism	Site	just	north	of	the	Dead	Sea,	a	site	which	has	only	
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been	accessible	 since	 Jordan	 signed	 the	Peace	Treaty	with	 Israel	 in	 1994.	 Israelis	 have	
no	access	south	of	the	Yarmouk	River,	while	Palestinians	can	only	access	the	river	at	the	
Israeli-controlled	baptism	site	 in	 the	West	Bank,	Qasr	 al	 Yehud	 (FoEME	2012).	 The	 fact	
that the physical river has been largely out of sight since 1967 further strengthens its 
conceptual representations and increases the disconnect between the two. 
Baptism in the 21st century 
This same disconnect exists in the religious realm in the sense that the reality of a   diminished, 
polluted	river	does	not	appear	to	affect	the	spiritual	value	of	the	water.	The	three	baptism	
sites	–	Al	Maghtas/The	Baptism	Site	 in	 Jordan,	Qasr	al	Yehud	 in	the	West	Bank	and	the	
Yardenit	Baptismal	Site	in	Israel	–	present	themselves	as	religious	sites	focused	on	biblical	
history and archaeological remains, and gloss over the multiple other narratives that are 
played	out	along	the	river.	Yet	the	region’s	recent	history	flows	just	beneath	the	surface,	
cluttering	the	mythical	narrative	of	the	Jordan	River	as	a	source	of	spiritual	cleansing	and	
renewal	with	the	starkly	utilitarian	and	political	narratives	of	modernity	that	materialize	in	
the	form	of	dams,	sewage	flows,	landmines	and	security	checkpoints.	
Figure 25.	Al	Maghtas/The	Baptism	Site	in	Jordan	(left)	is	just	a	few	metres	removed	from	the	baptism	
site	at	Qasr	al	Yehud	in	the	West	Bank	(right),	with	the	diminished	Jordan	River	flowing	between	the	
two, 2013. Source: Francesca de Châtel. 
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Just	 north	 of	 the	Dead	 Sea,	 the	 Al	Maghtas/Baptism	Site	 in	 Jordan	 and	 the	 Israeli-
operated	Qasr	al	Yehud	site	in	the	West	Bank	lie	just	a	few	metres	apart	on	the	two	banks	
of	the	river	with	an	invisible	border	running	between	them	(Fig.	25).	Both	sites	argue	that	
theirs	 is	 the	 “authentic”	 site	 of	 Jesus’s	 baptism,	 presenting	 biblical,	 archaeological	 and	
historical evidence to corroborate their claim. 
As	one	of	 the	earliest	Christian	pilgrimage	 sites,	 the	 Jordanian	Al	Maghtas/Baptism	
Site	was	 largely	abandoned	after	WWI	due	to	tensions	and	conflict	and	became	part	of	
an	inaccessible	military	zone	after	the	1967	Six-Day	War.	After	Israel	and	Jordan	signed	a	
peace	treaty	in	1994,	the	area	was	demined	and	“rediscovered”.	Extensive	archaeological	
work	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 patronage	 of	 the	 Jordanian	 Prince	 Ghazi	 bin	 Mohammed	
uncovered a series of churches, monasteries and other sites, including the cave where 
John	 the	Baptist	 retreated	 in	 the	 desert	 and	 the	 church	 described	by	 Theodosius	 and	
the Piacenza Pilgrim in the 6th	century	(Fig.	26).	Together	with	further	textual	references,	
these	 archaeological	 finds	 have	 led	 the	 Jordanian	 authorities	 to	 declare	 the	 site	 to	 be	
Bethany	Beyond	the	 Jordan,	 the	place	mentioned	 in	 John	1:28	as	the	place	where	 John	
the	Baptist	conducted	his	baptisms	in	the	Jordan	River,	but	also	the	site	of	a	church	built	
by	the	Empress	Helena,	and	the	place	from	where	the	Prophet	Elijah	ascended	to	heaven.	
Figure 26. The	remnants	of	a	Byzantine	church	built	on	the	Jordan	River,	on	the	site	where	Jesus	is	
said	to	have	been	baptized,	Al	Maghtas/The	Baptism	Site,	Jordan,	2013.	Source:	Francesca	de	Châtel.	
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The	Jordanian	claim	has	been	further	strengthened	by	a	series	of	“letters	of	authentication”	
from world religious leaders, and visits by two popes and numerous monarchs, heads of 
state	and	other	dignitaries	(Havrelock	2011;	282,	n.	10,	www.baptismsite.com).	Moreover,	
the	 Jordanian	 government’s	move	 to	 donate	 national	 land	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 12	
churches	of	different	denominations11 on the site adds a layer of modern mythology to the 
layers of biblical and archaeological mythology. The fact that a range of denominations have 
“endorsed”	Al	Maghtas	through	the	construction	of	places	of	worship	reinforces	the	site’s	
claims to authenticity and its image as a space for spiritual and religious contemplation 
and dialogue where communities can gather to pray, baptize and meditate. In the words 
of	the	site’s	director	Dia	al-Madani,	the	Al	Maghtas/Baptism	Site	is	“the	fruit	of	peace	on	the	
land”	and	an	opportunity	to	“rewrite	the	future”.	
Just	 as	 its	 transboundary	neighbour,	 the	Qasr	 al	 Yehud	 site	 in	 the	 Israeli-occupied	
West	Bank	uses	archaeological	remains	and	historic	accounts	to	prove	it	is	the	authentic	
site	of	Jesus’s	baptism.	It	refers	to	the	6th-century	Madaba	Map,	which	places	“Bethabara”	
(Bethany	Beyond	the	Jordan)	and	the	church	of	John	the	Baptist	west	of	the	Jordan	River	
(Fig.	27).	
11 	The	site	has	Greek	Orthodox,	Syrian	Orthodox,	Armenian	Orthodox,	Maronite,	Coptic,	Anglican	(yet	
to	be	built),	Catholic	(accommodated	in	the	largest	church	complex	in	the	Middle	East	and	currently	
under	construction)	churches	as	well	as	a	Russian	Orthodox	church	and	pilgrims’	house,	an	interfaith	
conference centre and a mosque.
Figure 27.	 Fragment	 of	 the	Madaba	Map,	 showing	 the	 Lower	 Jordan	 River	 and	 the	 Baptism	 Site	
“Bethabara”	to	the	west	of	the	Jordan	River.	Source:	Soon	Kim,	2013.	
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Palestinians consider this to be the Palestinian baptism site, and the late President Yasser 
Arafat	had	outlined	plans	in	the	1990s	to	restore	it	in	time	for	the	visit	of	Pope	John	Paul	
II	 in	2000.	However,	 Israeli	restrictions,	 lack	of	funding	and	corruption	meant	this	never	
materialized.	While	the	site	at	Qasr	al	Yehud	could	in	the	future	become	a	Palestinian	site	
as	part	of	a	peace	settlement,	for	the	time	being	it	remains	firmly	under	Israeli	control,	as	
it	has	been	since	1967	(Havrelock	2011).
As	the	Al	Maghtas/Baptism	Site	in	Jordan,	the	area	around	Qasr	al	Yehud	was	affected	
by	the	regional	conflict	and	became	an	inaccessible	military	zone	after	1967,	cordoned	off	
by	a	security	fence	and	surrounded	by	minefields.	After	1980,	limited	access	was	granted	
to	local	church	communities	who	came	to	celebrate	Epiphany	and	Easter.	During	the	rest	
of	the	year,	pilgrims	could	only	visit	the	site	by	appointment	with	a	military	escort	(Ginat	
2010).	
South	of	the	site,	an	area	of	about	10	km2	known	as	the	Land	of	Monasteries	remains	
off-limits	and	is	still	mined.	The	chapels,	monasteries	and	hermits’	cells,	some	dating	back	
to	the	Byzantine	era,	were	used	by	pilgrims,	monks	and	religious	communities	until	1967,	
when	Israel	took	control	of	the	West	Bank	and	closed	the	area	off	behind	a	security	fence	
to	prevent	Palestinian	refugees	from	crossing	the	Jordan	River	back	into	the	West	Bank.	
Soil	erosion	has	shifted	the	mines	that	were	placed	in	the	area	in	the	1970s,	making	their	
removal	risky.	Furthermore,	the	historic	buildings,	which	were	damaged	by	an	earthquake	
in	1965,	are	threatened	with	collapse	as	they	have	been	neglected	since	then	(Ginat	2010;	
Gal	2011).
After	the	papal	visit	 in	2000,	when	Pope	John	Paul	II	visited	the	Al	Maghtas/Baptism	
Site	in	Jordan	and	came	over	to	Qasr	al	Yehud	by	helicopter	for	15	minutes	–	a	visit	from	
which	then-Israeli	Prime	Minster	Ehud	Barak	excluded	Yasser	Arafat	–	 Israel	decided	to	
refurbish	 the	site.	 The	project	was	 jointly	 implemented	by	 the	 Israeli	Nature	and	Parks	
Authority	and	the	Civil	Administration,	the	Israeli	body	that	governs	the	West	Bank.	The	
site	was	 reopened	 to	 the	public	 in	2011.	Funding	 for	 the	project	came	 from	the	 Israeli	
Ministry	of	Tourism	and	the	Ministry	for	Regional	Cooperation,	a	controversial	move,	as	
part	of	the	US$	2	million	budget	was	effectively	drawn	from	funds	reserved	for	West	Bank	
development,	 “meaning	 that	money	 for	 Palestinian	 infrastructure	 has	been	diverted	 to	
the	development	of	an	 Israeli	 tourist	site”	 (Havrelock	2011).	Thus	 in	addition	to	being	a	
biblical	site,	Qasr	al	Yehud	also	makes	a	number	of	political	statements,	as	 it	competes	
for	 authenticity	 with	 its	 Jordanian	 neighbour,	 but	 also	 reiterates	 and	 reinforces	 Israeli	
presence	in	the	West	Bank.	
The river that runs between the two sites has also become a more complex and layered 
space since the 1950s. Its image as a holy river has been overshadowed by narratives of 
infrastructural development, which framed the river as a utilitarian water resource system 
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that was to be harnessed to meet the demands of a growing population in the region. In 
this view the river was a commodity, an economic asset and a development opportunity 
that was to be mechanized, controlled and appropriated. 
It also became a transboundary resource after the creation of the state of Israel 
in	1948,	 and	was	 soon	drawn	 into	 the	 regional	 conflict	 as	 a	 contested	 resource.	 Israel	
forcefully imposed the construction and operation of its National Water Carrier, prevented 
Jordanian,	 Lebanese	 and	 Syrian	 attempts	 to	 develop	 the	 river,	 and	 entirely	 barred	
Palestinians	 from	accessing	 it.	Meanwhile	 Syria,	which	 lost	 access	 to	 the	Upper	 Jordan	
River	and	Lake	Tiberias	with	Israel’s	occupation	of	the	Golan	Heights	 in	1967,	turned	to	
the	development	of	the	Yarmouk	River	and	its	tributaries,	where	it	built	38	dams	in	the	
following	decades	(UN-ESCWA	and	BGR	2013).	Jordan	also	started	diverting	water	from	the	
Yarmouk	and	Zarqa	Rivers	into	the	King	Abdullah	Canal.	Unsurprisingly,	the	first	victim	of	
these	unilateral	development	strategies	was	the	Lower	Jordan	River	itself.	
As	described	above,	 the	Lower	 Jordan	River	has	been	reduced	to	around	2%	of	 its	
historic	flow.	In	addition,	water	quality	in	this	part	of	the	river	south	of	the	Alumot	Dam	has	
been severely impaired. This is where Israel releases partially treated sewage and saline 
flows	diverted	from	the	shores	of	Lake	Tiberias	through	the	Saline	Water	Carrier.	Further	
downstream	 all	 communities	 along	 the	 Lower	 Jordan	 River	 release	 agricultural	 run-off,	
water	from	fishponds	and	poorly	treated	sewage.	Salinity	levels	also	continue	to	increase	
along the river course, reaching more than 20 times over the international guideline 
for	salt-sensitive	crops	and	making	the	river	unsuitable	for	use	in	any	sector	(Ibid.).	The	
overdevelopment	and	degradation	of	the	Jordan	River	has	also	affected	ecosystems	and	
caused	a	50%	reduction	in	biodiversity	(FoEME	2010),	shattering	metaphors	of	the	Jordan	
as	a	source	of	“living	water”	(Fig.	28).
Friends	 of	 the	 Earth	 Middle	 East	 (FoEME)	 has	 drawn	 attention	 to	 the	 severe	
degradation	of	the	Lower	Jordan	River	through	several	detailed	studies	and	a	wide-reaching	
international	campaign	to	rehabilitate	it.	It	also	warned	in	2010	that	“[o]rganic	pollution	is	
present in extremely high concentrations in the northern river segments and in levels that 
pose	seasonal	risks	to	public	health	in	the	southern	segments	–	including	at	the	southern	
baptism	sites”	(FoEME	2010:	16).	This	led	to	a	flurry	of	media	coverage	over	whether	the	
river	was	safe	for	immersion	at	the	baptism	site	in	the	West	Bank	(O’Sullivan	2010;	Oster	
2010;	Sherwood	2010).	The	Israeli	authorities	subsequently	issued	statements	declaring	
that the water was regularly monitored and safe for immersion. But as neither the Israelis 
nor	 the	 Jordanians	make	 comprehensive	 long-term	data	publicly	 available,	 it	 is	 easy	 to	
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speculate about the degree of pollution and whether it poses a public health threat.12 
The Yardenit Baptismal Site in Israel is far removed from such unsettling reports 
of	polluted	holy	water	and	 the	history	of	 conflict	and	shifting	borderlines.	Situated	 just	
south	of	Lake	Tiberias	before	the	Alumot	Dam,	Yardenit	gives	a	bucolic	impression	of	the	
Jordan	River	 as	a	 free-flowing,	 tree-lined	 river,	which	at	 first	 glance	 recalls	Commander	
Lynch’s	poetic	19th-century	descriptions	as	“fringed	with	perpetual	verdure;	winding	in	a	
thousand	graceful	mazes”	 (Lynch	1853:	233).	 According	 to	 the	Yardenit	website,	 this	 is	
one	of	the	only	places	along	the	Jordan	River	where	the	river	still	flows	naturally.	However,	
from	a	hydraulic	point	of	 view,	 the	 river	here	 is	 an	 artificial	 reservoir,	 regulated	by	 the	
upstream	Degania	Dam	that	controls	inflow	from	Lake	Tiberias,	and	the	Alumot	Dam,	1.5	
km	downstream.	The	water	at	Yardenit	is	essentially	the	same	as	that	in	Lake	Tiberias	and	
12 	At	the	Al	Maghtas/the	Baptism	Site	in	Jordan	a	monitoring	station	set	up	by	Mutah	University	in	
cooperation with the Baptism Commission continuously measures water quantity and quality on the 
basis	of	seven	parameters.	The	Jordan	Valley	Authority	also	carries	out	quarterly	tests.	In	Israel,	the	
Ministry	of	Health	analyses	water	samples	from	the	Qasr	al-Yehud	site	on	a	weekly	basis.	None	of	
this	data	 is	publicly	available	however.	Partial	data	 from	the	 Jordanian	Ministry	of	 Irrigation	for	the	
period	2006-2012	suggests	the	water	at	the	baptism	site	in	Jordan	meets	World	Health	Organization	
standards	for	bathing	(MWI	2013).
Figure 28. The	Lower	Jordan	River	below	the	Alumot	Dam	is	made	up	largely	of	saline	flows,	untreated	
sewage and other wastewater, Israel, 2013. Francesca de Châtel.
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therefore	close	to	drinking	water	quality	–	though	this	is	of	course	also	not	“natural”,	as	
Israel	has	transformed	Lake	Tiberias	from	a	brackish	into	a	freshwater	lake.	
In	 this	 ‘pristine’	setting,	 the	site	presents	a	bright	and	uncomplicated	narrative	 that	
merges spirituality, tourism and consumerism into a seamless modern-day religious-retail 
experience.	 In	 the	vast	 landscaped	parking	 lot,	 tourists	–	often	on	a	day	 tour	of	Sea	of	
Galilee	biblical	sites	as	part	of	a	Mediterranean	cruise	–	walk	past	the	“Wall	of	New	Life”,	
a	 multilingual	 mural	 “dedicated	 to	 ‘Christians	 throughout	 the	 world,	 who	 at	 this	 place	
have	followed	their	Savior	through	the	waters	of	baptism’.”	The	visitors’	centre,	designed	
in the shape of a church’s nave, includes a large gift shop selling everything from bibles 
and	olivewood	crucifixes	to	holy	water	(125	ml,	US$	6)	and	“I	Was	Baptized	in	the	Jordan	
River”	T-shirts,	but	also	Jewish	and	Israeli	souvenirs.	Across	from	the	gift	shop,	the	Manna	
Restaurant	 serves	 “biblical	 food”,	 including	 St.	 Peter’s	 Fish	 and	 dates	 produced	 at	 the	
nearby	Kibbutz	Kinneret.	Outside	near	the	baptismal	pools,	visitors	can	pick	up	a	video	
recording	of	their	own	baptism	ceremony	and	buy	empty	plastic	bottles	and	jerry	cans	to	
fill	up	with	water	from	the	Jordan	River.	Access	to	the	site	is	free	but	pilgrims	who	wish	to	
baptize	are	required	to	buy	or	rent	a	baptismal	kit,	which	includes	a	baptismal	gown	and	a	
baptism	or	re-dedication	certificate	to	take	home	with	them.	
Figure 29. The Yardenit Baptismal Site, Israel, 2013. Source: Francesca de Châtel. 
As	Yardenit	is	more	than	100	kilometres	from	the	two	southern	sites,	there	is	less	need	
to	legitimize	it	as	the	authentic	site	of	Jesus’s	baptism	–	tourists	who	visit	as	part	of	a	day	
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tour may not even be aware that there are any other sites. Yet, by omitting any biblical 
references	 to	 Bethany	 Beyond	 the	 Jordan	 and	 emphasizing	 the	 “scenic	 landscapes	
[described	in	the	Bible…]	that	have	been	preserved	to	this	day”,	the	site’s	tourist	brochure	
implicitly suggests that this is the authentic site of baptism, or at least the place where it 
can	be	relived	most	authentically	(Fig.	29).	
Billed	as	 “the	perfect	combination	of	 [sic]	 the	Christian	heritage,	 the	exciting	sights	
of	the	Holy	Land	and	the	history	of	civilization”,	the	Yardenit	Site	–	like	the	two	southern	
sites	–	also	weaves	 in	subtle	political	narratives,	firmly	rooting	the	story	of	baptism	into	
ancient	–	and,	implicitly,	more	recent	–	Jewish	history	in	the	Holy	Land.	The	site’s	location	
on	the	grounds	of	Kibbutz	Kinneret,	the	second	kibbutz	founded	in	Mandate	Palestine,	ties	
the	biblical	event	of	the	baptism	of	Jesus	into	Zionist	narratives	that	“framed	the	kibbutz	
founders	as	intrepid	pioneers	who,	 like	the	ancient	Israelite	tribes	under	the	leadership	
of	Joshua,	were	crossing	the	Jordan	to	an	era	of	independence	and	national	settlement.	
[…]	While	 the	baptism	has	 little	 to	no	significance	 in	 Judaism	and	the	kibbutz	members	
are mostly secular, its antiquity establishes a line of continuity between 1st-century	Jews	
like	 John	the	Baptist	and	Jesus	and	the	current	 Jewish	 inhabitants	of	the	State	of	 Israel”	
(Havrelock	2011:	277).
Thus while the three baptism sites present themselves as religious sites that focus on 
biblical	history	and	offer	a	space	 for	spiritual	 reflection,	each	also	represents	particular	
political, nationalist and economic interests, while at the same time glossing over the 
profound changes to the holy river itself. 
Pilgrims in the 21st century
Despite	the	environmental	degradation	and	changes	to	the	river,	the	Jordan	continues	to	
play an important role as a pilgrimage site, with nearly one million pilgrims a year visiting 
the three baptism sites.13 
Pilgrims	 perform	 baptism	 in	 the	 Jordan	 River	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons:	 some	 seek	
forgiveness of sins, others see it as a renewal of faith and to many it is a way of following in 
the	footsteps	of	Christ.	In	spiritual	terms,	the	water	has	an	ambiguous	status.	On	the	one	
hand,	the	Jordan	River	is	considered	the	source	of	all	holy	water	and	remains	the	only	type	
of	water	that	does	not	need	to	be	blessed,	but	on	a	ritual	level,	baptism	in	Jordan	River	
13 	Based	on	verbal	communications	with	staff	at	the	three	baptism	sites:	Yardenit	in	Israel	receives	
500,000	visitors	annually.	Al	Maghtas/The	Baptism	Site	 in	 Jordan	received	250,000	visitors	 in	2010.	
This	figure	fell	to	120,000	in	2011,	following	a	drop	in	overall	tourism	figures	in	Jordan	as	a	result	of	
unrest	in	the	region.	Visitor	numbers	at	Qasr	al-Yehud	in	the	West	Bank	were	estimated	at	800	a	day	
in summer and 3,000 a day in winter, equivalent to a total of about 700,000 per year. According to 
media	sources	(Sherwood	2010;	Daily Telegraph	2010),	annual	visitor	numbers	in	2010	before	the	site	
was reopened were around 100,000.
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water	is	no	different	from	any	other	baptism.	Yet	to	many,	the	experience	of	immersing	in	
the	river	where	Christ	was	baptized	forms	a	very	special	experience.	Despite	the	obvious	
physical changes to the river, its water is seen as eternally and unchangeably holy, and 
awareness of the relentless environmental degradation remains low, both among religious 
leaders	in	the	region	and	pilgrims.	At	Al	Maghtas/The	Baptism	Site	in	Jordan	for	example,	
visitors have the option of performing baptism in specially designed pools, which contain 
desalinated, chlorinated river water. However, according to the site’s directors, the pools 
are	hardly	ever	in	use	as	90%	of	adult	visitors	choose	the	Jordan	River.	
Msgr.	 Maroun	 Lahham,	 the	 Latin	 Patriarch	 Vicar	 General	 of	 Jordan,	 appeared	
indifferent	to	the	state	of	the	river,	considering	its	physicality	to	be	almost	irrelevant.	He	
affirmed	that	the	ritual	of	baptism	in	the	Jordan	River	is	a	spiritual	act:	“There	is	a	distinction	
between the physical state of the water and the sacred realm. From a religious perspective 
it does not matter whether the water is dense or light, clear or cloudy, polluted or not 
polluted. This does not touch upon the aspect of faith. […] Pollution is a Western concern, 
it	is	Cartesian.	Descartes’	influence	stopped	on	the	northern	shores	of	the	Mediterranean.”
Thus	for	many	Christian	believers	who	visit	the	Jordan	River,	the	physical	and	spiritual	
realms	continue	to	exist	separately,	allowing	the	image	of	the	holy	Jordan	River	to	persist	
independently	 of	 the	 altered	 physical	 river.	 An	 official	 at	 the	 Al	 Maghtas/Baptism	 Site	
in	 Jordan	 said	 that	 the	 river’s	holy	qualities	 are	unchangeable.	 “We	don’t	 like	 this	word	
‘pollution’.	[…]	The	water	quality	has	been	impaired	by	return	flow	of	fertilizer,	pesticides	
and	untreated	sewage	water.	[…]	There	is	also	inflow	of	saline	water	which	Israel	diverts	
from the saline springs in the Galilee, treated wastewater from Bet Shean, and in the winter 
also	water	from	the	side	wadis	and	the	Zarqa	River	in	Jordan.	All	this	does	not	affect	the	
spiritual	quality	of	the	river	though:	the	Jordan	is	the	Jordan.	It	is	a	holy	river.”
 Most	 religious	 tourists	who	visit	one	of	 the	baptism	sites	as	part	of	a	whistle-stop	
tour	of	the	Jordan	Valley	or	the	biblical	sites	in	the	Galilee	have	little	time	to	reflect	on	the	
state	of	the	river.	Rose	Horton	of	the	Touched	by	Grace	Ministries,	who	conducts	baptisms	
at the Yardenit Baptism Site in Israel, said that while she tries to raise awareness of the 
state	 of	 the	 Jordan	River,	most	 people	 have	 other	 priorities.	 “They’re	 coming	 for	 Jesus,	
not	because	there’s	water	issues	in	the	Middle	East.	Guides	may	mention	it,	but	with	the	
overload of information that people get during their visit to Israel, how much of this will 
they	remember?”	
reviving the Jordan river
Despite	 the	 continued	 zero-sum	 struggle	 for	 the	 river’s	 water,	 efforts	 are	 being	made	
to	 revive	 the	 Jordan	 River.	 Friends	 of	 the	 Earth	Middle	 East	 (FoEME)	 has	 developed	 a	
comprehensive	rehabilitation	plan	for	the	Lower	Jordan	River	based	on	extensive	multi-
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sectoral	 research	 in	 the	 three	 riparian	 countries,	 Israel,	 Jordan	and	Palestine.	 The	plan	
outlines	concrete	steps	to	remove	pollutants	from	the	river,	return	fresh	water	flow	to	it	
and	ensure	Palestinian	rights	to	a	share	of	the	river’s	water	are	fulfilled.	It	highlights	the	
crucial importance of cross-border cooperation and of treating the river basin as a single 
interconnected ecosystem that transcends political boundaries and disputes. 
Partly	as	a	result	of	FoEMe’s	advocacy	efforts,	Israel	started	releasing	1,000	m3/hour 
of	 fresh	water	 from	 the	 Alumot	Dam	 into	 the	 Lower	 Jordan	 River	 in	May	 2013,	with	 a	
commitment	to	increase	this	amount	to	30	MCM/yr.	The	Israeli	Ministry	of	Environment	
has	also	outlined	a	master	plan	for	the	upper	part	of	 the	Lower	 Jordan	River	up	to	the	
Bezeq	Stream,	 the	border	with	 the	Palestinian	West	Bank.	 In	addition,	 the	operation	of	
a	new	sewage	treatment	plant	near	the	Alumot	Dam	by	2015	will	remove	sewage	from	
the	river	(Udasin	2013).	If	Jordanian	and	Palestinian	plans	to	build	wastewater	treatments	
plants	in	their	part	of	the	watershed	are	realized,	“half	a	century	of	using	the	Jordan	as	a	
sewage	canal	can	now	be	brought	to	an	end”	(FoEME	2013).	
However,	as	FoEME	points	out,	the	removal	of	the	various	effluents	discharged	by	Israel,	
Jordan	and	Palestine	could	cause	the	drying	up	of	 the	river.	The	organization	therefore	
recommends	that	400-600	MCM/yr	of	fresh	water	be	returned	to	the	river	and	that	the	
river	 be	 allowed	 to	 flood	once	 a	 year	 in	 order	 to	maintain	 a	 healthy	 ecosystem.	While	
critics argue that none of the riparians are willing or able to give up their acquired share 
of	the	river,	FoEME	says	it	has	identified	over	1	BCM	of	water	that	can	be	saved	in	Israel,	
Jordan	and	Syria.	The	organization	is	advocating	for	the	establishment	of	an	international	
commission	to	manage	the	Lower	Jordan	River	basin	and	is	currently	developing	a	cross-
border	master	plan.	It	is	also	working	towards	the	creation	of	a	transboundary	ecological	
peace	park	on	the	border	between	Israel	and	Jordan.	
FoEME’s	broad-ranging	Jordan	River	Rehabilitation	Project	also	seeks	to	engage	and	
involve	Christian,	Jewish	and	Muslim	religious	leaders	both	in	the	region	and	internationally	
in	an	effort	 to	 raise	awareness	of	 the	 importance	of	preserving	 the	 Jordan	River	Valley	
as a site of shared religious and cultural-historical heritage. In November 2013, the 
organization	published	a	series	of	Faith-Based	Toolkits	(Christian,	Jewish,	Muslim),	which	
religious leaders are encouraged to use in their sermons and activities to engage faith 
communities	 in	 the	 region	 and	 beyond.	 Christian,	 Jewish	 and	Muslim	 religious	 leaders	
from	 Israel,	 Jordan	 and	 Palestine	 also	 gathered	 at	 a	 regional	 conference	 on	 the	 Dead	
Sea	in	Jordan	in	November	2013,	where	they	endorsed	the	Covenant	for	the	Jordan	River	
drawn	up	by	FoEME.	The	document	calls	upon	regional	governments	to	work	towards	the	
rehabilitation	of	the	Lower	Jordan	Valley,	which	“must	be	counted	as	part	of	the	heritage	
of	humankind”	(FoEME	2013).
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ConCLuSIon
Just	as	in	the	time	of	Commander	Lynch	when	the	image	of	the	“mighty	Jordan”	dominated	
the reality of a much smaller, irregular river, today in the religious realm the river’s holiness 
continues to overshadow the reality of pollution and degradation. In addition, the river’s 
ongoing	inaccessibility	continuously	abstracts	it	and	makes	it	easy	to	focus	on	the	concept	
of	the	Jordan	River	as	a	source	of	holy	water,	while	ignoring	the	reality	of	its	rapid	demise.	
Moreover,	 the	 unsolvable	 regional	 conflict	 continues	 to	 dominate	 other	 development	
efforts	in	the	region,	so	that	tackling	environmental	issues	is	often	made	to	appear	futile	
and irrelevant, and is in any case rarely a priority for the respective governments. Yet 
against	all	odds,	the	first	steps	towards	reviving	the	Lower	Jordan	River	have	been	taken.	
And	while	the	Jordan	River	will	never	return	to	its	natural	state,	it	could	again	becoming	a	
living river and a carrier of holy water that is not only worshipped in a religious context but 
also	revered	and	respected	as	the	key	to	life	and	livelihood	in	this	arid	region.
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ConCLuSIon
According to the 19th-century	French	novelist	Pierre	Loti,	the	Moors	called	it	Bled-El-Ateuch, 
the	land	of	thirst:	they	described	the	Moroccan	Sahara	as	a	land	of	never-ending	desolation,	
a	great	sea	without	water	(Loti	1896:	12).	But	the	local	nomad	tribes	knew	how	to	live	in	
these	arid	 lands	and	were	known	to	have	a	sixth	sense	 for	water.	 Just	as	seafarers	are	
said to be able to smell the approach of land, desert dwellers could sense the proximity of 
water. In a paradoxical way, they had lived with absence for so long that it had become an 
integral part of their life, and the search for water had become instinctive. There are even 
several accounts of desert caravans that were led by blind guides who, according to an 
account	by	a	British	explorer	who	travelled	through	Libya’s	Great	Sand	Sea	in	1939,	knew	
“by	smelling	 the	earth	where	the	springs	 lay	and	are	never	known	to	mistake	the	spot”	
(Bovill	1958:	93	n.4).	Leo	Africanus,	who	travelled	with	a	caravan	between	Morocco	and	the	
Sudan in the 16th century, also wrote that when his caravan lost its way, it was saved by a 
blind	guide	who	“riding	foremost	on	his	camel,	commanded	some	sand	to	be	given	to	him	
at	every	mile’s	end	by	the	smell	whereof	he	declared	the	situation	of	the	place”	(Ibid.:		93).
Through	 history,	 the	 population	 of	 the	 MENA	 region	 has	 lived	 with	 conditions	 of	
natural water scarcity, developing sophisticated water supply and irrigation systems to 
cope with the harsh environment. Scarcity did not only drive technological innovation, but 
also	elicited	a	unique	reverence	for	water,	as	reflected	in	the	region’s	three	main	religions	
–	 Christianity,	 Islam	 and	 Judaism	 –	 which	 venerate	 water	 as	 the	 primary	 element	 and	
the	source	of	all	life	on	earth	(see	Chap.	5	and	6).	Knowing	the	real	meaning	of	scarcity,	
communities	in	the	MENA	valued	water	in	a	special	way,	an	appreciation	that	was	reflected	
in urban and architectural design, art and literature, and social structures. 
Today	much	of	the	knowledge	about	water	and	the	special	sensibility	towards	its	value	
have been lost, and the fragile balance between man and water that was maintained for 
centuries has been disrupted. In this region where water is naturally scarce, resources 
have been severely overstretched and manmade scarcity has become a widespread 
problem.	The	MENA	region	 is	 today	 the	most	water-scarce	 region	 in	 the	world	with	an	
average annual per capita water availability of 1,100 m3	in	2007	–	a	figure	that	is	projected	
to	drop	just	above	the	level	of	absolute	scarcity	of	500	m3	by	2050	(World	Bank	2007).	
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As	discussed	in	Chapters	2-4	and	6	of	this	dissertation,	the	region’s	water	landscapes,	
from	Damascus’s	Ghuta	Oasis	 to	the	 Jordan	River	Valley,	have	been	transformed	 in	the	
space of a few decades: springs have dried up, irrigation systems have disappeared and 
rivers have been turned into sewage dumps. As discussed in Chapter 1, the factors that 
have	 led	 to	 this	 demise	 –	 exponential	 population	 growth;	 technological	 advances;	 the	
massive expansion of irrigated agriculture and the sustained drive towards food self-
sufficiency;	and	increased	demand	due	to	higher	living	standards	–	have	also	transformed	
man’s	relationship	to	water,	severing	an	invisible	link	that	had	existed	for	centuries	between	
man and the water he used. 
While the technological advances, which enabled the construction of dams and other 
large-scale water infrastructure, have engendered far-reaching progress and improved 
living	standards	throughout	the	region,	they	have	also	created	a	false	sense	of	confidence	
in the power of technology to turn deserts into greenery. In the process, the sustainable 
limits of the region’s land and water resources have disappeared from sight. Instead of 
recognizing	these	limits	and	reining	in	the	growing	demand,	decision	makers	and	leaders	
in	MENA	countries	have	driven	further	exploitation	of	water	resources	in	the	belief	that	
“not	a	single	drop	of	water	[should	be	allowed]	to	flow	to	the	sea”	(Swearingen	1988:	38).	
Water has become a symbol of power, and control over water has come to embody the 
nation	state’s	authority	and	dominance	–	over	nature	but	also	over	neighbouring	countries.	
Among	others,	this	is	exemplified	in	projects	such	as	Egypt’s	Aswan	Dam,	which	President	
Gamal	 Abdel	Nasser	 described	 as	 a	 “double	monument,	 immortalising	 the	 […]	 forceful	
emancipation	of	Arab	Nationalism”	(Zaki	1961:	3),	Libya’s	Great	Manmade	River,	which	in	
the	words	of	the	late	Colonel	Muammar	Ghaddafi	would	make	water	available	wherever	it	
was	needed,	and	Turkey’s	ambitious	Southeastern	Anatolia	Project,	which	has	drastically	
altered	the	flow	of	the	Euphrates	and	Tigris	Rivers	in	downstream	Syria	and	Iraq.	These	
political and technological myths create the illusion of power and plenty. Constructed 
upon age-old traditions and beliefs, but also on the convincing rhetoric and imagery of 
modern-day politicians and engineers, these myths conceal the reality of growing water 
scarcity, which is transforming landscapes and destroying ecosystems and livelihoods. 
Despite	far-reaching	environmental	changes,	the	disconnect	between	man	and	water	
persists. In general, there is little sense of individual responsibility with regards to the 
management of water resources in particular, and the environment in general. This can 
partly	be	explained	by	the	authoritarian	nature	of	governments	in	many	MENA	countries,	
which	until	2011	–	and	still	today	in	many	cases	–	exerted	tight	control	over	society	and	
developed highly centralized water management structures. This leaves citizens with a 
sense	 of	 powerlessness	 and	 engenders	 passivity	 and	 indifference	 towards	 the	 natural	
environment and public spaces. Even when people are aware that current levels of 
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water consumption are not sustainable, they seldom feel any personal responsibility 
for the situation or any compulsion to change their behaviour patterns; in their eyes 
this responsibility lies with God or the government and there is no sense of collective 
responsibility	towards	future	generations	to	preserve	water.	Thus	the	MENA	region	has	
strayed far from the concept that man is the guardian and steward of the Earth’s resources 
and	that	encourages	Jewish,	Christian	and	Muslim	believers	to	use	all	of	nature’s	resources	
with	consideration.	Despite	the	rigid	frameworks	that	govern	water	management	in	many	
MENA	countries,	legislation	is	weak	and	corruption	is	rife.	Water	has	become	a	tragedy	of	
the	commons,	a	 free-for-all	 to	be	avidly	and	unthinkingly	abstracted	and	exploited	until	
exhaustion	of	the	resource.	Lack	of	education	and	understanding	of	environmental	and	
water issues, over-reliance on God, the government and the power of technology, as well 
as	simple	indifference	have	cost	the	region	and	its	environment	dearly.	
***
Scientists	and	water	experts	in	the	region	affirm	that	the	technical	and	economic	solutions	
to	 the	MENA	water	crisis	are	 readily	available	and	 that	 it	 is	a	 lack	of	political	will	which	
prevents the implementation of much-needed change in the domain of water. Indeed, 
despite	 the	 fact	 that	cities	such	as	Amman	and	Damascus	 ran	out	of	water	more	 than	
10 years ago, that rivers and springs throughout the region are drying up and that 
groundwater levels are rapidly dropping, water generally remains a low priority on the 
political	agenda	–	except	when	 it	comes	to	the	expansion	of	 irrigated	surface	area	and	
further over-exploitation of the resource. This was true already before 2011, but since the 
start	of	the	“Arab	Spring”	(and	despite	feeble	claims	by	some	observers	that	the	various	
revolutions will spur a movement towards greater transparency and accountability in the 
domain	of	water),	it	seems	certain	that	water,	its	sound	management	and	future	uses	will	
drop	even	 further	down	 the	political	agenda.	 In	countries	 like	Egypt,	 Libya,	Tunisia	and	
Yemen,	key	issues	such	as	democracy,	freedom	of	expression,	human	rights	and	greater	
gender equality will continue to dominate the public debate for the coming years. In Syria, 
there	is	no	end	in	sight	to	the	conflict	in	March	2014,	and	the	Assad	regime	is	now	even	
using	water	–	or	rather,	the	contamination	and	withholding	of	freshwater	supplies	–	as	a	
weapon	against	populations	in	rebel-held	areas	(Reuters	2013;	UNGA	2014).	
In	general,	and	as	so	often	 in	 the	MENA	region,	many	 issues	are	more	urgent	and	
real than water and looming scarcity. Given that water scarcity is not conspicuous on an 
everyday	basis	in	many	places,	while	violence,	poverty,	unemployment	and	injustice	are,	
this	 is	perhaps	 true.	 In	 the	 long	 term,	however,	 a	 clean	and	sufficient	water	 supply	 for	
the region’s growing population is of fundamental importance. It is necessary for human 
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life, but also for the preservation of the region’s fragile ecosystems, which in turn support 
economic development and provide livelihoods to millions of people. As argued in Chapters 
3	and	4	of	this	dissertation,	the	Syrian	government’s	long-term	mismanagement	of	land	
and	water	 resources	 formed	 one	 of	 the	 triggers	 of	 the	 uprising	 that	 started	 in	March	
2011. The experience of the last 60 years in Syria shows that disregarding the balance of 
ecosystems and exploiting natural resources beyond their sustainable limit comes at a 
high cost. 
Water	and	its	sound	management	effectively	form	one	of	the	cornerstones	of	a	healthy	
economy. But water is also inextricably enmeshed in a complex web of political, economic, 
socio-historic	and	environmental	factors	that	influence	all	aspects	of	its	use	and	worth.	It	
is	therefore	impossible	to	address	the	future	of	water	in	the	MENA	region	without	taking	
these factors into consideration. Importantly, and as mentioned above, a wide variety of 
technical and political solutions is available. But this alone will not be enough to develop a 
new approach to water in this increasingly arid region: a new sensibility is needed. While 
it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation	to	define	such	an	approach,	it	should	embrace	
a broad, long-term view of the region’s water resources, designing a structure that will 
provide the region with a sustainable supply of water in 50 and 100 years,1 but also draw 
on	the	region’s	long	–	and	too	often	forgotten	–	history	of	sustainable	water	management.	
At	the	same	time,	any	new	approach	should	also	scale	down	to	the	local	level	and	take	in	
the	socio-cultural	and	environmental	specificities	of	a	place	before	implementing	any	far-
reaching	change.	By	balancing	scientific	knowledge	and	technological	capacity	with	socio-
cultural considerations and the ability to adapt to local conditions, a more pliable, subtle 
approach	will	emerge,	 laying	the	groundwork	 for	 the	development	of	sustainable	water	
management	systems	in	the	MENA	region.	
 
1 	 In	a	 textbook	example	of	 short-term	vision,	Syria’s	 former	minister	of	 irrigation,	Nader	al-Bunni,	
when	asked	about	the	status	of	Syria’s	water	resources	in	2050,	said:	“We’ll	reach	2035.	If	you	ask	me	
about	2050,	I	will	say	let	me	rest	peacefully	in	my	grave	and	leave	some	work	for	our	children	to	finish”	
(De	Châtel	2010).
Conclusion
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SaMEnVaTTIng
Dit	proefschrift	is	het	resultaat	van	een	reeds	14	jaar	durende	fascinatie	voor	water	in	het	
Midden-Oosten	en	Noord	Afrika	(MENA).	Gedurende	deze	periode	heb	ik	veel	gereisd	in	
de	regio,	van	Iran	tot	Marokko	en	van	Turkije	tot	Soedan,	en	heb	ik	vier	jaar	in	de	Syrische	
hoofdstad	Damascus	gewoond.	Ik	was	werkzaam	als	journalist,	schrijver	en	redacteur,	en	
deed	daarnaast	onderzoek	voor	een	boek	over	de	geschiedenis,	cultuur	en	politiek	van	
water	in	de	MENA	regio.	
De	 hoofdstukken	 van	 dit	 cumulatieve	 proefschrift	 zijn	 een	 weerspiegeling	 van	 die	
periode:	 drie	 hoofdstukken	 zijn	 gewijd	 aan	 verschillende	 aspecten	 van	waterbeheer	 in	
Syrië	en	drie	hoofdstukken	behelzen	een	groter	geografisch	gebied	in	de	MENA	regio.	Alle	
hoofdstukken	zijn	gebaseerd	op	empirisch	en	kwalitatief	onderzoek	en	 interviews	die	 ik	
vanaf	2001	in	de	MENA	regio	heb	uitgevoerd.	Alle	hoofdstukken	zijn	tussen	2007	en	2014	
afzonderlijk	gepubliceerd	in	wetenschappelijke	tijdschriften	en	publicaties.	
De	keuze	om	mij	te	richten	op	waterkwesties	 in	de	MENA	regio	werd	bepaald	door	
twee	extremen.	De	regio	geldt	als	een	van	de	meest	waterarme	regio’s	ter	wereld,	terwijl	
het	 tegelijkertijd	een	van	de	hoogste	bevolkingsgroeicijfers	kent.	Mijn	keuze	was	echter	
ook	 ingegeven	 door	 een	 dieper	 verlangen	 om	 beter	 inzicht	 te	 krijgen	 in	 de	 algemene	
geschiedenis	 en	 cultuur	 van	 de	 regio.	 Want	 naast	 de	 rol	 van	 water	 als	 noodzakelijke	
voorwaarde	 voor	 leven	 en	 overleven,	 zegt	 de	manier	waarop	water	wordt	 gebruikt	 en	
hoe	erover	wordt	gedacht	ook	veel	over	culturele,	 religieuze,	economische	en	politieke	
waarden	in	een	maatschappij.
De	 MENA	 regio	 kent	 van	 nature	 waterschaarste,	 droogte	 en	 sterke	 klimaat-
schommelingen.	 De	 bevolkingsgroepen	 in	 de	 regio	 pasten	 zich	 aan	 deze	 extreme	
omstandigheden aan door complexe systemen van waterwinning, wateropslag, en 
waterdistributie	 te	 ontwikkelen.	Het	 is	 niet	 toevallig	 dat	 de	 eerste	 irrigatiesystemen	 ter	
wereld	 in	 deze	 regio,	 in	 het	 gebied	 tussen	 de	 Eufraat	 en	 Tigris,	 ontwikkeld	 zijn.	 Hier	
bedwongen	de	Soemeriërs	in	het	vijfde	millennium	v.Chr.	de	onstuimige	wateren	van	de	
twee	rivieren,	waarbij	zij	water	via	kanalen	omleidden	naar	de	akkers	om	granen,	veevoer	
en	 dadelpalmen	 te	 verbouwen.	 Vanaf	 het	 derde	 millennium	 v.Chr.	 begonnen	 ook	 de	
oude	 Egyptenaren	 de	wateren	 van	 de	Nijl	 te	 benutten	 door	 irrigatiekanalen	 te	 graven	
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en	de	omliggende	woestijn	 te	 irrigeren.	Naast	deze	technologieën	van	waterwinning	en	
waterdistributie	 werden	 er	 ook	 complexe	 en	 gedetailleerde	 waterbeheersystemen	 en	
juridische	kaders	ontwikkeld	om	rechtvaardige	toewijzing	te	bevorderen.	Zo	ontwikkelden	
de	bevolkingen	van	de	Marokkaanse	Sahara	tot	de	Nijlvallei	en	van	de	Damasceense	Ghuta-
oase	tot	de	Mesopotamische	vlakten	door	de	eeuwen	heen	hun	eigen	waterbeschavingen.	
Op	praktisch	niveau	pasten	zij	zich	aan	de	extreme	weersomstandigheden,	onregelmatige	
regenval,	 droogtes	 en	 overstromingen	 aan	 door	 verfijnde	 waterbeheerssystemen	 en	
technologieën	 te	ontwikkelen.	Ook	op	 religieus,	 cultureel	 en	maatschappelijk	 vlak	werd	
water	een	kernsymbool,	getuige	de	vele	verwijzingen	naar	water	in	architectuur,	literatuur,	
religie en sociale structuren.
In	de	afgelopen	eeuw	hebben	ingrijpende	demografische,	technologische	en	politieke	
veranderingen in de regio de fragiele ecologische balans, die millennia lang in stand 
werd	gehouden,	ontwricht.	De	MENA	regio	 is	daardoor	op	dit	moment	het	gebied	met	
de	grootste	waterschaarste	ter	wereld.	De	regionale	waterbeschikbaarheid	per	persoon	
is	tussen	1950	en	2007	gedaald	van	4.000	kubieke	meter	naar	1.100	kubieke	meter	per	
jaar	in	2007.	Naar	verwachting	zal	dit	getal	tegen	2050	nog	verder	dalen	tot	550	kubieke	
meter.	Ter	vergelijking:	het	wereldwijde	gemiddelde	ligt	op	8.900	kubieke	meter	per	jaar	
en	 dit	 zal	 in	 2050	 rond	de	 6.000	 kubieke	meter	 liggen.	Daaraan	 is	 in	 de	 eerste	 plaats	
de	 sterke	 bevolkingsgroei	 debet.	 De	 bevolking	 van	 de	 MENA	 regio	 is	 tussen	 1950	 en	
2010	bijna	vervijfvoudigd,	van	82.2	miljoen	naar	384.1	miljoen.	Naar	verwachting	zal	dit	
aantal	verder	toenemen	tot	524	miljoen	in	2030.	Van	belang	is	ook	de	politieke	context	
van de regio die in de 20ste	eeuw	ingrijpende	veranderdingen	onderging:	de	ineenstorting	
van	 het	Ottomaanse	 Rijk,	 het	 ontstaan	 van	 de	 staat	 Israël,	 het	 einde	 van	 de	 koloniale	
overheersing	en	de	opkomst	 van	nieuwe	natiestaten.	Deze	 jonge	onafhankelijke	staten	
begonnen	 vanaf	 de	 jaren	 vijftig	 aan	 ambitieuze	 nationale	 waterontwikkelingsprojecten	
om de watervoorziening te vergroten en het areaal van geïrrigeerde gebieden uit te 
breiden.	Nieuwe	technologische	ontwikkelingen	boden	hen	daarvoor	de	mogelijkheden.	
Geïnspireerd	door	Russische	en	Amerikaanse	projecten	om	de	natuur	te	bedwingen	en	
woestijnen	tot	bloei	te	brengen,	omarmden	overheden	in	de	verschillende	MENA	landen	
vol	enthousiasme	de	“hydraulische	missie”,	waarbij	technologische	hoogstandjes	zoals	de	
bouw	van	hoge	dammen	en	waterkrachtcentrales	en	het	boren	van	putten	een	belangrijke	
rol speelden. 
Als	gevolg	van	deze	technologische	ontwikkelingen	veranderde	het	stromingsstelsel	
van	rivieren	ingrijpend	en	daalde	de	waterspiegel	in	de	gehele	regio	scherp.	Geen	regio	
ter	wereld	kent	meer	dammen	dan	de	rivieren	van	de	MENA	regio	in	verhouding	tot	de	
beschikbare	 hoeveelheid	 water.	 Zo	 is	 de	 Jordaan	 niet	 alleen	 zwaar	 vervuild,	maar	 ook	
gekrompen	tot	2	procent	van	zijn	historische	debiet.	Een	van	de	grootste	karstbronnen	
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ter	wereld,	de	Ras	al	Ain	bron	aan	de	Syrisch-Turkse	grens,	is	in	2001	volledig	uitgedroogd	
door het overpompen van water uit de 6.000 putten die in de afgelopen decennia aan 
beide	 kanten	 van	 de	 grens	 zijn	 geboord.	 Ondanks	 deze	 dramatische	 afname	 van	 de	
waterbeschikbaarheid	 en	 de	 drastische	 transformatie	 van	 landschappen	 in	 de	 gehele	
MENA	regio	in	de	afgelopen	eeuw,	zijn	slechts	weinigen	zich	bewust	van	de	ernst	van	de	
watercrisis.	Er	lijkt	een	kloof	te	bestaan	tussen	de	traditionele	voorstellingen,	beelden	en	
idealen van water en waterlandschappen en de realiteit van toenemende waterschaarste. 
Er	 zijn	 meerdere	 redenen	 voor	 dit	 gebrek	 aan	 bewustzijn.	 Zo	 verhullen	 verschillende	
lagen	 van	 cultureel-religieuze,	 politieke	 en	 technologische	 percepties	 de	 toenemende	
plaatselijke	waterschaarste.	De	hoofdstukken	van	dit	proefschrift	gaan	 in	op	een	aantal	
aspecten van deze discrepantie.
overzicht van de hoofdstukken
Het	eerste	hoofdstuk,	‘Perceptions	of	Water	in	the	Middle	East:	The	Role	of	Religion,	Politics	
and	Technology	in	Concealing	the	Growing	Water	Scarcity’,	onderzoekt	waarom	de	realiteit	
van	 toenemende	waterschaarste	 in	 de	MENA	 regio	 nog	 steeds	 voor	 velen	onzichtbaar	
blijft	en	identificeert	een	aantal	religieuze,	politieke	en	technologische	percepties	die	de	
waterschaarste	verhullen.	 In	het	hoofdstuk	wordt	betoogd	dat	de	mythe	van	overvloed	
onder	 andere	 wordt	 versterkt	 door	 de	 aanhoudende	 subsidiëring	 van	water	 en	 steun	
aan	 de	 landbouw,	 maar	 ook	 door	 het	 valse	 gevoel	 van	 zekerheid	 dat	 grootschalige	
infrastructuurprojecten	met	zich	meebrengt.	Bovendien	wordt	de	realiteit	van	toenemende	
waterschaarste verhuld door mythes, die op eeuwenoude tradities en geloofsovertuigingen 
rusten,	maar	 ook	op	de	 suggestieve	 retoriek	 en	beeldtaal	 van	hedendaagse	politici	 en	
ingenieurs.	Het	hoofdstuk	biedt	een	structureel	kader	voor	het	proefschrift	en	introduceert	
kernthema’s	die	nader	worden	uitgewerkt	in	latere	hoofdstukken.	
Hoofdstuk	2,	 ‘Damascus:	The	Death	of	the	Garden	of	Eden’,	 illustreert	en	ontwikkelt	
de	 thema’s	 die	 in	 Hoofdstuk	 1	 zijn	 geïntroduceerd	 met	 een	 historisch	 overzicht	 van	
waterbeheer	 in	de	Syrische	hoofdstad	Damascus	van	pre-Romeinse	 tijden	 tot	vandaag.	
Hierbij	wordt	het	contrast	geschetst	tussen	het	poëtische	historische	beeld	van	Damascus	
als	 een	 weelderige	 oase	 in	 de	 woestijn	 en	 de	 snelle	 uitputting	 van	 waterbronnen	 en	
vernietiging	van	waterlandschappen	in	en	rondom	de	stad	in	de	afgelopen	60	jaar.	
Hoofdstuk	 3,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Drought	 and	 Climate	 Change	 in	 the	 Syrian	 Uprising:	
Untangling	 the	 Triggers	 of	 the	 Revolution’,	 onderzoekt	 de	 politieke	 percepties	 rond	
waterschaarste	 in	 Syrië.	 Het	 hoofdstuk	 concentreert	 zich	 met	 name	 op	 de	 extreme	
droogte	tussen	2006	en	2010,	die	meer	dan	1.3	miljoen	mensen	in	het	noordoosten	van	
het	land	heeft	getroffen	en	heeft	geleid	tot	een	dramatische	mislukking	van	de	oogst,	de	
decimering van de veestapel en de migratie van naar schatting 65.000 families naar de 
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grote	steden.	Recente	analyses	van	de	oorzaken	van	het	huidige	conflict	verwijzen	vaak	
naar	de	droogte	van	2006-10	en	de	invloed	van	klimaatverandering.	Nadere	analyse	van	
de	bredere	economische	en	historische	context	van	het	huidige	conflict	 in	Syrië	maakt	
duidelijk	dat	het	verband	tussen	droogte	en	klimaatverandering	enerzijds	en	de	opstand	
anderzijds	zwak	is	en	het	bovendien	de	aandacht	afleidt	van	de	problemen	die	de	Syrische	
watersector	 daadwerkelijk	 en	 aantoonbaar	 teisteren.	 Een	 dergelijke	 sterke	 nadruk	 op	
externe	factoren	als	droogte	en	klimaatverandering	zou	daarbij	maar	al	te	eenvoudig	een	
excuus	kunnen	vormen	voor	het	uitblijven	van	de	al	jaren	noodzakelijke	hervormingen	en	
vernieuwingen	op	nationaal	 vlak.	Het	hoofdstuk	onderzoekt	de	discrepantie	 tussen	het	
overheidsbeeld	–	van	Syrië	als	een	van	nature	waterschaars	land	met	een	actieve	inzet	om	
zijn	watersector	te	moderniseren	–	en	de	realiteit	van	een	inefficiënt,	corrupt	en	verstard	
waterbeleidsysteem	dat	grootschalige	overexploitatie	van	natuurlijke	hulpbronnen	heeft	
bevorderd.	Wellicht	dat	klimaatverandering	tot	frequentere	en	hevigere	droogtes	in	Syrië	
zal	 leiden,	maar	 het	 onvermogen	 om	watergebruik	 te	 rationaliseren	 en	 de	 gebrekkige	
handhaving	van	wetgeving	met	betrekking	tot	water	vormen	een	veel	grotere	bedreiging	
voor	de	natuurlijke	rijkdommen	van	het	land.	
Hoofdstuk	4,	 ‘Watching	Landscapes	Disappear:	Local	Perspectives	on	the	 Impact	of	
Long-term	Water	Mismanagement	in	Syria’,	gaat	verder	in	op	de	discrepantie	tussen	de	
overheidsretoriek	en	de	dagelijkse	werkelijkheid	van	het	leven	op	het	Syrische	platteland.	
Het	 hoofdstuk	 beschrijft	 op	 basis	 van	 persoonlijke	 verhalen	 van	 Syriërs	 door	 het	 hele	
land	in	de	periode	2006-10	hoe	de	grenzen	van	de	natuurlijke	hulpbronnen	van	het	land	
werden	genegeerd	door	de	fixatie	van	de	Syrische	regering	op	voedselzekerheid	en	het	
daarmee	samenhangende	streven	om	het	geïrrigeerde	areaal	te	vergroten.	Dit	leidde	tot	
destabilisatie	 van	 kwetsbare	 ecosystemen,	 uitputting	 en	 vervuiling	 van	watervoorraden	
en	verzilting	en	verwoestijning	van	steppelanden.	De	verhalen	van	landbouwers	door	het	
hele	land	tonen	niet	alleen	de	omvang	van	de	milieuschade	die	in	de	afgelopen	60	jaar	is	
aangericht,	maar	ook	de	onvoorstelbare	vaart	waarmee	watervoorraden	en	landschappen	
zijn	vernietigd.	
Hoofdstukken	 2-4	 maken	 aannemelijk	 dat	 de	 aanhoudende	 veronachtzaming	 van	
de	grenzen	aan	de	exploitatie	van	natuurlijke	hulpbronnen	 in	Syrië	en	de	 toenemende	
kloof	 tussen	 de	 overheidsperceptie	 aan	 de	 ene	 kant	 en	 de	 toenemende	 armoede	
en	 het	 ontzeggen	 van	 burgerrechten	 aan	 de	 andere	 kant	 uiteindelijk	 het	 land	 hebben	
gedestabiliseerd en de eerste demonstraties tegen de regering in maart 2011 hebben 
aangewakkerd.	Sindsdien	 is	het	 land	 fysiek,	economisch	en	sociaal	verwoest:	meer	dan	
150.000	mensen	zijn	omgekomen,	meer	dan	een	derde	van	de	bevolking	 is	ontheemd	
en	de	economie	is	geruïneerd.	Er	is	voorlopig	geen	einde	in	zicht	voor	het	conflict	en	er	
is	geen	indicatie	te	geven	over	de	toekomst	van	Syrië.	Wel	is	duidelijk	dat	het	van	cruciaal	
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belang	is	bij	een	toekomstig	reconstructieproces	de	nadruk	te	leggen	op	de	noodzaak	van	
een	duurzaam	en	doelmatig	systeem	voor	het	beheer	van	natuurlijke	hulpbronnen.	De	
ervaring	van	de	afgelopen	60	jaar	toont	aan	dat	het	negeren	van	de	ecologische	balans	en	
de	overexploitatie	van	natuurlijke	hulpbronnen	een	hoge	prijs	kent.	
Hoofdstuk	 5,	 ‘Bathing	 in	 Divine	 Waters:	 Water	 and	 Purity	 in	 Judaism	 and	 Islam’	
onderzoekt	de	rol	van	water	in	het	jodendom	en	de	islam,	zowel	in	de	geschriften	als	in	de	
zuiveringsrituelen.	Het	hoofdstuk	beschrijft	specifiek	de	spirituele	kenmerken	die	worden	
toegeschreven aan water en analyseert de concepten rein/onrein in rituele zin en schoon/
vuil	in	strikt	fysieke	zin.	Het	gaat	ook	in	op	de	historische	ontwikkeling	van	de	gebruiken	
in verschillende culturele contexten, en laat zien hoe het veelal vage onderscheid tussen 
rituele	en	hygiënische	reinheid	vaak	miskend	werd,	en	nog	steeds	miskend	wordt.	
Hoofdstuk	6,	 ‘Baptism	in	the	Jordan	River:	Immersing	in	a	Contested	Transboundary	
Watercourse’,	 toont	 de	 gelaagde	 symboliek	 van	de	 Jordaan.	De	 rivier	 die	 de	 grens	 van	
het	Bijbelse	Land	Israël	vormde	en	waarin	 Jezus	Christus	door	 Johannes	werd	gedoopt,	
is	tegenwoordig	niet	alleen	een	bron	van	heilig	water,	maar	ook	een	geopolitieke	grens,	
een	omstreden	grensoverschrijdende	waterloop,	een	bedreigd	ecosysteem	en	een	strak	
gereguleerd	waterbeheerssysteem.	Het	hoofdstuk	verkent	de	kloof	tussen	de	verregaande	
fysieke	aantasting	van	de	rivier	in	de	20ste	eeuw	en	de	ervaring	van	christelijke	pelgrims	
die	 het	water	 als	 eeuwig	 en	 onveranderlijk	 heilig	 beschouwen.	 In	 het	 hoofdstuk	wordt	
ingegaan op de evolutie van het concept van heilig water in het christendom, de historisch-
religieuze	rol	van	de	Jordaan	als	de	“prototypische	rivier	van	het	leven”	en	hedendaagse	
grensoverschrijdende	inspanningen	om	de	rivier	te	herstellen.	
Samen	belichten	Hoofdstukken	5	en	6	de	centrale	rol	van	water	in	het	christendom,	
jodendom	en	de	islam,	maar	tonen	ze	ook	de	kloof	tussen	de	geschriften,	die	het	water	
aanprijzen	als	de	bron	van	het	leven	en	als	een	heilige	rijkdom,	en	de	alledaagse	praktijk	
waarin het water wordt vervuild, verspild en ondergewaardeerd.
De	artikelen	in	dit	proefschrift	hebben	niet	tot	doel	om	oplossingen	voor	de	watercrisis	
in	de	MENA	regio	te	bieden.	Ze	vormen	eerder	een	momentopname	van	de	situatie	vóór	
2011	en	trachten	een	aantal	oorzaken	van	de	crisis	te	identificeren.	Hierbij	is	het	duidelijk	
dat	water,	ondanks	de	toenemende	regionale	schaarste,	in	veel	MENA	landen	nog	steeds	
geen	overheidsprioriteit	is	en	dat	er	bovendien	nog	steeds	een	groot	gebrek	aan	bewustzijn	
van	de	watercrisis	bestaat.	Voor	de	toekomst	van	de	regio	is	het	van	het	grootste	belang	
om	een	duurzame,	lange-termijn	strategie	van	waterbeheer	te	ontwikkelen.

Vanishing Water 
Landscapes in 
the Middle East
The Jordan River has been reduced to 2% of its historic size and is heavily polluted. 
Across Syria, rivers are shrinking, springs have dried up and the desert is spread-
ing. The water crisis in the Middle East, the most water-scarce region in the world, is 
rapidly worsening, yet decision makers appear unwilling to acknowledge its severity 
and water remains low on the political agenda. How can this gap between the reality 
of growing scarcity on the ground and the continued illusion of plenty be explained? 
 
This is one of the key questions Francesca de Châtel explores in Vanishing Water 
Landscapes in the Middle East, a study that combines extensive research on the 
ground in pre-conflict Syria and across the region with historic data to show how high 
population growth, overambitious agricultural development projects and uncontrolled 
water use over the last 60 years have irreversibly disrupted the Middle East’s fragile 
ecological balance.
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